790.5/12–754
United States Minutes of a United States-United Kingdom Meeting1
Participants:
- United States
- C—Mr. MacArthur
- FE—Mr. Sebald
- PSA—Mr. Bell
- CIA—Mr. Richard Bissell
- CIA—Mr. Frank Wisner
- United Kingdom
- Sir Robert Scott
- Mr. Michael Joy
- Mr. L. H. Mitchell
Copies of the U.S. draft informal working paper2 concerning activities that might be undertaken under the Manila Pact to combat Communist subversion were distributed to the representatives of the United Kingdom. Mr. MacArthur said that the paper indicated some of the things that might be considered within the framework of eight-power cooperation. After reading the paper, Sir Robert Scott stated he would like to begin with a note of caution—he wanted to be sure that anything undertaken with respect to this paper would not disturb some existing arrangements which he viewed as entirely satisfactory. He also pointed out that in the first sentence of the U.S. paper, reference was made to the danger of internal subversion and suggested that subversion directed from without was as great a menace. Mr. MacArthur agreed that it would be desirable to eliminate the word “internal” before subversion.
Sir Robert Scott then referred to the difficulty of sharply separating open and secret information and propaganda activities. He reviewed in a general way some of the activities that the British undertake in this respect such as regular overt information activities, providing “classified” documents to officials of other governments and completely concealed activities such as covert support of a newspaper or printing press. He also made reference to the jungle training school maintained in Malaya. He inquired of Mr. MacArthur if papers agreed upon by the Working Group were to go to the Foreign Ministers as an agreed position.
Mr. MacArthur said that they were. Sir Robert Scott raised the question of the possibility of an agreed assessment of the situation in the area on the basis of intelligence information. Mr. MacArthur stated that we were extremely sceptical of the utility of trying to reach such an agreed assessment.
Sir Robert Scott then inquired as to whether the meeting of Ministers would be followed after an appropriate interval by a meeting of people who are specialists on matters of subversion. Mr. MacArthur stated that he believed we would have no objection to such meetings, but that we had in mind the possibility of continual liaison between Embassy staff members at whatever place had been designated to carry on such activity. He said we envisaged an increase in the size of our Embassy Staff in the place that might be selected for this activity, but that we opposed too elaborate an organization. Mr. MacArthur said that eventually we might find it necessary to agree to periodic meetings on an Ad Hoc basis or to some kind of a permanent organization. Mr. Joy reiterated the previous [Page 1034] statement made by Sir Robert Scott that nothing should be permitted to upset the “present happy arrangements”.
Mr. Bissell pointed out that one of the problems which would unquestionably arise is the fact that some of the states signatory to the Manila Pact do not have adequate security service. Sir Robert Scott suggested that the development of such services might well be a subject of discussion as a possible multi-lateral project. Mr. Bissell agreed that this was a possibility.
Sir Robert Scott said that there were three particular subjects that might be given consideration in discussing the current situation: (1) Indochina; (2) other areas particularly Burma and Indonesia; (3) Overseas Chinese communities. It was agreed that the question of Overseas Chinese communities was altogether too delicate for discussion by all eight powers. Mr. MacArthur suggested that it might be desirable to seek common agreement that the situation in the Associated States was difficult and serious and that each state a party to the Manila Pact should do everything possible to help the Indochina States maintain their independence. One instance of this would be Philippine recognition. Mr. MacArthur said that we do not at this time favor a common program but feel that each party to the Treaty should act independently. He pointed out that Australia and New Zealand are prepared to make a contribution.
Sir Robert Scott stated that each state must be made cognizant of the necessity of improving their own security forces and that it was also desirable for each state to emphasize the necessity for promoting stable and efficient governments in the area. Mr. Sebald thought that the discussion of the paper under consideration would, in itself, point up the necessity for improving security forces.
With respect to arrangements for carrying out the purposes of antisubversive clauses of the Manila Pact, Mr. MacArthur said that we oppose the establishment of any group to be in permanent session which he felt would tend to dilute the impact of our recommendations. He favored periodic meetings on a high level as well as a liaison group which the British describe as something of a “Post Office”—a central clearing point for the exchange of information. Sir Robert Scott suggested that representatives of the security services of the parties to the Pact might meet some six months after the meeting of Foreign Ministers. Mr. MacArthur felt that was much too long a time and that any meeting should be held within two or three months of the meeting of Foreign Ministers.
Mr. Bissell questioned the desirability of too wide a separation between specialists in the field and political policy makers. He pointed to the need to develop a real will to improve and make full use of security services in the area. He suggested the need of political [Page 1035] pressure to assure the full use of security organizations. Mr. MacArthur agreed that political and diplomatic pressure might be needed in this respect.
Mr. MacArthur questioned the desirability of having the question of security measures to be taken in Indochina as a part of the agenda and thought that each of the parties should only agree to take such measures as they were able to individually.
Sir Robert Scott suggested that cooperation in some fields such as the Police Training School in Malaya, might make it possible at a later date to bring in non-signatories to the Manila Pact—that they might agree to participate and cooperate without making any specific commitment. He recognized, however, that the first task should be within the Treaty area and that probably the principal problem, apart from the Associated States, would be Thailand. He suggested that the Thai Government badly needed to broaden the basis of its popular support.
Sir Robert Scott said that he would consult with London and notify us when we could meet again. In answer to a question, Mr. MacArthur said that we had some thoughts of tabling this paper for the Working Group week after next (week beginning December 20).
Mr. Wisner stated that he was perturbed by the suggestion that the absence of any formal organization would be compensated for by a meeting of the directors of the security services or their representatives. He said that he felt his agency would have great difficulty in agreeing to any such meeting which would be subject to considerable publicity. He felt that if meetings of this nature could be held less openly, possibly secretly, in conjunction with other meetings, he might be able to agree to such a proposal. Mr. MacArthur suggested that such meetings might be held covertly in the same locus as any liaison group which may be set up.
Sir Robert Scott said that he hoped that he would be able to provide us with additional comments and British views within a week.