S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the
Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie)1
top secret
[Washington,] November 17, 1954.
Subject:
- FE Comments on Attached NSC Draft—”U–S. Policy Towards the Far
East”
FE recommends that the following revisions be
made in the text of the NSC draft paper
dated November 122 on “U.S. Policy Towards
the Far East”. An explanation of these recommendations is included as Tab
A.
- Paragraph 2 —Eliminate all but the first
sentence and add the following language after the first sentence: “While
there is now no reason to anticipate an early collapse of the regime nor
any means of seeing when one might occur, inherently such regimes have
elements of rigidity and instability which might produce crises or break
down unexpectedly. We should be ready to exploit any opportunities which
might occur as a result of inherent internal weaknesses.”
- Paragraph 5b—Add the words “except by joint
agreement” to the end of the first sentence.
- Paragraph 5d—In the first sentence insert the
words “or imminent threat of such attack” between the words “attack” and
“against”.
- Paragraph 6b—Insert the words “as the only
Government of China” between the words “China” and “and”.
- Paragraph 7—Insert the words “weaken, or”
between the words “to” and “retard”, and a comma after the word “of in
the first line.
- Paragraph 7a—Eliminate the last part of the
sentence, beginning with “but”, and substitute the following language:
“and deal with it only on a local basis and only in regard to strictly
limited subjects where the regime is a necessary party at
interest”.
- Paragraph 7c—Eliminate the entire paragraph and
substitute the following: “Maintain the embargo on U.S. trade with
Communist China and continue to exert our influence on other free world
countries for the maintenance of the current level of trade restrictions
against Communist China, without, however, exerting our influence in
such a manner as would be seriously divisive.”
- Paragraph 7d—Eliminate the whole paragraph and
substitute the following: “Create discontent and internal divisions
within
[Page 968]
each of the Communist
dominated areas of the Far East, impair relations of the Asian Communist
regimes with the Soviet Union and with each other, and impede actions
taken by these regimes to increase their war-making capacity by all
feasible overt and covert means consistent with the basic policy ‘not to
be provocative of war’.”
[Tab A]
Explanation of Recommended Changes
- Paragraph 2—For the past, two or three
years at least there has been no expectation that an early collapse
of the Chinese Communist regime would occur. The policy of applying
external pressures to Communist China was not based on an
expectation that these pressures would bring about such a result,
although it was recognized that they might encourage resistance
within Communist China to consolidation of the Peiping regime’s
power. Such pressures have been designed, however, to weaken, or at
least retard the growth of, the power of a regime which has from the
beginning been intensely hostile to the United States and which
continues to threaten our security interests. FE believes that we should continue to pursue a policy
of external pressures against Communist China for this
purpose.
- Paragraph 5b—It should be recognized that
under some circumstances offensive actions by the Chinese
Nationalists would be in the interests of the United States. Thus
the door should not be closed to all offensive action by the
Nationalists. We should, however, protect ourselves against
offensive actions which would be detrimental to U.S.
interests.
- Paragraph 5d—Circumstances may arise under
which a Presidential request for Congressional authority prior to an
actual armed attack would be advantageous. It might act as a
deterrent to aggression, or if not, would at least enable U.S.
forces to move more rapidly when the attack occurred.
- Paragraph 6b—FE feels that it is an important part of our present
policy that we recognize the Government of the Republic of China as
the only Government of China, that this policy should be continued,
and that this should be stated specifically in the paper.
- Paragraph 7—While the policies set forth
under this paragraph can be justified solely on the grounds that
they will tend to retard the growth of the power and influence of
the Asian Communist regimes, it should be made clear that it would
also serve the U.S. interest to weaken these regimes in absolute
terms by whatever
[Page 969]
courses
of action can be devised under these policies. Opportunities for
weakening them may arise in the future which do not exist
now.
- Paragraph 7a—FE feels that the second half of the sentence in
paragraph 7a (beginning with “but”) is too broad and could easily be
misinterpreted to authorize a wide range of dealings with the
Chinese Communist regime even though formal recognition is not
extended. Actual practice has been to deal with Peiping on a very
limited basis where such contact was unavoidable in order to obtain
specific U.S. objectives. Examples have been the Armistice
negotiations in Korea and subsequent discussions on the Korean
Political Conference at Panmunjom,3 the Geneva
Conference, and direct negotiations on Americans detained in
Communist China.4
Paragraph 7c—This paragraph fails to
recognize that the U.S. controls not merely strategic items but
embargoes all trade and financial transactions with Communist
China. On the basis of this paragraph U.S. goods which were not
classified as strategic could be traded with Communist China and
U.S. and foreign nationals would be able to engage in financial
transactions in connection with such trade. Such a policy would
make it considerably easier for the Chinese Communists to
dispose of exports which are surplus to the requirements of the
Soviet bloc. Without the U.S. market Communist China has been
experiencing difficulty in disposing of surplus exports. On the
financial side it would relieve the pressure on Communist
China’s meager foreign exchange reserves. FE opposes such relaxation on U.S. trade and
financial controls and believes that total U.S. embargo of trade
and financial dealings with Communist China should be
maintained.
As to the second part of paragraph 7c.
While it is recognized that there are limits beyond which it
would be counterproductive to go in exerting influence on our
allies to maintain the current level of their trade
restrictions, FE believes that
the United States should maintain its prior position that the
overall interests of the free world are best served by the
maintenance of current multilateral control of trade with
Communist China. Any acquiescence in a relaxation of China
controls for the purposes stated in Section 7c (2) would tend to
become a full retreat to the relatively low level of controls
now applied multilaterally against the Soviet bloc. There are no
persuasive technical or political criteria which could clearly
justify a level of strategic controls intermediate between
present multilateral China controls and controls against the
Soviet bloc. Since the goods Communist China most desires from
the free world
[Page 970]
are
those on the present multilateral China control lists, there
could be no significant increase in free world-China trade
without a very substantial reduction in the China strategic
list. While it is true that many China list items can be
transshipped from the European Soviet bloc to Communist China,
such transshipment is generally costly and inefficient. It
imposes an added burden on the Communist bloc which we should do
nothing to lighten.
- Paragraph 7d—The suggested substitution
protects our basic position but leaves us free to deal with changing
situations.