Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

790.5/11–1654

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Secretary of State¹

confidential

[Washington,] November 16, 1954.

Subject:

• India and our “Understanding” Attached to the Manila Pact

With reference to your memorandum to me of November 15, 1954, (Tab A)² your confidential guidance on the “Understanding”, sent from Tokyo on September 10, was circularized the same day to New Delhi and other embassies (Tab B).³ Basic guidance to our USIS posts on the treatment to be given the Manila Pact was contained in a circular telegram dated September 10, 1954 (Tab C).⁴ This directed that stress on the United States’ “Understanding” should be avoided so as not to stimulate the belief that the United States stood on a different basis from other signatories.

The reason for the insertion of the United States’ “Understanding” was made quite clear at the time of the Manila conference by commercial information media. In addition the USIS wireless file carried the full text of your television report to the nation of September 15, in which you stated that we had stipulated “the only armed attack in that area which we would regard as necessarily dangerous to our peace and security would be a Communist armed attack”.

While I am sure that Prime Minister Nehru and other Indian government leaders are aware of the reasons for the United States’ “Understanding”, there probably is a lack of comprehension on this point on the part of the average Indian. This could be remedied to some extent if we wished to⁵ risk emphasizing our differences on this matter with the other signatories of the Manila Pact, and possibly creating an adverse impression on public opinion in Pakistan.

I consider that our “Understanding” has had some effect in making the Indian reaction to the Manila Pact less hostile than it would otherwise have been. Whether further advantage can be gained from it in our relations with India is open to question:⁶ India’s opposition to the Manila Pact was not based on Pakistan’s participation in it nearly so much as on the fear that it would increase international tensions in Southeast Asia, lead to interference in internal affairs of Asian nations under certain circumstances, and obstruct India’s hopes to maintain its own leadership in Southeast Asia. In addition Prime Minister Nehru made the point that NATO had been used to raise issues for consultation with regard to an area outside the protected region (namely Goa), and that the same might happen in connection with the Manila Pact.

It was probably because of these objections to the basic approach of the Manila Pact that Indian leaders have never, to my knowledge, expressed appreciation of our “Understanding”. It is clear however, that Indian objections to the Manila Pact have not approached the intensity of their objections to our military aid to Pakistan.

1. Drafted by Harold George Josif of the Office of South Asian Affairs and by Henry T. Smith, Acting Director of that office.

   A marginal notation by O’Connor indicates that the comments noted below were made by the Secretary.

2. This memorandum, drafted by Dulles personally, reads as follows:

   “I am curious to know whether we ever attempted to make an asset out of the fact that we insisted on limiting the Manila Pact (Article IV (1)) to “Communist” armed attack. The result was to avoid what might seem to be a general alliance with Pakistan as against India. This was, of course, not pleasing to the Pakistani but it showed clearly our unwillingness to get involved as a partisan in possible disputes between India and Pakistan.

   “So far as I am aware, there has never been any indication by India of appreciation of our position in this respect. We were the only one of the parties to take this position.”

3. In this circular telegram the Department of State had briefly summarized the negotiatory history of the “Understanding” attached by the United States to the treaty. (File copy is guidance as transmitted in telegram 590 from Tokyo; 790.5/9–1054)
4. Not found in Department of State files.
5. Next to this sentence is the following handwritten notation: “No”. The words “if we wished to” are underlined by hand.
6. Next to this sentence is the following handwritten notation: “I agree”. The words “open to question” are underlined by hand.