Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

OCB files, lot 62 D 430

Memorandum by the Regional Director for Far East Operations in the Foreign Operations Administration (Moyer) to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration (Stassen)

secret

[Washington,] October 27, 1954.

Military and Economic Assistance Planning in the Far East

Discussions with FOA Mission Directors and reflection on current problems in the Far East, during the recent FOA meeting in Manila,¹ brought out certain questions bearing on our programs in the Far East that I feel I should bring to your immediate attention.

These questions relate to the total impact on countries of this area involved in plans under consideration for support to indigenous military forces, and to the future United States funding that such plans will require. They suggest that a fresh look ought to be taken at the role of these forces in overall plans to attain our security objectives in the Far East. They raise, in my opinion, the fundamental question whether the free world defense against Communism in the Far East would not be achieved more certainly by less emphasis on programs building up such forces, and more emphasis on aid strengthening government administration, building up strong internal security forces, and assisting economic development.

Specifically, should the force levels in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos not be substantially below these initially proposed? Will the expansion of armed forces in Thailand and the Philippines achieve the mutual objectives which the United States shares with these countries? What about the size of the force levels in Korea and Formosa? Should larger sums than now contemplated be applied to programs building up internal police and security forces and to economic assistance?

One reason for raising these questions is the extremely heavy cost to the United States in which I think we become involved in giving support to the indigenous military forces. Practically none of the Far Eastern countries can finance the cost out of their own resources; they must of necessity fall back upon the United States for the additional financing that is necessary. If current plans and proposals for aid to these forces are carried out, budgetary and direct forces support of considerable magnitude will be required for some years to come, to supplement the revenues of the countries concerned. This support from the United States will be required until such time as the economic development of these countries can make them more nearly self-supporting and this, with the possible exception of Japan, cannot be anticipated within the next decade. Abrupt termination or even substantial reduction of United States support, before self-support is achieved, would lead to serious internal difficulties, perhaps chaos.

Moreover, many countries of the area, notably Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand, lack the administrative competence to handle successfully the internal political and economic problems that arise in attempting to build up large modern military forces. There is danger, as I think we now see to some extent in Korea, that the country may build up a top-heavy military structure which, in its total effect, will contribute more to internal instability than to stability.

United States planning, of course, cannot overlook the need to prepare against the potential danger of overt Communist attack. A more likely immediate threat in most of these countries, however, is from internal subversion accompanied by the instigation or exploitation of civil wars. The pattern of Communist penetration in the Far East has consistently started with propaganda activities and the organization internally of a Communist apparatus, eventually of guerrilla and other armed forces. Assistance has been given from the outside only to activities that first have taken root internally. Our major immediate effort in most of these countries, it seems to me, should be directed at meeting this initial internal threat, by a flexible combination of political, psychological, economic, military and police actions or programs. The problem is to stop Communism before it gains strength.

If that principle is sound, a wise policy in the immediate future would be to concentrate more on such a flexible program of action as may be required to bolster morale, stabilize legal governments, stabilize the economies of these countries and assist them in controlling subversion. More limited objectives should perhaps be sought in military assistance and training with immediate emphasis, in countries like Vietnam and Thailand, on programs directed at the building up of strong elite internal security forces. In certain cases it may at the same time be in the U.S. interest to pay the price in military and economic support to maintain regular military forces of high fighting capabilities; but in those cases we should move in full awareness of the problems that may be created.

Taking Vietnam as an example, it would seem to me that emphasis in an immediate program of action would reasonably concentrate on:

(a) Such military assistance and training consistent with the armistice agreement as is required to build up strong internal security forces, including police forces, extending such assistance and training only to selected nationals now serving in the Vietnamese army or constabulary and the French Expeditionary Corps;

(b) Immediate expansion of economic programs to

(1) Build up administrative competence,

(2) Meet need widely felt by the people,

(3) Develop the country’s economic potential, and

(4) Resettle persons displaced by war, starting them on productive endeavors.

1. A Far East Regional Conference of the FOA was held at Manila Sept. 20–24. A record of its sessions, dated Oct. 2, is in U/MSA files, lot 56 D 551, MISC/RA-75.