Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

611.90/10–754

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State¹

top secret

[Washington,] October 25, 1954.

Discussion:

The report of the Van Fleet Mission is divided into eighteen chapters, most of which are wholly or in part concerned with military detail.

Summarized below are General Van Fleet’s conclusions and recommendations. Attached as Tab A is a summary of General Van Fleet’s “Appreciation”. Tabs B through E² are summaries of his reports on Korea, China, Japan, and the Philippines.

Conclusions and Recommendations of the Van Fleet Mission:

1. The U.S. lacks—and needs—an over-all policy identified with and enthusiastically supported by the free nations of East Asia (Japan, ROK, Philippines, China).

2. The U.S. should promote an East Asian organization to resist Communist aggression. The contribution of each nation should be “determined and integrated”. Each nation should “understand” and “accept” its role in the organization.

3. Native forces should be trained for defense and to take “advantage … of favorable situations arising … [as a result of the]³ cumulative effects of constant pressure against the enemy”. They should be prepared to fight at home and “in task force operations in other Asian countries”.

4. We must “clearly demonstrate” our readiness to use nuclear weapons in the event of aggression, “but only against military targets”.

5. The U.S. can and must resolve the outstanding differences among the East Asian countries.

6. All U.S. armed forces in the Pacific should be placed under a single Command. For political, economic, psychological and cultural exchange there should be a unified regional organization “comparable to that in the NATO framework”.

7. U.S. troops should be redeployed from Korea and Japan and replaced by equivalent native divisions.

8. U.S. representation in East Asia should be strengthened.

[Tab A]

U.S. Position in the Far East: An Appreciation

General Van Fleet’s appreciation of the situation in the Far East proceeds from the assumption that we are engaged in a global conflict with the Communist powers in which Asia is the active theatre and Communist China is the “chosen instrument” of the Soviet Union. The way to meet this conflict, Van Fleet maintains, is to take the offensive. He discounts the idea that offensive operations against Communist China would bring Soviet intervention by asserting that the Soviet Union will do nothing to endanger the “base for the world revolution” i.e. the Soviet Union itself. This being so, Communist China is at present a greater threat to us than the Soviet Union.

The immediate task, Van Fleet says, is to subtract China from the Soviet orbit before China wins control of Japan and Southeast Asia. We had the chance to do this both in Korea and Indochina but a failure in American leadership prevented it. What must be done now is to recognize the military threat posed by Communist China and to prepare to meet if offensively when the next Chinese aggression occurs.

American leadership must be forcefully asserted toward this end. Our European allies must be made to realize that the fall of Southeast Asia would inevitably lead to the fall of Western Europe to Communism. The same is true of Japan. In Southeast Asia itself we must take advantage of the prevailing nationalist sentiment and break decisively with colonialism. In East Asia we must equip and prepare the Chinese and Korean armies for offensive operations. These countries must be “integrated” under our leadership with Japan and the Philippines so that the negligible strength of the components can be merged to create the considerable strength of the whole.

In the short-run American leadership must clearly mark the limits beyond which we will not tolerate Communist aggression. At the same time we must maintain constant pressure against the enemy.

When the next Chinese Communist aggression occurs we must take the offensive. Since this is most likely to occur against Formosa or its subsidiary islands, the Chinese Nationalists are the most likely to be in a position to spearhead the offensive. This should take the form of an invasion of Hainan Island and the subsequent establishment of the Chinese Nationalist forces on the mainland through the isolation and invasion of the Liaotung Peninsula.

Although he does not specifically project his strategy beyond this point, Van Fleet implies that the ultimate defeat of the Chinese Communists might bring about a situation where Japan would be in a position to reestablish itself in Manchuria.⁴

1. Drafted by Franklin L. Mewshaw of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.
2. Tabs B through E are not printed.
3. Brackets and ellipses are in the source text.

4. The Van Fleet report was discussed at the meeting of the National Security Council on Oct. 28, 1954. The memorandum of discussion reads in part: “The President said that he was trying to decide what disposition to make of the Van Fleet report. He also inquired whether there was anything in the original directive to General Van Fleet which would have permitted him to go so far afield in his report. Mr. Cutler replied that there was nothing which would have so authorized General Van Fleet.” (Memorandum drafted by Gleason that day; Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file) NSC Action No. 1258–a, taken at this meeting, reads: “[The National Security Council:] a. Noted and discussed a summary of that part of General Van Fleet’s personal report on his recent mission to the Far East which dealt with national security policy, as read at the meeting by Cutler.” (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95)

   For a longer excerpt from the memorandum, including further material on the Van Fleet report and full text of NSC Action No. 1258, see volume xiv.