Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

790.5/6–454

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor)

top secret

[Washington,] June 4, 1954.

Subject:

• Overt Chinese Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia

Participants:

• Ambassador Spender, Australian Embassy
• Mr. J. Allen, Second Secretary, Australian Embassy
• Ambassador Munro, New Zealand Embassy
• Mr. R.H. Wade, First Secretary, New Zealand Embassy
• The Secretary
• Mr. L.T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary, EUR
• Mr. H. Raynor, Director, BNA

Eyes only for Ambassadors and General Smith. The Secretary called in Ambassadors Spender and Munro late Friday afternoon¹ indicating to them that he wanted to speak to them as representatives of our ANZUS allies. He said that on many aspects of the Indochinese problem, as well as Southeast Asia in general, the situation was so fluctuating and indeed so unpredictable that it was most difficult for Governments to take firm positions. There was, however, in his opinion one question which even though its occurrence was felt by us to be unlikely was one on which he felt it would be possible to take a firm position and thus provide at least one firm and solid point in an otherwise fluctuating situation. He referred to the question of what should be done should there be overt Chinese aggression in the area.

The Secretary then made the points contained in the attached “Talking Paper” and handed a copy of this paper to each of the Ambassadors. The Secretary emphasized the fact that the action we were proposing was for the contingency of overt Chinese aggression and was in no sense a substitute for what needed to be done in any event for the defense of Southeast Asia under present circumstances.

The Secretary added that we were convinced that should recent Communist successes in Indochina “go to their heads” and cause the Chinese Communist to run amuck this would mark the beginning of a course of developments which if they were not dealt with seriously and at once would lead to a threat to the position of the three ANZUS countries in the Pacific. While we don’t expect this development we do feel there is enough risk that it might take place so that it is only prudent to prepare to meet it and by making such preparation provide one solid fact in this generally cloudy situation. The Secretary did not feel we could afford to let overt aggression in the area pass unnoticed. The United States for its part has already indicated that it could not let it pass. If the United States should back down from this position the result would be very serious and the United States does not intend to back down. As our allies under the ANZUS Treaty, we hope Australia and New Zealand will support us on this matter politically and morally. The Secretary said that this proposal does not mean a request at this time for specific military commitments.

Ambassador Munro inquired about the intention regarding the publication of any agreement reached. The Secretary said he felt publication might be salutory as a deterrent but that this could be decided in the light of circumstances when agreement was reached. The Secretary said it was not always necessary to publish things as he had the feeling that Communist intelligence was so good that they were able to judge when there was firmness and agreement on a matter and when contrary-wise there was weakness and disagreement. He referred in this matter to their sensing our underlying firmness with respect to Korea as contributing to the achievement of the Korean armistice and concluded that some times, therefore, it is not necessary to publish something to the world in order to obtain a desired deterrent effect.

Ambassador Spender inquired about the reference to France in paragraph 2 of the “Talking Paper” and what the grounds were for French concern. The Secretary replied that intelligence sources have indicated that the Chinese are reconstructing old Japanese airfields around Hainan and on the Luchow Peninsula in a way so that they could be used for jet planes. He added that intelligence did not, however, reflect any special accumulation of planes or an abnormal accumulation of forces near the border on the Chinese side. He also said that we believed overt aggression was unlikely to occur as the military situation and also the political situation was running so strongly in favor of the Communists that it would appear to be folly for them to engage in open aggression thus solidifying opposition to them and also adversely affecting Asian opinion. We did not, therefore, think this development probable unless their recent successes “go to their heads”. Ambassador Spender then inquired about the relation of using collective armed force and the immediate appeal to the United Nations (see paragraph 3 of the “Talking Paper”) and said the same point occurred in the suggested minute. The Secretary replied that in his view these actions would be concurrent but that the use of collective armed force should not be conditioned by the appeal to the United Nations.

Ambassador Munro then raised the question as to whether we felt the French would ask for intervention in the case of overt Chinese aggression. The Secretary replied that he did not regard this as a matter for bargaining with the French. He referred to the greater sanctions statement on Korea,² to the President’s address of April³ and his own of September, 1953⁴ and said that these statements and also this suggested action were not being made in the interest of helping the French but of helping the United States. He said should there be overt Chinese aggression the United States, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines would be the targets thereof. This policy was, therefore, designed to serve the interests of The United States in seeing that the Pacific does not become an unfriendly body of water. He referred to the chain beginning with the Aleutians, going through Japan, Okinawa, Formosa, the Philippines and down to Australia and New Zealand and said that if this chain were broken the defense of the Pacific would fall back to its eastern shore with a possibility of holding the Hawaiian Islands. Therefore, this is a policy, as we see it, in the interest of the United States and also our ANZUS allies. The reference to the French was only because the French feel there is a somewhat greater risk now than formerly of overt Chinese aggression. It was really only a statement of intelligence. The Secretary said the French views on this matter should not be in any sense determinative and, as a matter of feet; we have hot discussed the matter with the French.

Ambassador Spender said that it was his assumption that under this plan military action might not be confined to Indochina. The Secretary said this was correct as there might well be other ways of meeting aggression more effectively.

Ambassador Munro asked if short of this proposal but on the matter of meeting the present situation in Indochina it was correct that we did not anticipate U.S.-French action but still wanted to see action on a broader basis. The Secretary indicated that this view was also correct.

Ambassador Munro then inquired as to the French position relating to the several conditions which we had put to the French several weeks ago on the question of possible intervention. The Secretary replied that the points relating to the independence of the Associated States were coming along well in that the declarations, etc., which the French have indicated they would be prepared to make, looked good to us. Furthermore, the French have indicated that they would not seize upon collective intervention as an excuse to pull their own troops out; in other words they would regard international intervention as supplemental and not substitutive to their present effort. Mr. Merchant added that the French had also gone along, as Ambassador Munro knew, with the current Thai appeal to the United Nations. The Secretary indicated that otherwise there had been little progress in the talks with the French. He added that on the Thai-United Nations action the United Kingdom and France had both been reluctant fearing the effect of the action on the Geneva Conference. We, however, have been hesitant to discourage the Thais in taking this action and we held the view if the matter were handled discretely [discreetly?] it should not injure the position at Geneva.

Ambassador Spender observed that he gathered, therefore, that it was correct to say that the Thais had taken the matter up in the United Nations on their own volition and not under pressure of the United States. The Secretary said that this was not only true but as a matter of fact we had some difficulty in restraining them from taking it up for almost a year.

Ambassador Munro then asked what our views were with respect to the timing of the next meeting of the Security Council saying that he understood the British and French didn’t want it held until after Geneva. The Secretary said that it would no doubt take several days to work out a resolution and he thought it was probably alright for the matter to be held in abeyance until the latter part of next week. He added we would not want to press the matter if it would have a bad effect at Geneva. Ambassador Munro injected the observation that this point is a factor in the thinking of the New Zealand Government also. The Secretary said we had some Congressional criticism because of the lack of United Nations’ action which had come up in consideration of our aid bill and our attempt to broaden the Indochinese part thereof so that the money could be used in other Southeast Asian countries. This was an additional reason for our not wanting to block the Thai action. The Secretary summarized our position by saying that while we do not desire to rush matters too much, that on the other hand we didn’t want to have the matter drag to the extent that it would indicate that this was not a serious matter.

Ambassador Spender inquired if this Thai-United Nations action satisfied the conditions we had raised with the French about United Nations action. The Secretary replied that it did not fully satisfy it as we would hope for action of a broader nature. For instance, adding the Associated States to it. There was some question raised by Ambassador Munro as to whether present action could be broadened or whether it would be necessary to start afresh. The Secretary said while he had not studied the technicalities of this matter he would expect a Soviet veto in the Security Council and perhaps if technicalities did not make it difficult that when the matter were taken into the Assembly it could be started in that body on a broader basis.

[Attachment 1]

Talking Paper

1. You will recall that the President in his speech of April 16, 1953, and the Secretary of State on September 2, 1953, have warned Communist China that any overt aggression by its armed forces would have grave consequences which might not be limited to the area of the aggression.

2. The Government of the United States believes that the Chinese Communist regime is not likely to undertake overt unprovoked military aggression in the Western Pacific or South East Asia area at this time. At the same time it should be noted that the French have expressed to us concern lest the Chinese Communists use their air forces or allow the use of their territory for air strikes in support of the Vietminh assault against the Tonkin Delta. The possibility of such Chinese intervention cannot, of course, be ruled out.

3. It continues to be the conviction of the Government of the United States that if the Chinese Communist regime should commit overt unprovoked military aggression, in this or in any other form, it should be met by collective armed force and that there should be an immediate appeal to the U.N. to call on member states to support the nation or nations attacked or threatened.

4. It is the judgment of the Government of the United States that if there exists a strong and united will to defeat any such aggression should it occur, its occurrence would be hardly likely. On the other hand, the lack of such a will would increase the likelihood of such aggression occurring.

5. It is the present intention of the President of the United States, if such overt aggression is committed by the Chinese Communist regime, at once to request approval by the Congress for the use of the armed forces of the United States against Communist China to defeat the aggression.

6. In view, however, of the fact that the United States is allied with Australia and New Zealand by the Security Treaty of September 1, 1951, it seems appropriate first to consult about the action to be taken in such a contingency and to seek to agree to a joint course of action. The U.S. intends to pursue the same course with respect to the Philippines with which it also has a similar treaty. We expect also to inform the United Kingdom and invite its parallel action, even though the United States has no treaty alliance with the United Kingdom in relation to this area.

7. This proposed action is clearly related to the collective defense of Southeast Asia, but is not in substitution for the efforts now being made to carry out the U.S. proposal of March 29, 1954, for such collective defense is relevant to present circumstances, even though there be no overt Chinese aggression.

8. In order to facilitate an agreement on a joint course of action to counter any overt Chinese Communist aggression, the United States proposes that an agreed minute be adopted by the members of the ANZUS Pact. (Table minute.) The United States would hope that the Governments of Australia and New Zealand would find it possible to concur in this course of action in order that we would be prepared to act promptly should the need arise.

[Attachment 2]

Proposed Agreed Minute

If Communist China should commit overt, unprovoked military aggression in the Western Pacific or Southeast Asia, the government of each member state would at once:

a. request approval from its Congress or Parliament for the use of its armed forces against Communist China to defeat the aggression;

b. support an appeal to the United Nations by the parties attacked for assistance against the aggression; and,

c. seek to persuade other free nations to join in the action with such help as each can give.

1. June 4.
2. Text of the Declaration signed on July 27, 1953 by the 16 nations participating in the UN Command is incorporated in the foreword to the Special Report transmitted by the Command to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on Aug. 7, 1953. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 24, 1953, p. 247.
3. “The Chance for Peace,” delivered Apr. 16, is printed ibid., Apr. 27, 1953, p. 599.
4. “Korean Problems,” delivered Sept. 2, is printed ibid., Sept. 14, 1953, p. 339.