Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

790.5/6–454

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor)

top secret

Washington, June 4, 1954.

Subject:

• Collective Defense in Southeast Asia

Participants:

• Ambassador Spender, Australian Embassy
• Mr. J.L. Allen, Second Secretary, Australian Embassy
• The Secretary
• Mr. Merchant, Assistant Secretary, EUR
• Mr. Raynor, Director, BNA

Eyes only Ambassadors and General Smith. Ambassador Spender called on the Secretary this afternoon at his (Spender’s) request. He had previously sent down the attached memorandum¹ putting certain questions. He opened the conversation by saying that the Secretary would recognize that these were not his questions and would realize that many of them had been discussed previously with the Secretary or with Mr. Merchant. Ambassador Spender indicated, however, that he had been instructed by his Government to call and ask them. In view of the shortness of time it was agreed that in this discussion the Secretary would concentrate on a few of the more significant questions and Ambassador Spender could follow up on the others later with Mr. Merchant if he desired to do so. Ambassador Spender said that the Cabinet had met yesterday but that thus far he had not received a report on the meeting. Ambassador Spender then paraphrased the first question in the memorandum by putting it: “If a conference is held would it deal with one or the other or both of the subjects of collective arrangements for Southeast Asia as a whole and international military intervention in Indochina?” He said the Australian position was that they were ready to sit down in a conference on collective arrangements for the area as a whole but had certain reservations with respect to the subject of international military intervention in Southeast Asia. The Secretary replied that the problem of collective action constantly shifts with the passage of time and the situation is much different and more difficult now than it was on March 29 as intervention would now carry with it more liabilities. He said the French have not requested formal intervention but have been using this subject as a card to play at Geneva. The Secretary said the question was not susceptible to a categorical answer and that the answer would have been easier two months ago than it is now. He said we still desired a conference of the ten countries and that as of today, in addition to discussing collective arrangements for the whole area, we would want to discuss courses of action presently open to us. The latter point, however, might change.

Ambassador Spender then raised question 4 of the memorandum² and the Secretary said that we had objected to partition in part on the belief that neither Viet side would accept it. While we would oppose partition we can see the possibility of a military regrouping which would lead to a rather long de facto division of authority but not necessarily to partition and that this might be acceptable as being consistent with the concept of a united country. The Secretary said we can see no basis at all for partition or regrouping in Laos or Cambodia as there are no hostile forces in those areas and no authentic rival authorities despite the recent Communist fictional invention of some purported authorities. We do, however, accept the fact that the situation in Viet Nam is subject to some military regrouping perhaps accompanied by a degree of de facto division of authority and may be necessary as a step to end the fighting in Viet Nam.

The Ambassador then raised the question under 2 (a) of the memorandum.³ The Secretary replied that these questions could not be answered categorically with which the Ambassador agreed. He said circumstances are constantly changing and the conditions under which military intervention would be feasible cannot be stated. He said, for instance, would the French be prepared to move in more troops or would they on the other hand move troops out. What would be the state of morale of the French and the Viet Nam. Also, if the French made a settlement at Geneva of a certain type the possibility of intervention might be foreclosed as we could not go in to upset a settlement which the French had reached. On the other hand if the Geneva talks should break off without a settlement the situation would then have to be considered in the light of the circumstances prevailing at that time.

Ambassador Spender finally raised the question under 2 (c)⁴ and the Secretary said again this was a question which could not be answered because the degree of Asian support and United Nations support would depend on the nature of the action contemplated or taken and this we could not determine at this time.

1. Not printed, but see footnotes 2, 3, and 4, below.

2. Numbered paragraph 4 of the memorandum reads:

   “4. Partition:

   “The Australian Government does not necessarily reject the possibility of the partition of Vietnam as an acceptable settlement.

   “In United States view, what is the distinction between military regroupment and partition?

   “Is United States Government opposed to partition in any circumstances?”

3. Questions in numbered paragraph 2 (a) follow:

   “What are the circumstances (if these can be stated) in which the United States would contemplate military intervention?

   “What is the irreducible minimum result required at Geneva, in the absence of which the United States would contemplate military intervention?”

4. Numbered paragraph 2 (c) follows:

   “What is the United States estimate of (i) Asian support and (ii) United Nations support for such action [military intervention]?”