Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
Memorandum of Discussion at the 198th Meeting of the National Security Council Held on Thursday, May 20, 19541
[Extracts]
Present at the 198th Meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States (presiding for part of Items 1 and 8); the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary of Commerce (for Item 6); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Items 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5); the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (for Items 1, 4 and 5); the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers (for Items 1, 2 and 3); Mr. Milton for the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force (for Items 1, 2 and 3); the Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget; Assistant Secretary of Commerce Anderson and Marshall Smith, Department of Commerce (for Item 6); Admiral Delany, Foreign Operations Administration; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, and the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (for Items 1, 2 and 3); the NSC Planning Board (for Items 1, 2 and 3), as follows: Mr. Bowie, Department of State; Mr. Tuttle, Department of the Treasury; Gen. Bonesteel, Department of Defense; Mr. McDonnell, Department of Justice; Gen. Porter, FOA; Mr. Elliott, ODM; Mr. Reid, Bureau of the Budget; Mr. Snapp, AEC; General Gerhart, JCS; Mr. Amory, CIA; and Mr. Staats, OCB. The following were also present: the Director of Central Intelligence; Mr. Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Gen. Persons, Deputy Assistant to the President; Gen. Carroll, White House Staff Secretary; Mr. Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.
. . . . . . .
[Page 497]8. Regional grouping in Southeast Asia (NSC Actions Nos. 1086–b and c,2 1104–b,3 and 1112;4 NSC 54055)
Mr. Cutler summarized the four Planning Board meetings which had been devoted to the preparation of an interim report on the regional grouping for the defense of Southeast Asia. Owing to disagreements in the Planning Board, no paper for Council consideration had been completed. Nevertheless, Mr. Cutler himself had prepared an informal statement6 consisting of a description of three possible types of regional grouping. To this he had added a series of basic questions which brought out the differences of opinion in the Planning Board consideration of the problem. He then called on Secretary Dulles for comment.
Secretary Dulles expressed the opinion that the discussions in the Planning Board, as described by Mr. Cutler, had been useful. He stated that the situation with respect to creating a regional grouping had been fluctuating. He had been obliged to “feel his way” and accommodate his views to those of the representatives of the other nations. Secretary Dulles suggested that when you started to stir up a thing like this regional grouping, you couldn’t be sure precisely what would come up. But in any event, the stirring process had evoked a very lively reaction among such South Asian nations as India and Pakistan. It was quite possible that the end result of our efforts to create a regional grouping would be different from what we had originally planned, but the results, nevertheless, might be very useful to us. In other words, Secretary Dulles said he didn’t think we were going to get the thing we were ostensibly after, but we would probably get something better than if we hadn’t tried at all. The United Kingdom is obviously trying to interest India and Pakistan in the problem. If the British succeed in bringing in India and Pakistan, it would constitute a triumph for British diplomacy. It would also be a triumph for us, even if we couldn’t claim it to be.
Mr. Cutler asked Secretary Dulles if he knew anything of the content of the plan for Indochina which Krishna Menon7 was hurrying to present at Geneva. Secretary Dulles replied that he had no idea of the content, but that Menon was a “pretty bad fellow”. The [Page 498] President observed that judging from the past activities of Menon, whatever the content of his plan it was not likely to be acceptable.
At this point the President was obliged to withdraw from the meeting, and Mr. Cutler asked the Secretary of State for further comment on the status of his efforts to achieve a regional grouping.
As of today, said Secretary Dulles, there is substantial agreement between the U.S. and the U.K. on initiating five-power military conferences in Washington. The agreement was not, however, as complete as was indicated by reports in the press. The British had been leaking vigorously news items to the press in the course of the last 48 hours, perhaps in the hope of covering up their differences with the United States on the formation of the regional grouping. They were attempting, in short, to disguise the fact that they had broken their engagement to us on this subject made on April 13.8 The essence of the difference was whether the examination of a possible regional grouping should be made during or after the Geneva Conference, and the British were now trying to make it appear that they had never disagreed with our proposal to conduct this examination while the Geneva Conference was still in session.
Another explanation of the British attitude was their obvious desire to associate the Colombo Conference powers with a regional grouping for the defense of Southeast Asia. Secretary Dulles speculated that perhaps there was a healthy competition between ourselves and the British in the effort to achieve some kind of regional grouping. On the other hand, Secretary Dulles declared himself not optimistic about establishing any very useful regional grouping very quickly.
Meanwhile, talks had been going on in Paris with the French with respect to our pre-conditions for military intervention in Indochina. These talks with the French had now been interrupted, owing to the departure of General Ely to Indochina for a brief inspection of the military situation there. We had agreed, said Secretary Dulles, that General Trapnell9 should go to Paris to discuss military problems with Premier Laniel and his associates. In fact, General Trapnell had been on his way to Paris when we received word that General Ely had gone to Indochina. We had accordingly called General Trapnell back from Gander, but he would be sent to Paris again after the return of General Ely.
Secretary Dulles indicated that if these talks with the French on pre-conditions succeeded, they would form the cornerstone of a regional grouping which would include Indochina, but he did not believe [Page 499] that the French had really made up their minds whether or not they wanted to continue the war in Indochina with U.S. participation. These talks were probably being used chiefly to strengthen the French bargaining position with the Communists at Geneva. While one couldn’t be sure, Secretary Dulles felt that even if Premier Laniel agreed to meet our pre-conditions, the French Chamber of Deputies wouldn’t go along with the decision. He was therefore inclined to the view that in our conversations with the French on pre-conditions we were going through an academic exercise except in so far as these conversations affected the Geneva Conference. He did not exclude, however, all possibility that the French might ultimately agree to internationalize the conflict.
With respect to the U.S. pre-conditions, Secretary Dulles expressed the view that we might be exaggerating the significance of the independence issue for the Associated States. The Associated States had already achieved in fact a very high degree of independence. Moreover, if we harped on the independence issue it might well rise to embarrass us when the scene shifted from Indochina to Malaya.
In explaining the hesitations of Australia and New Zealand, Secretary Dulles pointed out that the Australians were in a tough spot in view of the imminence of the national election. Accordingly, we had refrained from pressing the Australians too hard. Secretary Dulles indicated that the Foreign Minister of New Zealand was seeing the President this afternoon.10 Both these Dominions were torn between their sentimental ties with the United Kingdom (now greatly strengthened by the visit of the young Queen) and their practical security ties with the United States. Above all, they wished to avoid making a choice between these ties.
[Here follows discussion of the military situation in Indochina and of the Geneva Conference. These portions of the memorandum are printed in volume XIII, Part 2, page 1586.]
The National Security Council:11
- a.
- Discussed the subject in the light of a report by Mr. Cutler, based on the discussion of the subject in the NSC Planning Board.
- b.
- Noted and discussed an oral report by the Secretary of State on developments with respect to the formation of a regional grouping in Southeast Asia; the Geneva Conference; and the military situation in Indochina.
- Drafted by Gleason on May 21.↩
- Included in the memorandum of discussion at the 192d NSC Meeting, Apr. 6, 1954; see vol. xiii, Part 1, p. 1250.↩
- Included in the memorandum of discussion at the 194th NSC Meeting, Apr. 29, 1954, ibid., Part 2, p. 1431.↩
- See footnote 2, p. 463.↩
- Dated Jan. 16, p. 366.↩
- See his memorandum dated May 19, p. 490.↩
- Ambassador of India in the USSR.↩
- Regarding this development, see Dulles’ memorandum of conversation, Apr. 30, vol. xvi, p. 622.↩
- Maj. Gen. Thomas J.H. Trapnell, Chief of MAAG in Vietnam, August 1952–April 1954.↩
- Record of the substance of this meeting has not been found in Department of State files.↩
- The lettered subparagraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1132. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95)↩