788.5 MSP/4–1952: Telegram
No. 170
The Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State1
priority
4024. 1. Following my talk with Shah regarding likelihood funds earmarked for 1952 military aid to Iran being diverted to other countries, Shah discussed matter with Mosadeq insisting latter give required assurances. (Embtel 3916, April 14.)2 Shah also requested [Page 372] Ala to ask me for copy draft reply which last January Shah was hoping be able make to Kingsbury Smith (Deptel 1410 of January 11).3 At Ala’s request on morning 17 April I give him following draft of proposed reply to Kingsbury Smith altered somewhat to make it suitable for incorporation in communication from Prime Minister to me.
“International position Iran has been consistently clear. Iran seeks maintain friendly relations with other members UN. To extent that its resources and general conditions permit, it loyally supports and defends principles of charter UN. While devoted to cause world peace it is doing what it can strengthen its defensive capabilities. If it should be attacked from any direction whatsoever it would defend itself with all resources it commands.”
In handing Ala this draft I stated that although I thought US Govt would still consider it satisfied requirements of 511 (a) in conjunction with assurances already contained in Mosadeq’s note of January 4,4 I could not be sure.
2. Ala discussed this draft on same day with Prime Minister who said he did not believe he could give assurances contained in it but would take up matter with Cabinet in afternoon session. During this session Minister War Yazdanpanah and Minister Roads Busheri urged Prime Minister give such assurances. Only member Cabinet really opposed was Kazemi, Foreign Affairs Minister, who argued that giving assurances this kind would inevitably force Iran into Western bloc and would provoke Russians. Foreign Minister particularly opposed to phrase “while devoted to cause world peace” which he maintained would mean Iran ready to go to war for cause world peace. Prime Minister told Cabinet he would endeavor persuade me to recommend that US Government accept statement from him to effect Iran willing to accept military aid from US and adhere to principles UN charter. He did not think could go further without endangering Iran’s neutrality.
3. Ala reported these developments to me on evening April 18 and asked if US Government could not accept statement suggested by Prime Minister. I said no I would not even submit statement this kind for approval. If I did Washington would certainly obtain [Page 373] impression Prime Minister was taking frivolous attitude towards matter considerable importance. Ala said he would discuss matter again morning 19th with Mosadeq.
4. This morning after talking with Mosadeq Ala telephoned me. Said Prime Minister still maintained he could not give assurances of character contained in draft. Ala added Shah had asked him urge me recommend Washington accept Mosadeq’s proposed draft accompanied by private assurances of Shah that as soon as new government would come into power Shah would do all possible prevail on it give full assurances of kind needed. I told Ala I was not sure US Government would be satisfied even with statements of kind I had given him and I knew it would be useless to propose anything less strong. At Mosadeq’s request I saw him today shortly before noon. Before calling on him I had edited draft given Ala cutting it down to three short essential statements which read as follows:
“To extent that its resources and general conditions permit, Iran loyally supports and defends principles of charter UN. It is doing what it can to strengthen its defensive capabilities. If it should be attacked from any direction whatsoever it would defend itself with all resources its command.”
5. Prime Minister opened our conversation with long dissertation regarding importance to US and to Iran that US continue maintain active interest welfare and independence Iran. He said this interest so important US shld not allow matters of mere form or legal technicalities to prevent it from giving Iran such aid as it might need. He insisted he had always desired US military aid but unfortunately US had not been prepared to give it unless Iran give US commitments which he was not in position to give because of certain internal and international considerations.
I interrupted Prime Minister at this point. I said I still failed understand why kind of assurances which US required should be embarrassing to him or to Iran. I handed him copy of draft quoted in paragraph 4 above asked him read carefully three sentences contained in it and tell me why any country which was loyal member UN should hesitate incorporate them in statement of its policies. Prime Minister after going over these sentences one by one inquired if I thought they would satisfy my government. I replied I had not had opportunity submit them to Washington but I believed that they would. He said he was willing to make statements substantially the same as those incorporated in this document if his Cabinet would agree. He might however like make several minor changes. Prime Minister then proceeded to scribble various versions of draft of note to me. After considerable haggling I finally [Page 374] agreed to accept for consideration Washington draft which seemed to me to meet our basic requirements. I asked him if I was at liberty submit this draft immediately to State Department for approval. He said he preferred I wait until Cabinet should have opportunity pass on it this evening. In view however urgency this matter I am submitting tentatively herewith for Department’s comments English translation his Persian draft.
6. Pursuant to our oral conversations I find it necessary to inform Your Excellency that:
“My Government in view of its financial and economic situation has never withheld acceptance of the assistance which Your Excellency’s Government is prepared to extend to this country.
To the extent that Iran’s resources and general conditions permit Iran supports and defends the principles of the charter of the UN.
It is also doing what it can to defend its defensive capabilities.
And if it should be attacked from any direction it shall defend its freedom and independence with all its might.”
6. [sic] I told Prime Minister that if this note should be acceptable US Government Department of State at appropriate time would probably be obliged to inform Congress that in its opinion Iran had qualified itself to receive military aid. Prime Minister said he would have no objection but earnestly requested that State Department in informing Congress that Iran had qualified self receive military aid would not publicly state that Iran had complied with provisions MSA. He did not want his opponents say he had allowed himself to be governed by US legislation. He therefore had avoided any reference to US legislation in his note to me.
7. Although I did not discuss with Prime Minister character my reply to his note I hope Department will not insist that it contain reference to MSA. I suggest my reply be limited to acknowledgment his note and to statement to effect that I have pleasure inform him my government is taking appropriate steps to resume extension of military aid to Iran.
8. I sincerely hope Department can accept as satisfactory assurances Prime Minister’s draft without alterations. Changes on our part might result in series of attempted alterations by him. I have been encouraged to believe that this draft might be acceptable to Department in view attitude displayed by Department in Deptel 1410 of January 11 in reply Embtel 2545 of January 9.5
[Page 375]9. Shall inform Department just as soon as we learn Cabinet’s decision.6
- Transmitted in two sections.↩
- Telegram 3916 also reported that Henderson informed the Shah again that the United States could not resume military aid to Iran until the Iranian Government had provided the proper assurances called for under Section 511 (a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951. (123 Richards, Arthur L.)↩
- On Jan. 9 Ambassador Henderson cabled to the Department a draft reply from the Shah to questions which Kingsbury Smith, a newsman, had addressed to him. The suggested response would have provided, when incorporated in a formal letter from the Iranian Government, the proper assurances necessary to qualify Iran for military aid under the terms of the Mutual Security Act. (Telegram 2545; 788.5 MSP/1–952) The Department informed Henderson that it approved this plan on Jan. 11. (Telegram 1410; 788.5 MSP/1–952)↩
- See footnote 4, Document 141.↩
- See footnote 3 above.↩
- On Apr. 19 Ambassador Henderson reported that Mosadeq informed him that the Iranian Cabinet had approved the draft note submitted in telegram 4024. (Telegram 4025; 788.5 MSP/4–1952)↩