Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

No. 1374
Editorial Note

The document in this editorial note is located in Department of State file 774.5 MSP. It is not a ribbon copy. It was typed on a plain sheet of paper. Colonel Gerhardt in Cairo sent this document on November 29, 1954, to Vice Admiral Arthur C. Davis,USN, who was Director of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense. It reads as follows:

• “1. On 23 November, Gerhardt, Eveland . . . met with Abdul Nasr, Amer, and a member of the Prime Minister’s personal secretariat in a four hour night session, which followed a previous rundown with a member of the personal secretariat of the night before. Atmosphere was cordial and relaxed. General discussion of regional defense arrangement problem provoked expression by Nasr of two major considerations:
  • “a. People of Egypt are not conditioned to think in strategic terms and this remains a major problem for Nasr and the RCC to overcome in the future.
  • “b. He recognizes and admits the inadequacies of the Arab League Security Pact as a vehicle for regional defense. However, Nasr nevertheless believes that with a revision of the present Security Pact an adequate basis for RDA can be obtained although he has not worked out the details of such a revision.
• “2. One point on which he laid emphasis was command structure from which it could be inferred that the basis for the defense arrangement must be indigenous and the commander from the area. (Later exploration of this showed clearly that they have not thought the problem through in terms of personnel or organization.)
• “3. He left the impression that the RCC considered that during the period in which they were building up internal strength they would develop the revisions to the Pact required to strengthen it. He felt that the U.S. could help this program by using its influence with the Arab Nations at the appropriate time that they support a revised Arab Security Pact.
• “4. Nasr displays a keen understanding of the strategic importance of the area and the critical role which Egypt plays in it. He also is keenly aware of the vacuum that exists between the northern tier of defense and the Egyptian base. In a brief strategic estimate he considered that the Soviets would strike first at the oilfields and as a second priority the Egyptian base crossroads. (He promised to submit a more detailed estimate before the departure of the group.) He said that there were neutralist elements in Egypt who felt that with a strong national army the frontiers could be defended and the Soviets would bypass Egypt. He did not accept this view since he did not see within Egypt the capability of developing a sufficiently strong force to deter a Soviet attack on Egypt. Hence the vacuum between the northern tier and Egypt must be filled. He referred several times to his conversations with Mr. Dulles of two years ago and to the principle that the defense arrangement for the Middle East must be based upon indigenous factors. A MEDO with a superimposed command structure is out as far as he is concerned.
• “5. On the question of an MDAP agreement with Egypt for grant military assistance, he pointed out that the words ‘mutual,’ ‘Agreement’, ‘Assistance’ are all unacceptable at the moment in view of the internal situation in Egypt. Though he stated that he could sign an agreement that night, nothing would happen in Egypt the next day or during the period when the RCC maintain full control, still he was looking to the years ahead, when a constitution had been adopted, elections held and a parliament established. At that time the opponents of the regime would have free play to attack the government and he did not feel he could take on the fight that would inevitably come over the Suez Base Agreement and a military pact with the U.S. at the same time and have the right forces win.
• “6. In a detailed discussion on the points which might be objectionable, aside from the major obstacle of the Pact itself, he agreed that a small survey team in civilian clothes would be acceptable. As to the MAAG he drew the parallel to the old British Military Mission and felt that though he could understand the functions of the MAAG, within the army the operations of the officers assigned to the MAAG would create more resentment and lose more good feeling for the U.S. Hakim Amer during this entire discussion was very negative and probably is the major opponent of any type survey mission or MAAG. His main concern seemed to be maintaining control of the contact between his group and the American officers of the MAAG group. This may stem from lack of confidence in the complete loyalty of all officer personnel until present programs now in process detect and eliminate any disloyal elements.
• “7. After long discussion and argument, Nasr came around to an estimate of the time period before he felt he would be in a position to sign a grant agreement. He felt that if he could convince the people that the Government had signed an agreement with the British which really provided for their evacuation, he would have overcome one of his major obstacles. At the time when the last British soldier left Egypt we could say that this agreement had been carried out and that the government had been correct in signing the agreement. He mentioned the time of 18 months which is the period remaining before completion of the British evacuation. At the conclusion of this period he would be in a position to undertake a military assistance agreement with the U.S. During the interim period he felt he must concentrate on the internal problems of Egypt. He recognized the real necessity for sustaining the morale of the army which meant providing newer equipment and other morale building items. It is clear he is not thinking of uniforms, sidearms, etc. as morale building items. The equipment he has in mind is clearly of a major item category which the troops can see operate and take as an indication of a fulfilled promise to get them better equipment. He wants a strong loyal army which is capable of backing the regime when a parliamentary government takes over. He mentioned several times the fact that for a year he had expected U.S. military equipment and his officers have not seen it forthcoming. However, if he had to sign a pact to get it he would elect not to sign the pact, to forego grant assistance and to get what equipment he could by purchase. When asked where the money would come from he referred back to the economic aid agreement but was clearly told that there was no money available to increase the present funds utilized in that agreement.
• “8. As to the current amount which was being held for a grant aid program, it was explained to Nasr that unless there was an agreement this money would inevitably by reallocated to other more urgent needs and that the military authorities in the U.S. could not in all conscience recommend a diversion of this money to economic aid to Egypt to increase their capability for reimbursable aid in view of the large demands on these funds for what would have to be considered, from the military point of view, as more critical requirements.
• “9. Nasr did not raise the question of any residual amount from the three million dollar fund. At the suggestion from our side Nasr agreed to have reps from Hakim Amer’s staff meet with Gerhardt and Eveland the following night for discussion of pricing and requirements should he have any funds of his own available. This was purely to be eploratory and on an exchange of information basis.
• “10. It is possible that the position taken by Nasr was dictated by the feeling that he could still get additional funds from the U.S. to support a reimbursable aid program. Aside from the psychological difficulties of the words “mutual”, “military. and “assistance”, Nasr kept harping on the fact that his enemies, no matter what kind of an agreement be signed or even if he signed would attack him, in the event that military aid of a grant nature came into the country, with the claim that he had sold out Egypt to the Americans. The difficulties of making exceptions for Egypt and the effect upon other MDAP agreements and the MDAP program as a whole, were repeated to him several times. Unless after further reflection on the discussion he indicates a changed position, it would seem that the proper course of action would be to drop any further negotiations for MDAP agreement and on the face accept his timing of approx 18 months. This has been his decision based upon his estimate of what he can get away with and would relieve the U.S. of its commitment at least insofar as grant aid program is concerned. His estimates on the strengthening of the RCC and the elimination of the Muslim Brotherhood, Communists, Dissident Groups, etc., indicated a completion date of approx two months, at which time, if from his ever-increasing strength position, he succeeds, he will have consolidated the position of the RCC for the reasonable future. There is a possibility that at that time, if he is continuously worked upon to reevaluate his strength, he may be willing to negotiate on the timing of an MDAP agreement. It is the general concensus that he does not fully understand the details of MDAP, MAAG, etc. despite the fact he says he does, and that considerable education is still required.
• “11. In view of the nonavailability of any additional funds to be worked through the economic agreement for reimbursable aid from the U.S. and the timing factors mentioned by Nasr, there seems little point in holding the MDAP funds in the present fiscal year appropriation for Egypt.
• “12. The possibility exists of developing a program of support for the Egyptian forces in their new responsibilities in the protection of the Suez Base. Nasr and Amer were asked if they had developed a program to take care of this situation. They replied that they had and felt that they could meet their requirements. That this is probably more wishful thinking than anything else was borne out in subsequent meetings with Nasr’s reps. The decision as to whether this thin lead would stand up as a basis for a program would have to be made in Washington by State, Defense, JCS and FOA.
• “13. Several meetings were held on 24 and 25 November with Nasr’s reps which will report on arrival in Washington.”