[Attachment]
Summary Of State–JCS Meeting—March 19, 1954
Subject:
- British Proposal on Suez (London’s 3991)
After introductory remarks by Mr. Murphy, Mr. Jernegan outlined the British proposal,
emphasizing that any feasible arrangement with respect to Suez
on a purely Anglo-Egyptian basis would probably be unacceptable
to the British. but that if the U.S. agreed to the British
proposition, it would certainly be acceptable to the British,
and probably to the Egyptians. It was pointed out that more
intransigence on the part of the British and a series of
incidents might be expected if some new step of this kind were
not taken. Special reference was made to the importance the
British attach to the Egyptians creating an atmosphere of
“mutual confidence”. The basic questions are:
- 1.
- How long can Eden
hold the Conservatives in line?
- 2.
- How long can the Egyptian situation be controlled pending
an arrangement to make an agreement?
United States involvement under the British proposal was listed
by Mr. Jernegan as:
- 1.
- A willingness, though not a commitment, to be included
in such an arrangement.
- 2.
- A commitment of a sort (a) to consult in the event of
an attack upon Egypt, the Arab countries and Turkey; and
(b) to consult in the event of a “threat” to these
countries or Iran.
- 3.
- Agreement to assist in arranging to make an American
contribution. (It was pointed out that this had come up
before, and had been approved in principle by the U.S.
Government.)
Mr. Jernegan believed that
the Egyptians would look favorably on this proposal because:
- 1.
- It eliminates the “uniforms” question.
- 2.
- It meets the “availability” formula which is
acceptable to both sides.
- 3.
- It associates the United States with the
effort.
Mr. Murphy emphasized that
a question of British domestic politics is involved, and that
the element of United States association would clinch the matter
with Churchill and with
the Conservative back benchers. Mr. Murphy suggested that it was likely that the
Egyptians would agree to invite us (although we had not yet
explored this point with Ambassador Caffery), and referred to Ambassador Caffery’s close association with
the negotiations so far.
Mr. MacArthur reviewed the Secretary’s
discussion with Eden on
this subject at Berlin. It was stressed then, he said, that if
the present situation dragged on it would result in a hardening
and a deterioration of the position on both the British and
Egyptian side.
Admiral Carney
interjected that more than Egypt was involved; that even if we
accepted, difficult negotiations on details might ensue and that
long-standing friction not only between Britain and Egypt but
also between Britain and all the Near East might be transferred
to us; and that there were also cost considerations which had to
be studied.
Mr. Jernegan replied that
we are likely to suffer from these disabilities whether or not
we accepted this present proposal. Mr.
MacArthur echoed this, and stressed
that the acceptability of the proposal to the Egyptians was a
sine qua non of our
participation.
Admiral Radford suggested
that if we should take this on, we should demand that the
British accept a reasonable Iranian oil settlement.
Further discussion involved exactly what the proposal committed
us to. Admiral Carney
pointed out that we would be involved very
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heavily in the Middle East in
any tension which involved the British.
Exploring the availability conditions, Admiral Radford pointed out that they
are very limited if Iran was not included; and that the USSR could initiate a militay
operation in the Middle East (in Iran, for example) without
violating Turkey.
The Air Force representative did not believe that the proposed
“availability” arrangement would mean as much to us as it would
if it involved NATO, and that
it would assist the British position in the Near East far more
than it would our own in a global war.
One JCS suggestion was that we
should agree to the proposal on condition that the United States
present it to Egypt and that, if acceptable, the British accede
to it. Mr. MacArthur stated that if we let
the British propose it we would still get the credit . . . ; and
that an easing of UK–Egyptian tensions might also result—which
would not be the case if the U.S. presented it.
Mr. Jernegan stressed the
importance of time. He said that this was a desperate and last
ditch effort by Eden to
get a settlement and that it put the Foreign Secretary very much
out on a limb.
Discussion took place concerning the possibility of having an
answer from the JCS by Saturday.
The JCS felt that this was not
nearly enough time.
Consideration was given to the suggestion that the United States
Government should take a long hard look at this proposal and
should not be stampeded into making a hasty decision. The JCS felt a short but reasonable
study should be made of the implications of the British
proposal.
