641.74/3–1754: Telegram
No. 1298
The Ambassador in the United
Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of
State1
priority
3991. Re Deptel 4699 and Embtel 3956.2 At Eden’s request, I called late last evening and he handed me an aide-mémoire on Egypt summarized below (text pouched today).3
Begin Summary. Negotiations now held up by two main issues, availability and uniforms. On first, Egyptians had indicated they would be prepared make base available in event of attack on Turkey though not Iran. This “to a great extent” would meet British requirements on availability but divergence on uniforms still unreconciled. Whole issue largely one of confidence. Behavior of Egyptian Government over Sudan, violent attacks in speeches Egyptian Ministers and continuance terrorist activities make it impossible for HMG have any confidence that Egyptian Government would adhere to agreement on Canal Zone if one were made. In particular, to leave 4,000 British soldiers in Canal Zone whether in uniform or not would be “offering hostages to fortune”. At same time HMG anxious reach agreement and believe Egyptians are too and that if Anglo-Egyptian relations are ever to be placed on better footing, present may be right moment seek agreement.
HMG, therefore, considering whether it would be possible abandon idea of keeping British soldiers in Egypt to maintain base after withdrawal British forces and substitute concept maintaining installations with civilian contract labor. At same time, HMG would expect to secure right re-enter base in case real emergency and would expect that Egypt in return for total evacuation British troops would be prepared grant this right over considerably longer period than seven years contemplated.
Main outlines of new plan under consideration are:
- (a)
- British troops would redeploy elsewhere than in Egypt.
- (b)
- UK would obtain right re-enter base in case of attack on Egypt, and Arab state or Turkey, and immediate consultations in case of threatened attack on these or Iran. “A 20–year life for this arrangement” should be sought.
- (c)
- Certain key installations, such as airfields, would be maintained by civil contractors under arrangements with Egyptian Government which would be responsible for their security. No British soldiers would remain in base as technicians. Egypt would engage herself to maintain these installations.
- (d)
- Agreement would contain preamble covering free navigation Suez Canal, making it clear this replaced 1936 treaty.
- (e)
- Considerable quantities of equipment which could not be maintained by civil contractors would need to be removed and therefore HMG would have to insist on more time, “probably two years”, within which the last troops would be withdrawn although substantial withdrawals would be made at an earlier date.
Egyptian Government would be informed this plan could only be put forward if Egypt prepared satisfy HMG “they would take necessary steps restore confidence”, e.g., undertake observe terms and spirit of Sudan agreement and contribute to orderly transfer of power by insuring that balance in Governor General’s commission is not upset. Official Egyptian spokesman must also refrain from unbridled attacks on Britain and on British public servants in Sudan.
Given present state Anglo-Egyptian relations, HMG feel such arrangement unlikely be effective if made on purely Anglo-Egyptian basis and consequently believe US Government should be associated with it.HMG hope USG would be prepared accept invitation by Egypt to use base on same terms as it would be available to HMG and “work out with HMG and in due course with Egypt arrangements under which base would be maintained until such time as Egyptian resources capable doing work efficiently”. Aide-mémoire concludes:
“HMG would ask USG give most earnest consideration these proposals and let them have as soon as possible their comments on question civil contracts by American firms, in addition to British, and arrangements under which these could be entered into”.
End Summary.
Eden explained plan summarized above was approved after long discussion in Cabinet afternoon March 15. He said it was sincere attempt not only meet Egyptians on question of uniforms but go further and remove all military personnel in order contribute to an amicable durable settlement. He particularly hoped we could associate ourselves with this endeavor which would make the plan feasible for the British Government from a parliamentary point of view and would contribute importantly to durability of settlement.
In this connection, he explained that idea of British Government was that Egyptians would invite US to use base and would agree that base would be maintained by Egyptian Government through civilian contractors who would be acceptable to both US and British Governments. He hoped that US private contractors would be interested in joining British contractors in doing this. He said it [Page 2232] was not contemplated that the US Government would incur any expense in connection with this phase of plans, and if no US private contractors were available, he felt sure British contractors would be available who could do the work on satisfactory basis.
In response to questions, Eden made the following explanations and comments regarding details new plan.
Re (b) above: He said that he would not insist on 20–year life for arrangement, but he pointed out that Egyptians had always maintained that their main objection to existing situation was presence British troops and that if British troops were removed, Egypt should have no objections to making base available over long period. I said that present proposed arrangement provide for availability of base for only seven-year period and that I doubted very much whether Egyptians would agree period as long as 20 years. I believe from discussion which ensued that Eden would be satisfied with something like 10 years. However, mention was made of disadvantageous precedent a short period would create as far as Iraq is concerned.
Re (c): Eden explained that plan contemplated civilian contractors being employed and paid by Egyptian Government and British Government (and American Government, if latter should become associated with plan) would have right to periodic inspection to insure installations being properly maintained.
Re (e): Eden explained that Defense Ministry believes that if base were to be maintained by civilian contractors it would have to be reduced in size and additional time would be required for removals. He emphasized strongly, however, that this would not affect withdrawal of combat troops.
Eden stated that no action with respect to the above plan would be taken by HMG vis-à-vis Egypt until reply had been received from US.
In Embassy’s opinion, reference in paragraph 1 of summary to effect it impossible for HMG “have any confidence that Egyptian Government would adhere to agreement. should be read in connection with subsequent statement that Egypt would be informed plan could be put forward only if Egypt takes necessary steps restore confidence.
- Repeated priority to Cairo as telegram 107.↩
- In telegram 3956 from London, Mar. 15, not printed, the Department was informed that Aldrich on Mar. 9 had spoken to Eden along the lines of telegram 4699, Mar. 12, supra, and that upon receipt of that instruction, the Chargé, Butterworth, reiterated Aldrich’s remarks to Eden. Butterworth also believed it likely that the Cabinet would authorize Eden to resume the negotiations along the lines suggested by Nasir. (641.74/3–1554)↩
- Not printed; the aide-mémoire was transmitted in despatch 3136 from London, Mar. 17. (641.74/3–1754)↩