Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

641.74/5–2653: Telegram

No. 1172
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State¹

top secret
priority

London, May 26, 1953—noon.

6245. Following are my comments on Deptel 7550, May 23:²

1. Department’s revised formula appears contain essentials of all elements to which British attach importance in any settlement. (Assume, in this connection, paragraph 2a would cover point of air defense.) This fact, plus prospect close US association with contemplated arrangements would, I believe, mitigate with British in favor of plan.

2. On other hand, plan, as presently drawn up, would undoubtedly raise Parliamentary and public opinion difficulties here. While difficult gauge extent this problem, I believe it sufficiently far-reaching to make it impossible for Churchill to defend initial agreement which publicly concedes evacuation without any assurance regarding future availability of the base and area defnse cooperation unless he were able at some time to give indication that latter questions had been or would be covered in second agreement. This might be done by Churchill taking selected back-benchers and opposition leaders into his confidence re secret commitments outlined paragraph 2 Department reference telegram, appealing to them not to rock boat. However, spreading knowledge of secret commitments this widely is risky procedure in situation where leak might enable Egyptians to maintain that agreement had been vitiated by violation of secrecy. Moreover this procedure could not be applied to press, nor could position probably be held very long in Parliament.

3. Problem might be taken care of here if Naguib could find it possible to make public announcement immediately on conclusion evacuation agreement that now Egypt’s national aspirations have been achieved, he has taken initiative in inviting US and UK (and perhaps others) to discuss area defense arrangements, including training and equipping Egyptian armed forces so that they can play their maximum effective role in common effort. Ambassador Caffery will know whether such a statement is possible, but it seems to me comparable in statesmanship to stand Naguib took on Sudan and to be minimum which would be required to cope with thorny problem here. Against background statement of this kind, I believe Churchill might be able hold off criticism. He, however, is only competent judge of this and I cannot speak with complete conviction on this point.

4. I think suggested terms of reference for base committee (Deptel 7551 May 23),³ could probably be sold with difficulty to British, except for E. Query: Are we convinced that Egypt would not accept arrangement whereby British instructions would be sent directly to senior British technician with copy simultaneously to base commander and perhaps provision for diplomatic consultation in event of disagreement?

5. I have further suggestion on problem of technicians which I throw out without knowledge its possible acceptability to British. Idea would be for Egypt and British Governments to agree to designate and give responsibility to some well-known British engineering firm to undertake care and maintenance certain specified facilities and stores subject right of inspection both parties. Arrangement this kind might, it seems to me, have following advantages:

a. From standpoint Egyptian sensibilities re sovereignty, it might be less onerous have private firm undertake work than UK Government employees.

b. War Office could informally let its requirements be known to London office of firm which could issue necessary directives to technicians on base, thereby obviating British Government formally instructing UK Government employees on Egyptian soil.

c. Eygpt could defend arrangement as being on essentially same basis as any other private firm doing business in Egypt.

d. From UK point of view, arrangement would permit more organized direction and management within base area than would be case with lot of individual government technicians.

6. Major factor in British attitude towards any plan which we may evolve will be extent to which we are prepared to continue to stand firmly with them.

Aldrich

1. Repeated to Cairo as telegram 332 and priority to Athens for the Secretary of State as telegram 161.
2. Printed as telegram 1665 to Karachi, Document 1170.
3. See footnote 5, Document 1170.