Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

684A.86/5–454: Despatch

No. 814
The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State

secret
No. 2613

Cairo, May 4, 1954.

Ref:

• Dept’s CA 6175 of April 28, 1954.

Subject:

• Comments re Measures To Improve Arab-Israeli Border Situations

The following comments are numbered to correspond with the suggested measures listed under section III (B) of the reference instruction.

1. While General Bennike may be considered by the Arabs to be their friend, Colonel Riad has commented to the reporting officer on several occasions recently that “Bennike never talks”. Riad was referring specifically to General Bennike’s recent visit to Cairo with Colonel Hommel to discuss the March 25 and April 4 incidents in the Gaza Strip and the General’s attendance as an observer at the Egyptian-Israeli MAC meetings of April 29. Riad appeared to be disappointed at the General’s lack of initiative and forcefulness.

Not only should higher ranking officers of outstanding ability be appointed as Chairman of the MAC’s but they should (a) serve for a period of two or three months at UNTSO headquarters in Jerusalem and even have some brief practical experience in the field as observers before assuming the chairmanships and (b) serve for a longer period as chairman. The latter point is assuming increasing importance as the Arab and Israeli members of the MAC’s gain experience and become increasingly adept at parliamentary maneuvering.

2. While it is true that old-timers occasionally develop localitis, it is perhaps equally true that short-timers do not have a chance to master the tricks of the trade. It might be risky to shorten the terms of service of observers unless at the same time they are provided with the protection against bamboozlement which UN translators and politico-legal advisers would provide. It should also be noted that the observers provided by other UN members frequently serve for much longer periods than those provided by the US. Perhaps the answer is to decrease the number of US observers.

3. The question of the assignment of expert consultants should be examined closely before being put forward. In the case of experts from the US-Mexican Border Service, hostile critics could make some very crude remarks about their effectiveness in controlling illegal immigration from Mexico while in the case of the British the Egyptians might well take a dim view of their assignment to the Egyptian-Israeli area, at least before an Anglo-Egyptian settlement.

4. Here again the question of assigning politico-legal advisers to each MAC could raise some difficult political questions, particularly if the individuals concerned were great power nationals.

5. Freedom of movement for observers involves the settlement of various other issues such, for example, as the status of the various parties in the demilitarized zones.

6. Improved rules of procedure would be desirable but a great deal could be accomplished under the existing rules if the chairman were better grounded in the subtleties of parliamentary procedure and could thus guide the proceedings with authority.

7. As far as the Arabs are concerned prompt and continuing publicity not only of MAC decisions but of the factual background leading to such decisions would do more than anything to increase the understanding of the UNTSO machinery. It is assumed that such publicity would emanate from UNTSO headquarters in Jerusalem and that the pertinent documentation would be made available on a worldwide basis through UN channels.

8. In the field of equipment there might also be considered floodlights for critical sectors and electrified fences.

9. Publicity regarding incidents and the facts behind MAC decisions would do much to destroy the political and propaganda benefits which the parties now believe are to be derived from the boycotting of meetings.

10. It is doubtful that a mere statement of intent would change the Arab position concerning the definite marking of the demarcation lines. The refugees, in particular, would put little faith in any such statement.

11. In appropriate cases information on punishment of individual violators of the armistice might well be a function of the UN publicity activities envisaged under paragraph seven.

12. The past system might also be extended to permit land transit between Egypt and Jordan.

13. The Egyptian authorities attach great importance to local agreements since the police have generally known their opposite numbers for a considerable period of time and are able to settle many minor incidents which would otherwise clutter up the agenda of the MACs. Reinstatement of local agreements, moreover, would eliminate much of the present competition to see which side can pile up the greatest number of complaints in the MACs.

Jefferson Caffery