784A.00/4–2954: Telegram
No. 813
The Chargé in Israel (Russell) to the Department of State
1140. I saw Eytan, Director General Foreign Ministry, at King David Hotel, Jerusalem yesterday at his invitation. He said Sharett had asked him to say IG convinced United States program of arms aid to Iraq will encourage Arab bellicosity. xIG realizes United States does not intend have arms used against Israel but that is intention of Iraq as shown by recent statements of its leaders. IG not sure of United States strategy but clear to IG what we are in fact doing is building fragile crust of area defense over rotten center (Israel–Arab tension) and that crust must collapse. By giving arms we are putting off day when Arabs will be willing to make settlements; are, indeed, putting premium on intransigeance since Arabs see they can get arms even if they maintain war-like position toward Israel. This step by United States moreover, puts regional cooperation (e.g., water schemes) in different light and interposes obstacles to IG participation, since IG’s desire to cooperate was based on present relative strengths. Does not necessarily mean complete change but must be much heart-searching. Eytan said he had seen reports United States economic aid agreement with Jordan had been drafted to leave out condition of no economic discrimination and Jamali had announced arms were being furnished without conditions attached. IG would be greatly interested to know nature of conditions, if any, under which Iraq is to receive arms.
I told Eytan I understood Israel’s concern but was convinced that realistic appraisal of all factors would lead to conclusion United States program was in Israel’s interest. I pointed out United States had been concerned over dangers which area faced ever since emergence post-war Soviet expansionist policies; that every effort had been made to evolve plan based on cooperation of all countries in area and many approaches toward this end were considered; that with passage of larger part of decade danger was becoming more apparent and imminent and possibility of Arab–Israel cooperation no greater; continued existence of free way of life, in which Israel has as great a stake as any, requires that whatever steps are possible be taken at this time. I said Turkish-Pakistan agreement had been a most favorable development; that while Iraq, to our common distress, had refused up to present time to move in direction of peace with Israel, at same time it was genuinely and intelligently concerned over dangers from north and prepared to take [Page 1539] steps to promote security against them; that in our view it was best to take advantage this latter fact while continuing to do everything possible to promote Israel–Arab peace along whole broad front; that we are convinced it might well prove suicidal for all of us to permit lack of success to date in this latter effort to stand in way of opportunities which are presented to deal with Communist threats in area which have in recent months been increasingly apparent to all and increasingly concrete. I said that no one can minimize unhappiness of present Israel–Arab border situation but at its worst it was preferable to area becoming another Korea or Indochina. I said that as against dangers which Israel feared from program of United States cooperation with Arabs were: (a) United Nations which has established special machinery to deal with problem and which can be strengthened and improved; (b) Tripartite Declaration; (d) United States economic aid to Israel which has accounted for one-third of Israel’s imports during last three years, has amounted to approximately $200 per capita as contrasted to approximately $1 per capita to Arab countries, is largest per capita of economic aid to any country and has given Israel very substantial security against Arab economic warfares; and (d) integral provisions which Congress has placed in arms aid legislation and which State Department and other United States agencies have executed with great care to prevent arms being used in way that would negative [negate] purposes of program. I said I would query Department on specific nature of guarantees and would report to Eytan any information which I could. I said that, to paraphrase Holmes, if I were Israel, arms to Iraq would give me pause but, having paused, I would pass on to cooperative policy in dealing with area’s problems.