974.5301/4–2452: Telegram
No. 426
The Deputy United States Representative
at the United Nations (Gross) to
the Department of State
736. Re Suez: Present at mtg yesterday requested by Eban were Eban, Lourie and Rafael for Israel; Jebb and Laskey for UK; Hoppenot and Ordonneau for France and myself, Ross and Maffitt for USUN.
Eban opened discussion saying Israeli Govt was weighing advisability of calling SC attention to Egyptian failure to implement its Sept 1 SC res but wished Eban first to discuss question with cosponsors, more particularly the 3 most concerned with NE stability and Suez question. Eban stressed he did not consider such discussion premature in view of lack of result of res, length of time situation unfavorable to Israel has existed (3 years) and assurances from Austin and Shone (UK) in past that US and UK formally supported doctrine of maritime freedom. He pointed out no goods for Israel have passed Canal since res, situation in this respect ironically being worse than before res. This state of affairs primarily was due to silence of Egyptians on repeal of restrictive legislation, executive orders, etc, or Egyptian indication that free passage rights will be granted Israeli goods. Shipping companies reluctant accept Israeli orders under these circumstances.
This was first time any SC res “totally without effect”. As time passed without show-down danger grew of Israel appearing to sanetion [Page 922] Egyptian obstruction. Israel had refrained from attempting to cause show-down since it felt solution of Anglo-Eyptian problem would bring with it solution of Suez problem. However, these 2 matters were not necessarily linked and recalling that September 1 resolution was not conditioned on settlement of Anglo-Egyptian question, Eban examined possible courses of action open to Israel if Anglo-Egyptian deadlock remains:
- (1)
- Leave matters as they are;
- (2)
- Without seeking statement of position from Egypt, test out its present Suez policy by putting cargoes on foreign vessels for passage through Canal or sending Israeli ships through Canal;
- (3)
- Make similar test by seeking Egyptian public statement, action in law, or even private intimation through diplomatic channels assuring free passage rights to Israel.
Of these alternatives, Eban felt first out of question for fear of appearing to sanction Egyptian obstruction and because of cost of burden to Israeli economy of costly makeshifts to obtain necessities such as fuel occasioned by Canal being closed to Israel.
Of 2 remaining possibilities, third seemed preferable to Eban as avoiding danger of incident.
Coming to his main point, Eban then inquired whether US, UK and France could make representations to Egypt with view to Cairo’s giving assurances of free passage. These did not need to be public.
I said that while our advocacy of free passage is and has been firm, we wld have to seek US Govt’s reaction to Eban’s statement and inquiry and discuss further thereafter.
Jebb recognized lack of compliance by Egypt but pointed out that at time of res it was generally felt that SC wld support no stronger action than September 1 res; furthermore, Egypt is physically in control of Canal. If question of further SC debate should arise at this time, he was sure UK would see no useful purpose in such debate but since Eban’s proposal was not to this effect he would consult London and be glad to discuss matter further when he had instructions. He emphasized that present moment is critical in Anglo-Egyptian negotiations and voiced doubt that UK would act on Suez matter until outcome of negotiations is known. He had no idea what London wld do if negotiations failed. In reply to Eban’s query whether successful outcome of negotiations would, as matter of course, include solution of Suez restriction problem, Jebb said he would inquire of London.
Hoppenot felt sure SC debate on Suez at this stage wld be fruitless and wld only crystallize Egyptian intransigence; thought that main factor in Suez solution was Anglo-Egyptian negotiations; but supposed that if démarche were decided upon by British and US, [Page 923] France wld associate itself therewith. He suggested that possibly for reasons of face and in order to avoid prejudice to NE defense, Egypt might prefer simply to “overlook” passage of Israeli goods through Canal.
Eban commented that this possibility could be better assessed after Egyptian reply to suggested representations. Jebb thought such course would be easier for Egyptians if they felt sure Israel wld give no publicity to opening up Canal to its goods and ships.
Re this observation and time question I had brought up, Eban thought suggested representations should include mention that Israel intends to utilize its maritime rights to the full. This led me to observe that alternatives 2 and 3 were tactical steps leading to some further objective. I inquired what that objective was, if Egypt refused. Eban replied that if there is case of obstruction in course of test Israel would certainly bring matter to SC. Timing of such action would necessarily be influenced by Israel’s fear that delay might be interpreted as sanction of obstruction, as well as by economic burden on Israel.
In reply to query from Ross whether Israel might obtain some clarification of its questions from Egyptians themselves, Eban said this matter cld not be dealt with by personnel of Israeli-Egypt MAC, only official mtg place of Israel and Egypt, nor through their informal contacts with non-governmental Egyptians.
Speaking for US, France and UK, I said it was clear we were agreed that we shld seek instructions from our govts and renew discussion with Eban after receipt thereof. I undertook to keep in touch with respective dels and arrange such mtg, when circumstances warrant.