Office of the Historian

674.87/8–2254: Telegram

No. 226
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt1

secret
Washington, August 27, 1954—11:14 a.m.

330. We wish explore cautiously all aspects Iraq Egyptian suggestions for area defense arrangements based on revised Arab Collective Security Pact with western adherence (Baghdad’s 104 and following).2 [Page 546] Adoption proposal would involve abandonment our present policy of basing area defense on northern tier concept and Turk-Pakistan pact. We need particularly precise information re manner and timing association western powers and Turkey and Pakistan and nature any moves contemplated on Israel issue. Our attitude necessarily will depend largely on whether Arabs prepared reverse previous anti-Israel orientation Arab League and we therefore especially interested Nuri statement one function new pact would be prepare for peace with Israel. Does Egypt understand arrangements in same manner as Nuri and is she willing proceed at this time?3

When approached by Egyptians (Baghdad’s 105)4 Embassy Cairo should endeavor obtain details but refrain from indicating US attitude.5

Embassy London requested query Foreign Office.6

Smith
  1. Drafted by Burdett and cleared by NE and NEA. Repeated as telegram 108 to Baghdad, 1136 to London, 258 to Ankara, and 261 to Karachi.↩
  2. Dated Aug. 21, not printed. It concerned a conversation with Nuri Said on the Iraqi-Egyptian talks. (674.87/8–2154)↩
  3. Telegram 107 from Baghdad, Aug. 23, reported Salem said time would be needed to erase Egyptian suspicions of Great Britain, while Nuri Said claimed he expected Great Britain and the United States to be associated with the pact from the beginning. (674.87/8–2354) Telegram 244 from Cairo, Aug. 23, suggested differences existed between the Egyptian and Iraqi interpretations on the nature and extent of agreement reached, and had suggested caution until the situation was clarified. (674.87/8–2354)↩
  4. Document 223.↩
  5. Telegram 260 from Cairo, Aug. 27, reported that Salem and Nuri Said did interpret the Sersank conversations differently. Salem had not been authorized to commit the Government of Egypt to anything, and Nasser was not prepared to go along with Iraq in cooperating with the West to the extent that Salem had apparently indicated that Egypt might. (674.87/8–2754)↩
  6. Telegram 1113 from London, Sept. 1, reported some confusion about what had happened at Sersank. On the basis of available information, the Foreign Office was inclined to welcome the Iraqi-Egyptian proposals on the grounds that a lessening of tension between Iraq and Egypt was a good sign. They considered it encouraging that non-Westerners were suggesting a regional organization that would invite Western participation. A British official commented that the Suez settlement had made Great Britain more optimistic about building on the Arab League and less favorable to the northern tier concept, although it did not necessarily consider the two inconsistent. (780.5/9–154)↩