674.87/8–2254: Telegram
No. 223
The Chargé in Iraq (Ireland) to the
Department of State1
105. Conversations with Prime Minister Nuri and members of his government indicate that Nuri and Iraqi Government following Iraqi-Egyptian conversations and agreements are moving away from Turk–Pakistan pact and multilateral arrangements involving Pakistan, Great Britain (Embtel 86, August 17, 1954)2 toward plan invoking Arab Collective Security Pact modified in accordance with Article 51 of the UN charter and expanded to permit membership to non-Arab states. This proposal, given in more detail below, is to be placed before UK and US for their consideration and comments before action by Iraq and Egypt.
As background, Nuri said Egyptians at Sersank had indicated that with signature of Anglo-Egyptian agreement,3 their hostile attitude toward Iraq and to cooperation of Arab states with west had altered. They now saw merit in cooperation with west and were even ready to work toward it.
Egyptians at Sersank opposed Turk–Pakistan pact as well as multilateral arrangements with Pakistan which Nuri admitted he had in mind (reftel). They argued in particular that Pakistan was neither militarily nor geographically analogous any Arab state. When Egyptians asked for alternative proposal as basis for Arab cooperation with west, Nuri said he had brought forward Arab collective security pact, to be suitably modified to meet spirit of Article 51 of UN charter and to permit membership of non-Arab states as Turkey, Great Britain, Iran and Pakistan and even United States. He said he had been surprised at welcome given his proposal by Egyptians.
[Page 542]Prime Minister said agreement subsequently reached along following lines:
- 1.
- ACSP would be modified and expanded along lines given above. Arab states would pledge troops and military support to other Arab states in case of aggression from whatever source. Since Arab public opinion opposed sending troops abroad, they would give only general support to non-Arab states while such states would pledge similar support to Arabs in event aggression. Britain and US might confine themselves to military aid and technical support in peace time and to aid and such forces as were feasible in case of aggression.
- 2.
- One function of new pact would be to prepare for peace with Israel in accordance with UN resolutions, not in exact terms of such resolutions but rather in their spirit. If Israel sincerely wanted peace it should show itself in a conciliatory and peace-minded mood. It was entirely a matter of how much Israel really wanted peace. Arabs could not be forced into making peace but Israel could have peace any time it was ready to talk along UN resolution line.
- 3.
-
This proposal for modified ACSP would be submitted to UK and US for their comment and advice through their embassies in Baghdad by Iraq Government and in Cairo by Egyptian Government Nuri had informed UK Chargé. He was not [now?] informing me with request that information be forwarded to Department. Salem would contact Ambassadors Caffery and Stevenson.
Prime Minister said US reaction and comment on following points particularly desired: (a) What was US attitude in general to ACSP suitably modified and expanded to include non-Arab countries: Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Great Britain and US?
(b) What suggestions could US make as to alterations, deletions, or additions to text of pact to enable it to accomplish this new objective and to win US adherence? Nuri said US draft of desired changes would be most welcome.
(c) Would US adhere to such pact if modified in direction desired by US? He hoped that US would adhere. It would benefit Middle East countries and West and should settle fears of Jewish world concerning peace and safety of Israel.
(d) What was US attitude toward inclusion of France? He believed France should not be asked and hoped that we would not insist. Its influence in Syria and presence in NA [North Africa] were distasteful to all Arabs, If a member it would be continuous source of irritation and trouble.
- 4.
- Until comments of US and UK had been received no action would be taken by Iraq or Egypt nor would proposals and comments be communicated to other Arab states.
- 5.
- Egypt and Iraq would meet in Cairo September 15 to consider replies of US and UK Governments.4
Prime Minister said he hoped US and UK would react favorably. He was supporting the plan because: (1) Objectives of Turkish–Pakistan pact would be achieved more quickly and completely plus [Page 543] advantage of bringing Arab world into Middle East regional defense system immediately, which he understood had been eventual objective of Turkish-Pakistan pact.
(2) Plan would accomplish objective of MEDO which West had put forward in 1951 and while Egypt had rejected and other Arab countries had found objectionable, it had merit, which MEDO did not have, of being put forward by Arab states as indigenous plan.
(3) As an indigenous plan it would be difficult for Arab countries to reject, while Turkish-Pakistan pact would be hard to sell Arab peoples and to ratify.
(4) Place of Israel and its reaction had been carefully considered. Nuri thought pact had merit of concentrating attention Arab states on Soviet menance and diverting it from Israel. Israel’s position under pact should be better than under MEDO. Pact would be in accordance with Article 51 of UN charter and therefore under watchful eye of UN as well as to non-Arab members. Peace with Israel was considered as integral part of the new arrangement.
Nuri said he wanted to make it clear that in putting forward this scheme he was not abandoning principle of regional defense which lay behind Turkish-Pakistan pact. He was still 100 percent for this principle but he believed that the proposal would have great advantages over existing plans.
When asked what effect he thought proposal would have on Anglo-Iraqi treaty, he said that if Great Britain joined pact, the bilateral treaty would be no longer necessary and could be abandoned. The two air bases would, of course, revert to Iraq but agreements drafted by technicians would regulate their use by Great Britain and all other signatories of the pact.
He thought Great Britain would approve and join new pact. It provided a new basis whereby its relations with Iraq could be firmly established. Great Britain had always valued its influence in the Persian Gulf region and its adherence to pact would restore its influence there as well as among the Arab states.
In conclusion, he again expressed hope that Department would react favorably to the proposal.
Embassy comment follows.5
- Repeated to Cairo, Ankara, Karachi, London, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Jerusalem, Tehran, and Tripoli. Transmitted in two parts.↩
-
Telegram 68 from Baghdad, Aug. 9, reported the Egyptian Minister of National Guidance, Maj. Saleh Salem, was expected to arrive in Baghdad on Aug. 13 with a party of about 20. They planned to visit the King and Crown Prince at Sersank for a few days and then go to Baghdad. (674.87/8–954)
Telegram 86 reported that Nuri intended to review Iraq’s foreign policy, not just “Arab policy” with Salem. He intended to propose alteration of the Arab League Collective Security Pact to permit the inclusion of Pakistan, Great Britain, and the United States. If Egypt refused to accept that, Nuri would counter with a proposal that would leave Iraq free to set up a regional defense plan, initially with Pakistan, but later to be expanded to include the Arab States, the United Kingdom, and possibly the United States. (674.87/8–1754)
↩ - Regarding the Heads of Agreement between Egypt and the United Kingdom, signed on July 27, 1954, see Document 1348.↩
- See telegram 358 from Cairo, Document 229.↩
- See telegram 110 from Baghdad, infra.↩