Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

790D.5 MSP/4–954: Telegram

No. 203
The Ambassador in Pakistan (Hildreth) to the Department of State

top secret

Karachi, April 9, 1954—1 p.m.

820. Principal point in military aid disturbing GOP and quite unclear to Embassy is continuing nature program.

Embassy has assumed from policy decisions inherent in “northern tier” defense concept, Turk–Pakistan agreement, et cetera that continuing defense build up of Pakistan was integral part this policy.

Embassy consequently astonished find survey team¹ thinking of “one shot operation” also to discover in their [garble] that “fiscal year 55 MDAP does not contain funds for ME area other than Greece, Turkey and Iran. There is no assurance that future MDAP will contain funds for Pakistan”. Embassy cannot reconcile above with [garble] statement before House Foreign Affairs Committee April 5 that “1955 mutual security program will include continuing authorization for military supplies to Pakistan”.

Team was able satisfactorily explain to Pakistanis restrictive nature their mission which well understood and survey accomplished in best atmosphere and with fullest possible Pakistan cooperation. Nevertheless all high GOP officials feel keenest disappointment and puzzlement over failure receive indications long range character program. Both Governor General and Prime Minister have spoken to me last few days and Governor General pleaded with me go to Washington to report.

Pakistan mood is not helped by voluminous publicity on Indian $85 million program and impression US rushing to placate Nehru. Embassy understands $2 million civil aviation program for India just signed. (Seeming capitulation on attrition US observers will not help matters and Prime Minister and Governor General both feel World Bank proposal on canal waters shows desire to appease India because of decision give GOP military aid.² Prime Minister has again mentioned gravity Pakistan commitment to West and suggested Iraq others would watch Pakistan see whether commitment was worth risks.

While naturally tending exaggerate risks of new policy and assuming somewhat self-righteous attitude, nevertheless Pakistanis in some justice point seriousness their decision both internally and externally.

Embassy cannot help noting difference Pakistan and Indian attitude of Indochina airlift not to mention complete cooperation we receive from Pakistanis in every field. While natural Pakistan instinct is to ask for moon nevertheless we believe regrettable that by time survey team arrived thinking of Defense and State Departments had not been coordinated sufficiently so that survey team or Embassy could have given some assurance on future prospects and long range objectives our aid programs here. Detailed despatches Saturday pouch.³

Hildreth

1. Brig. Gen. Harry F. Meyers headed a U.S. military survey team which visited Pakistan.
2. For documentation on this subject, see vol. XI, Part 2, pp. 1633 ff.
3. Under cover of despatch 649 from Karachi, Apr. 8, Ambassador Hildreth transmitted to the Department the minutes of the meetings described herein, as drafted by the Pakistanis, none printed. (790D.5 MSP/4–854)