661.93/11–2354: Circular airgram
No. 632
The Secretary of
State to All Diplomatic and Consular
Missions1
CA–3400
Subject:
- Counteracting Possible Misinterpretation of Recent Sino-Soviet Accords
Some reports reaching the Department have interpreted the Sino-Soviet communiqués of October 12, 19542 as (1) a significant shift in Sino-Soviet relations in favor of China, or (2) as an indication of a struggle between the two Communist powers, out of which China has emerged victorious. The Department feels that these ideas are erroneous and that their acceptance might lead to a dangerous over-evaluation of Communist China’s strength and willingness to follow courses of independent action. The following observations are therefore made for the guidance of officers in the field in discussing the agreements with their contacts among foreign officials, subject to the discretion of the field and to the general caution that United States officials should not give these communiqués undue importance by calling special attention to them.
The communiqués must be considered from two viewpoints: (1) the impression they were calculated to give to the world, particularly Asia, (2) how they mirror Sino-Soviet relations. Without doubt the communiqués were designed to give the impression that Communist China enjoys a new degree of independence from and equality with the Soviet Union. In particular, they were designed to (a) heighten Communist China’s prestige in order to strengthen her in her drive for a leadership in Asia and for recognition as a world power (through admission to the United Nations and by diplomatic recognition by other states), and (b) to promote the current Communist [Page 1262] theme of peaceful coexistence by encouraging the belief that close association with the Communist bloc is compatible with sovereignty and independence and does not entail subservience to Moscow.
Further, it was probably in the interest of both powers for the purposes of the advancement of the Communist movement in Asia, to give the impression that the Soviets have now accorded a position of approximate equality to China. Thus, a liquidation of Soviet footholds in China which had been often interpreted by sensitive Asians as European extra-territoriality was dramatically announced in the communiqués. Apart from this intention to foster the impression that the Communist Chinese regime has been accorded a position of approximate equality, the agreements did not reveal anything essentially new; the scheduled withdrawal of Soviet troops merely implemented a commitment given in 1950; the level of economic aid announced continues to be niggardly; the liquidation of the joint stock companies followed a pattern already well underway in the Eastern European Communist bloc.
The new agreements although designed to have maximum propaganda usefulness, may reflect some real, though not fundamental, adjustments in the relations between the two regimes. There is no reason to believe that any readjustment put a serious strain on the partnership, which is based on strong ties of ideology, common objectives, and shared hostility to the free world. Communist China continues to accept the role of a junior partner in the coalition, because of the Soviet Union’s greater economic and diplomatic experience and its possession of the sinews of power, economic, political, and military resources. The communiqués reflect the continuing Soviet acknowledgment that Communist China occupies a more important and independent position in the Communist hierarchy than do the Soviet Union’s Eastern European satellites. It seems certain that the Soviet Union, in its own national interests and in order to maintain its supremacy in the world of Communism, attaches high importance to its paramount position in China. This influence is asserted by “advice” given through party channels, and Soviet aid programs and technical advisers.
The communiqués present the picture of a common front on foreign affairs. There are, however, at least two indications of some degree of Soviet uneasiness in this field. A special point was made, in the guise of mutually-assumed obligations, to commit the Chinese Government to consultation with the Soviet Government on all aspects of policy which might be of mutual interest. This stress on mutual consultation probably was sought as a general check on Chinese Communist foreign policy. The language used in referring to Formosa, noticeably milder than that habitually employed by [Page 1263] Chinese Communists, may reflect the Soviet Union’s concern lest Communist China take action dangerous to Soviet security on the Formosa question. Other signs would seem to confirm the impression that the Soviet Government looks with less enthusiasm than does the Chinese Communist regime on a potentially dangerous breach of the peace in the Far East.
In summation, however, despite the above indications of differences of emphasis on policy matters, and despite Communist China’s “junior partner” status, it should be emphasized that these communiqués reflect the high degree of identification which characterizes the interests and objectives of the Soviet Union and the Peiping regime. Every effort must be made to emphasize this unity of purpose, as well as the basic unchanging dedication of the two regimes to the creation of a Communist-dominated world through coordinated subversion.
- Drafted by Walter P. McConaughy and Edwin W. Martin, Director and Deputy Director, respectively, of the Office of Chinese Affairs (CA), and by David L. Osborne (CA) and Robert O. Blake (EE); cleared by Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. Robertson and Merchant (EUR); and approved for transmission by Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy.↩
- Telegram 530 from Moscow, Oct. 12, reported a description of the eight communiqués and joint declarations that constituted the Soviet-Chinese agreements of Oct. 12. The translated texts of these agreements are printed in Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1954, pp. 321–327.↩