Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

611.61/11–854: Telegram

No. 631
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Moscow, November 8, 1954—7 p.m.

725. Conversation with Malenkov¹ took place standing up behind table and was carried on without interpreter (Embassy telegram 720²). Malenkov said to both British Ambassador³ and myself—although obviously directing his remarks to me—that in present state of world diplomats had very important responsibility, particularly in not permitting “small matters” to develop into big issues. He said that when there was “coolness at the top” between governments, minor questions were sure to arise and that patience and care were needed. (Although not so stated, it seemed to be clear that he was referring to Stiff-Sommerlatte incident⁴ although he might possibly have had in mind latest plane incident.⁵)

I told him that I was in complete agreement with him and that since I had been in Moscow, whenever a minor question arose, I had in every case attempted to deal with it confidentially and quietly with Soviet Foreign Office, but that I must tell him in all frankness that position taken by Soviet Government in regard to minor incidents was what sometimes caused them to be blown up into major issues. Malenkov did not dispute my statement and looked rather quizzically at Molotov who at this point joined the group. Malenkov continued, addressing both British Ambassador and myself, that also diplomats had a very important function in conveying accurately to their governments the real sentiments of the government to which they were accredited and that he hoped we understood that Soviet desire for peace and normal relations was very serious and sincere; that Soviet people and Government wanted peace in order to pursue their plans of internal development; that world situation was serious and many of the outstanding questions would take time and patience before they could be settled by negotiation which Soviet Government considered to be the only proper method of resolving disputes.

At this point, strongly supported by British Ambassador, I pointed out to Malenkov that he must understand that diplomacy operated under very special and peculiar circumstances in Moscow, mentioning almost total absence of normal contact between foreign representatives and Soviet leaders. I told him I had not asked to see him because I had no special proposals from my government to make to him and did not wish to take up his time in a purely ceremonial visit. He said that lack of contacts therefore, in my case had been because I had not sought it. Both British Ambassador and I pointed out that this was not what we had in mind, but that in other capitals there were innumerable opportunities for normal informal contacts which were not present in Moscow. Malenkov then made the interesting observation that they were trying to create “conditions” which would improve the situation in this respect.

Turning specifically to United States, Malenkov said that Soviet Government had noticed that policy pursued by President Roosevelt⁶ had been reversed by United States Government and that President Roosevelt had been strongly criticized for his policy at Yalta and at other conferences. I told him that as he was undoubtedly aware, I had been Roosevelt’s interpreter and had seen with what sincerity the President had attempted to find a basis for relations with the Soviet Union. I added that my views on this subject were a matter of public record which Malenkov said he realized. I went on to say that I thought Soviet Government was making a very serious mistake if it misunderstood the reason why relations between United States and Soviet Union had deteriorated and that since he had mentioned the wartime agreements, I could tell him that the American people had been greatly disillusioned by attitude of Soviet Government towards these agreements. At this point, Malenkov interjected the standard statement that Soviet Union always abided by its agreements. I told him that I had seen President Roosevelt up to a few days before his death and that he had been very deeply concerned at the attitude of Soviet Government concerning these agreements; that his messages in late March and April 1945 which must be in files of Soviet Government clearly reflected this concern, to which Malenkov nodded agreement. I added that Mr. Harry Hopkins directly in my presence in May 1945 had said the same thing to Marshal Stalin.⁷ This led to a discussion of United States political scene on which I told Mr. Malenkov that, judging from Soviet press, I found little evidence of knowledge, to say nothing of understanding, concerning the United States and that, with reference to his statement concerning the importance of objective reporting by diplomats, I could only say that there was vast room for improvement in regard to information concerning the United States. I said I thought the constant use of the worn out clichés concerning Wall Street, et cetera, which was the image of the United States presented to Soviet people by press here was neither serious nor realistic and I could think of nothing more dangerous or incorrect than an attempt to draw a distinction between the policy of the United States and the sentiments of its people. At this point, Kaganovich who had joined the group referred to speeches and statements appearing in United States press hostile to Soviet Union and promoting the idea of war. I repeated that I thought Soviet Government could well undertake a more serious study of United States and how it functioned other than mere collection of isolated items in US press which being free, expressed a great diversity of opinion. Malenkov listened most attentively to this and merely remarked that foreigners frequently thought that leaders of Soviet Government had nothing better to do than to dictate every item in Soviet press, to which I replied that no one seriously believed that they had time to devote to every detail in the press but I had noticed a certain consistency of treatment on any given subject. In urging Malenkov to a more realistic appraisal of US, its purposes and policies, I mentioned that our political scene was somewhat more “complicated” than his, to which he laughed and agreed.

Malenkov with appearance of great earnestness said to both British Ambassador and myself that it was frequently believed that Soviet Union in attempting to improve its relations with England was doing so “at the expense” of its relations with US. He said that this was not “solid” or serious and that Soviet Government was not so foolish as to try so stupid a game as this. He said there were apparently greater possibilities in some fields than in others but emphasized that Soviet Government desired to have normal and good relations with all countries. At one point the Paris agreements came up and he said that they believed something should be done “before their ratification”, to which I replied that we believed prospects for normalization of relations would be better after their entry into force. He did not pursue the subject any further.

As indicated previously, there was nothing startling or especially new in this conversation with Malenkov but it was singularly free, on his side, of usual mechanical clichés which other Soviet officials including Molotov invariably use. He seemed particularly desirous of impressing upon us seriousness with which Soviet Union viewed world scene and of its desire to prevent it turning into war. He made on me an impression of a man of great determination and ruthlessness but with a more subtle and highly developed intelligence than his associates.

I mentioned to him casually during conversation that there was possibility that I might be returning to Washington for routine consultation following my trip to Sweden. I did so in order avoid any impression when it became known that it was due to sudden emergency decision on part US Government.

Although I was not present I gather that in his talk with Congressman Wickersham Malenkov sent message to President Eisenhower concerning Soviet desire for friendship good relations et cetera, together with an expression of his personal esteem for the President as “a fine soldier and an honorable man.” As understood by some members of staff who were present, on departing, Malenkov said to Wickersham that “as situation stands now, we are ready to turn back to US”.

French Ambassador⁸ told me also that Khrushchev (who as far as I could gather is not especially bright) said that if Paris agreements went into effect, Soviet Union would have to embark on larger defense program, to which French Ambassador replied he doubted it since they had never let up on their military preparations since end of war.

While obviously exchanges at reception of this character are traditional and do not have any direct bearing on Soviet policy, there is no doubt that last night Soviet officials went out of their way, particularly in regard to US, to emphasize seriousness of their desire for normal relations. The attitude of Malenkov and other Soviet officials together with restrained tone of speeches over holidays I believe reflect the hesitancy and concern of Soviet Government when confronted with situation, particularly in regard to West German rearmament, which they realize are not in position to do much about.

Bohlen

1. For a subsequent, personal assessment of this conversation, see Bohlen, Witness to History, p. 370.
2. Supra.
3. Sir William Hayter.
4. On Oct. 26, the Soviet Government declared the wife of Embassy Second Secretary and Vice Consul Karl Sommerlatte to be persona non grata.
5. Reference here is to Ambassador Bohlen’s Nov. 8 protest regarding the downing of a U.S. B–29 aircraft by Soviet aircraft; for text of the note, a Nov. 7 Soviet note, and a Nov. 17 U.S. note, see Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 29, 1954, p. 811.
6. Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, Mar. 4, 1933–Apr. 12, 1945.
7. Regarding the mission to Moscow in May 1945 by Harry L. Hopkins, Adviser and Assistant to President Harry S. Truman, see Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. I, pp. 21–62.
8. Louis Joxe.