Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

761.00/1–2054: Telegram

No. 615
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State¹

top secret
priority

Moscow, January 20, 1954—6 p.m.

882. On eve of Berlin conference² it would appear appropriate to summarize briefly certain compulsions, inhibitions and contradictions which appear from here to affect, if not indeed in large measure control, present Soviet foreign policy. Since these spring primarily from internal political and economic developments since death of Stalin, they have perhaps not been as visible abroad as other elements of present Soviet policy such as opposition to EDC, US bases, desire to divide Europe from US, etc.

1. The first of these factors is the attempt made by Stalin’s successors to institute group rule at the top as against the total power of one individual. Whether or not this attempt succeeds or fails is of course the big open question for future. However, adoption of this principle of dictatorship as against one-man rule has already produced important changes in methods with inevitable bearing on Soviet relations and attitudes towards non-Soviet world. As already reported, by its nature, group rule does not have same monolithic precision as absolute dictatorship of one man and possibilities of serious difference of opinion at summit are greatly enhanced as a result. For that reason leadership as already demonstrated by shift on conference issue between November 3 and 26³ is more vulnerable to external factors such as public opinion both at home and abroad.

2. Soviet Government has committed itself very deeply to certain new internal policies especially in economic field. They have undertaken within next two to three years to produce an appreciable rise in standard of living and the development of agriculture, consumer goods and domestic trade. It is not necessary here to examine in detail what economic consequences in field of armament and tempo of heavy industrial development these programs may entail but merely to point out that government is so deeply committed to these programs that any sharp reversal in this field would create in my opinion a very serious situation for regime.

In circumstances entire present domestic program of Soviet Government dictates necessity of avoidance of international complications of a serious nature. It is for this reason and not because of any statements made by Soviet leaders that I believe new regime needs and genuinely desires some relaxation in international tension. They have, in effect, promised their people (1) relief from threat of war, (2) an important improvement in their standard of living and well-being, and (3) an increased element of personal security for average law-abiding citizen. The chances of success in these three fields are at best problematical but they are doomed to almost certain failure in event that international situation returns to a state of crisis. In short, for this phase of its development (we are of course not dealing now with Soviet policy or attitudes several years from now), Soviet Government by its own domestic policies to say nothing of greatly complicated problem of control over satellites has made peace an imperative necessity for present regime. As against this, however, must be placed equal determination of Soviet leaders not to give up any territory which they acquired as result of World War II. This determination I believe is based not only on obvious factors such as strategic advantage of forward positions, et cetera, but more directly upon the repercussions which abandonment of any Sovietized regime such as in East Germany would have on satellite neighbors and possibly eventually on maintenance Soviet system in Russia.

The Soviets would of course like to have benefit of both—that is, achieve some relaxation of tension especially in field of armaments without yielding any territory which they control at present time. I emphasize this contradiction (previously reported Embtel 659⁴) in Soviet position since I feel its recognition and exploitation could be of considerable value to western strategy at Berlin in not allowing Soviets to escape from consequences of this basic contradiction which they face. In other words, if they can be made to recognize that a genuine reduction in tension is only possible by serious concessions on their part I believe we can present Soviet leadership with a choice which is almost certain to provoke dissension and even real division. I do not anticipate in any sense that it would be possible or even desirable to bring this contradiction to a head at Berlin.

The factors outlined above are not temporary phenomena but will continue to affect Soviet policy for at least next two or three years. These long-range considerations should be well worth keeping in mind during Berlin conference and may be helpful in resisting temptation on part of our allies to make unnecessary concessions in belief that something must be done quickly with Soviet Union.

Bohlen

1. Repeated for information to London, Paris, and Bonn.
2. The Four-Power Conference met at Berlin, Jan. 25–Feb. 18.
3. For information on the Soviet notes of Nov. 3 and 26, see Document 611.
4. Document 611.