Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

661.00/12–554: Telegram

No. 611
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State¹

secret

Moscow, December 5, 1953—7 p.m.

659. In addition to factors discussed in Embtel 624² which caused shift in Soviet position between November 3 and November 26 following considerations which may have played part in this development are worth examining.

It is possible that Soviet Government realized far-reaching implications mentioned Embtel 624 of a continued insistence on Chinese Communist participation as price for meeting. Tripartite note November 16 must have revealed to Kremlin that issue of Chinese participation was not in itself sufficient to divide three Western powers and therefore as long as this Chinese condition was maintained there was no prospect of any important contact with chief Western powers for indefinite future. It is likely that logical consequence of absence of any communication between East and West for a long period of time with blame resting squarely on Soviet Union was viewed with genuine concern by Soviet Government. Apart from fact that such a situation would serve to enhance Western solidarity, and materially assist in adoption EDC, it would almost inevitably mean return to intensified cold war and re-emergence of element crisis in international relations with accompanying increased danger war which Soviet Government if only because of domestic programs initiated this summer in agriculture, consumer goods and trade fields would not wish to see. Incompatibility between atmosphere of enhanced crisis in its international relations and these domestic programs both in USSR and satellites would be obvious even to Soviet bloc population.

It is belief of most foreign observers in Moscow that present regime genuinely desires to avoid complications and adventures in its foreign relations while domestic program to which government deeply committed is in progress. Soviet Government thus finds itself, as previously reported, confronted with major contradictions in its foreign relations: On one hand, desire to avoid accentuation tension in international relations with accompanying danger of war, and on other, determination to give up territorial acquisitions obtained as result of war, where Soviet form of society has been imposed. Soviet shift even of tactical position in space of three weeks is most unusual in Soviet practice and would not have taken place during Stalin regime. It, in all probability, was subject of considerable debate and possibly difference of opinion in hierarchy. External evidence of Soviet periodicals which went to press around November 26 and obvious surprise at Vienna peace conference indicate that this shift was not planned very far in advance since articles in these periodicals, i.e. Kommunist, New Times, continue emphasize condition of Chinese [garble] participation. This shift in position is illustrative of fact reported as far back as April (Embtel 1518³) that present direction Soviet Union is not in position to exercise same total cynical disregard contrast between Soviet word and deed possible under Stalin. Third factor of interest set off by note of November 26 which may possibly have some bearing on Soviet position and tactics at any four-power conference has been new formulation in regard to concept of Europe. Whereas previous Soviet propaganda had stressed two-world concept in ideological sense, Department will have noted that November 26 note speaks in terms of Europe as geographic concept and for first time since war does not reject out of hand idea that Eastern European nations and their relationship to European security are subjects for discussion. Heretofore Eastern European countries and in particular their relationship to rest of Europe have been regarded as outside of any discussion especially in political and security fields. Articles in Soviet press subsequent to November 26 note have stressed this new line of “Europe for the Europeans” with Anglo-Soviet and France-Soviet treaties as basis for such development without US (note difference in text November 26 note and reference Malenkov to British Ambassador that UK European country Embtel 631⁴). It is to be anticipated that theme will become one of chief lines Soviet propaganda prior to and at any four-power conference. Its aim, of course, is to seek to differentiate between interests of Europe including UK as against activities in Europe of “non-European countries”—the United States. It may likewise foreshadow at conference Soviet proposals for European regional security which of course would involve chief aim of present Soviet policy in Europe: i.e., European agreement for limitation and control of any German armament with ultimate aim of squeezing US out of Europe. Department will recall in this connection that only point on which Molotov said Hitler found themselves in enthusiastic agreement in November 1940 was on desirability exclusion US from participation European affairs.

On specific problem of Germany, inclined to doubt if Soviets yet prepared to contemplate downfall GDR which would presumably be consequence of free elections (Bonn’s 102⁵). Believe more likely that they will continue present line of insisting that German unification, elections and other attendant factors matter for two German regimes to work out while four powers confine themselves to peace treaty and other aspects German foreign relations.

The foregoing is submitted for possible assistance in consideration of present and future lines Soviet policy.

Department pass Bermuda if desired.

Bohlen

1. Repeated for information to London, Paris, and Bonn.
2. In telegram 624, Ambassador Bohlen offered his analysis of the significance of the Soviet notes of Nov. 3 and Nov. 26 to France, the United Kingdom, and the United States regarding the Austrian and German problems. Bohlen said he could discern no basic shift in the Soviet attitudes toward the Austrian and German problems, but he found it important to try to identify the circumstances and considerations that forced or induced the Soviet Government to finally accept the principle of a four-power meeting on the problems. (661.62/11–2753) For full documentation on these notes and the Western communications to which they replied, see vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 658 ff.
3. Printed as telegram 448 from Moscow, Document 585.
4. Not printed. (641.61/11–2853)
5. Not printed.