Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “USSR”

No. 610
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie)¹

top secret

[Washington,] October 14, 1953.

Subject:

• Direct Discussion Between United States and U.S.S.R. of Current Problems.

(Reference:

• Your Memorandum of September 28, 1953;²
• Mr. Knight’s Memorandum of October 2, 1953;
• Mr. Beam’s Memorandum of October 6, 1953;³
• Mr. Adair’s Memorandum of October 7, 1953.⁴)

In your memorandum of September 28, 1953 you requested a statement of views concerning problems which might be capable of being discussed separately by the US with the Soviets, as opposed to those problems which are so interdependent that separate US–Soviet negotiations concerning them would not be possible.

Consideration of the possibility of separate US–Soviet negotiations regarding outstanding problems at issue involves two questions: (1) agreement between the US and the USSR as to the degree of interdependence of issues involved; and (2) the propriety of individual action on the part of the US in connection with problems which are of direct interest to our Allies.

With regard to the first question, it seems clear, as pointed out in Mr. Adair’s memorandum (copy attached), that the USSR is presently endeavoring to attribute a high degree of interdependence to the major problems at issue between us. Whereas we are attempting to promote a separate solution of the Austrian question, for example, the Soviets take the position that this question is linked with a German settlement, which in turn is said to be related to general problems of international tension, including those in the Far East. This line is calculated to postpone concrete discussion of Austria and Germany, as well as insuring that, if negotiations are ever undertaken on the basis of the Soviet request for a review of the broad range of problems at issue, the USSR will stand to gain propaganda advantages through offering appealing concessions in one problem area but only in return for impossible or highly undesirable concessions from our side in another area. There is no reason to suppose that this attitude on the part of the USSR will change in the near future since, while the USSR seems disposed to seek a temporary abatement of the more extreme forms of international tension, there is no indication that the USSR finds it necessary to abandon its position of opposition to the US on basic problems at issue. Viewed in this light, it does not appear likely that the USSR would be willing to agree to negotiate seriously with the US on any separate political problems of major importance. It is possible, however, that the Soviets would be agreeable to talking with us regarding problems of relatively minor significance.

With regard to the second question raised above, that of the propriety of individual action on our part in connection with problems of direct interest to our Allies, it would appear that this consideration alone would preclude us from undertaking separate negotiations on the German and Austrian questions, regarding which our tripartite position is so well established and so far advanced. The same would hold true, we believe, with regard to Indochina, in view of the direct French interest there.

While we think that the prospects of negotiations between the US and the USSR regarding problems of major importance are not favorable, there are discussed below certain issues which could conceivably be discussed on a separate basis:

1. Armaments Controls: Although we have emphasized in the past that this is a matter to be discussed in the forum of the UN, and have stressed that armament control is something which is, in fact, linked with problems of world tension and can only be resolved after tensions are lessened, it would be possible to justify an initiative on our part for direct talks with the USSR on the basis of the necessity for agreement between the two major atomic powers if armament control is to be successful. Such an initiative might be accepted by the Soviets as presenting an opportunity to negotiate endlessly without reaching agreement. This would offer us the possibility of at least talking with the Soviets on armament control, although it is difficult to see any other advantages accruing from it, in view of the unrealism of discussing armament control, in the absence of any change in the basic hostility of the USSR to the non-Soviet world and the virtual certainty that the Soviet state in its present form could never agree to a verification system satisfactory to the US.

2. Korea: We have represented the UN in negotiations with the Communist side in Korea and it would therefore appear appropriate, from the standpoint of our Allies, to approach the USSR directly regarding aspects of a Korean settlement. It is doubted, however, if the USSR would be prepared to involve itself directly in negotiations on Korea or to consider changes in the status quo in Korea in an exclusive context. Soviet agreement to a united, non-Communist Korea appears unlikely under any circumstances, and in any event could not be obtained without the granting of Western concessions in regard to other issues which we would consider undesirable.

3. Berlin: While there is a clear tripartite interest in Berlin, there is a precedent for direct US–Soviet negotiations regarding Berlin which was set in the Malik–Jessup talks leading to the lifting of the blockade. Since the Soviets must be presumed, especially after June 17, to be more anxious than ever to weaken the position of the Western allies in Berlin, they probably could be persuaded to discuss the problem of Berlin separately in the hope of obtaining favorable concessions. However, given the diametrical opposition of the US and Soviet objectives in Berlin, where the East-West clash is revealed in its sharpest form, the chances of success from such a discussion would appear minimal. It seems probable that the question of Berlin is not capable of negotiation in the absence of a German settlement.

4. Austrian Economic Problems: The suggestion made by Mr. Beam in his memorandum of October 6 (a somewhat similar one was made by Vienna in Embtel 844⁵) that we take the lead in requesting a reexamination of Austrian economic problems by the Occupation Authorities should be explored. In view of the apparent disposition of the Soviets to lighten the burden of their occupation in Austria, such an approach, if made after Soviet willingness to discuss a treaty at Lugano has been tested again, might bring favorable results.

5. Danube Waterway: The possible review of the convention controlling navigation of the Danube is a question which might be discussed with the Soviets, although it is doubtful if they would consider changes in the convention in the absence of a German and Austrian settlement.

6. Cultural Exchange and East-West Trade: We have noted the suggestion made by Mr. Beam in his memorandum of October 6 that some kind of arrangement might be worked out with the USSR in view of the Soviet interest in promoting East-West Trade and our own interest in bringing about an increase in cultural exchange with the Soviet Bloc. While it appears that the USSR might well be disposed to discuss cultural exchange with us, our own position with regard to the feasibility of developing cultural exchange is unfavorable. Our present immigration laws make it very difficult for us to accept non-official visitors to the United States from Soviet Bloc countries, a fact demonstrated most clearly in the case of the proposed visit of a Soviet chess team to the United States last July. In view of our inability to encourage visits of Soviet Bloc persons to this country, it would not be advisable for us, under present immigration restrictions, to push the question of cultural exchange with the USSR.

It is possible, of course, that cultural exchange could be increased between Western Europe and the Soviet Bloc, although it may be doubted if the benefits which would be gained by such increase would warrant greater support from the US in the direction of increasing East-West trade.

7. Non-Aggression Pacts: Our present policy of linking any kind of European security arrangements with a German settlement and of discouraging consideration of such arrangements on a separate basis would seem to preclude private discussion between the US and the USSR of this subject.

8. Communist China and Formosa: The USSR would probably be pleased to discuss directly with the US the recognition of Communist China by the United States, the admission of Communist China to the UN, and a change in the status of Formosa. It is difficult to see how these questions could be unlinked from a broad discussion of Far Eastern problems, even if we desired to do so, which in turn is highly doubtful.

In summary, it would appear that the possibility of separating out current problems for direct US–Soviet discussion is not promising. It seems most likely that the Soviets will continue for the foreseeable future to insist on the interdependence of major political questions and will refuse to consider seriously the possibility of their resolution on a separate basis.

There are, of course, a number of issues of strictly bilateral interest between the US and the USSR (Lend-Lease, plane incidents, American citizens, VOA jamming, Amerika Magazine) concerning which diplomatic negotiations might offer more hope of success than the larger problems discussed above.

1. Drafted by Stoessel (EE) and cleared by Barbour (EE), Ridgway B. Knight (EUR/WE), and Ben Tillman Moore, Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs.

2. Bowie’s memorandum reads:

   “At a meeting Saturday morning, September 26, on the German and Austrian problems, the Secretary raised the question as to which of the problems, among those currently at issue between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., might be capable of being discussed separately with the Soviets with some degree of success and which were too interdependent for separate solution.

   “In order to follow up on this question, I would appreciate a brief memo of your views concerning the interdependence or separability of the various problems outstanding between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.” (PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “USSR”)

3. Neither Knight’s nor Beam’s memorandum is printed.
4. Not printed. Charles W. Adair, Jr., of the Office of European Regional Affairs.
5. Dated Oct. 2; for text, see vol. VII, Part 2, p. 1902.