Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

661.00/7–753: Telegram

No. 600
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State¹

top secret

Moscow, July 7, 1953—10 p.m.

36. In view of fact that I will be absent for several weeks from Soviet Union² and forthcoming tripartite Foreign Ministers meetings, I feel it appropriate to set forth certain conclusions concerning significant developments in Soviet Union since Stalin’s death without waiting as had been my original intention for outcome of Korean armistice talks. The events on which these conclusions are based have been reported as they occurred with appropriate comment from this mission. It is wise and, indeed, essential to exercise the utmost prudence and skepticism concerning significance Soviet moves since Stalin’s death. I believe that we can no longer without detriment to our purposes continue to dismiss the present phase of Soviet policy both internal and external as simply another “peace campaign” designed solely or even primarily to bemuse and divide the West. The events that have occurred here cumulatively add up, in my opinion, to something considerably more important, offering on the one hand more opportunities and on the other considerably more dangers than the standard propaganda gestures which we have seen since the end of the war.

I am impelled, in part, in this telegram by Deptel 16³ which while directed primarily to satellite countries nonetheless in second paragraph contains estimate of present Soviet actions which I feel does not realistically accord with full scope events since Stalin’s death. In order to avoid misinterpretation it is necessary to repeat certain fundamental premises:

1. The Soviet Union remains a totalitarian police dictatorship, reinforced by a highly integrated ideology and consequently basically continues to regard all countries and organizations which it does not control as basically hostile and no change in this respect can be anticipated as long as basic structure of Soviet society remains unaltered.

2. Stemming from above, Soviet policy naturally will always hope for disruption of any association or alliance inevitably regarded by them as hostile. It has, however, not been characteristic of Soviet policy and in my opinion still is not, to adopt measures which affect their internal power structure merely for the sake of some maneuver designed to confuse their enemies.

While events set in motion by Stalin’s death in regard to the Soviet Union proper and its relations with satellite areas have by no means run their course, I believe there is sufficient evidence to warrant as reasonable assumptions the following considerations: (These, of course, should be viewed in the light of the constant possibility that future events either internal or external could radically affect their future validity.)

(1) Fear of general war—even before the death of Stalin there was evidence that the Soviet Government was becoming genuinely concerned as the prospect that the intensity of the cold war resulting from their attitude and actions in postwar world was leading to a situation where events could take over with the consequent automatic progression towards general war which I believe at all times the Soviet Union has been most anxious to avoid. Subsequent events since his death have confirmed view that this was the central purpose in the political field of Stalin’s Bolshevik article with its assertion that contradictions between capitalist states were de facto stronger than the contradiction between the Soviet and non-Soviet world. The logic of this position would appear to have dictated a return to diplomacy as a means of furthering Soviet interest and averting the progression towards war.

(2) The death of Stalin, requiring an important if not yet basic reorganization of the direction of the Soviet Union, offered an opportunity to put this policy into operation as something new with the employment of methods impossible under Stalin’s one-man dictatorship.

(3) Although evidence is insufficient to justify a firm conclusion on this point, it is possible that the economic strain of the multiple burden of great armament expenditures, capital investment and inflated public works programs plus the political necessity of making some concession to the material well-being of the people may be a factor.

(4) The problem following Stalin’s death of retaining without the possibility of recourse to Stalin’s methods of rule, the hold over the Eastern European satellites and the increasing complexity of relations with Communist China presented the new leadership with the almost definite necessity of some shift in policy in these fields.

Internal measures—While we simply do not know what forms of combinations or rivalries are transpiring in the upper reaches of the Soviet Government, I can only report that the principle of collective leadership as against one-man rule has been consistently and steadily developed in this country since Stalin’s death. It has been driven home not only in the central press and given ideological underpinnings in the theoretical party journals but also has been disseminated in depth according to our information in factory and party meetings throughout the country. It would be a folly to attempt to predict that this experiment in impersonal collective leadership will last indefinitely and we can never dismiss the possibility of dissension at top level or some other event which might radically change the current line. It can only be stated now as a matter of opinion that if there is a radical reversal of present tendency back to the state of arbitrary terror characteristic of Stalin’s rule, this would come as a shock to the population of this country and would impose severe strains on the system. The present lines on which new leadership is operating internally have become sufficiently clear to be identified and they all seem to point in the direction of a less rigorous and more “liberal” regime in Soviet terms of reference. They are:

(a) Primary emphasis on the necessity of improving the standard of living of the population as the chief “duty” of the party and government (a point which has been stressed in recent developments in East Germany and Hungary).

(b) Legality in the sense of less arbitrary exercise of police power and more respect for the right of the individual citizens.

(c) Emphasis on the nationality policy of respect for the internal and other national attributes of minorities in this country and their denunciation of the policy of Russification.

(d) As an essential accompaniment the skillful but nonetheless consistent destruction of the myth of Stalin’s infallibility and his relegation as a junior member of the Communist Valhalla with obviously carefully considered selection of what part of his policies or programs can be retained and what discarded.

In its foreign relations most evidence to date would indicate that the Soviet Government desires a return to diplomacy and a lessening of world tension for an indefinite period of time. It is too soon to say in what substantive fields they would be prepared to make concessions or abandon their previous hold over areas such as Eastern Germany, Austria, etc., in Europe. It looks, however, from here as though the series of moves that it has made—such as the note to Turkey, exchange of Ambassadors with Austria and Yugoslavia—are primarily designed to jettison the more senseless and unproductive positions in which Stalin had placed them and as preparation for some serious diplomatic action in the coming period. The most important events which have occurred in the field of Soviet action as against words would appear to be in Eastern Germany and to a considerably lesser degree in the satellite area. The new policy announced in early June for Eastern Germany which so far as we can ascertain from here has not been reversed by the events in Berlin on June 17,⁴ I do not believe can be solely dismissed as a “tactical” maneuver designed to influence West Germany opinion. They would appear to have been motivated as previously reported by recognition of bankruptcy of policy of forced draft Sovietization of Eastern Germany and possibly likewise to place Soviet Government in a better political position for serious discussions on German unification. There is no need to argue the point that the Soviet objective remains the prevention of German rearmament and incorporation into European defense system. But as distinct from previous efforts in this direction which were confined to propaganda and threats the present developments would appear to forecast a more serious political and diplomatic effort to achieve this objective.

The foregoing current analysis attempts only to hit the high points as I do not wish to overburden this message by unnecessary details or supporting evidence. My chief purpose in this message is to emphasize my belief that events behind iron curtain and especially here, are running in our favor and primary task at present is maintenance Western unity and confidence in US leadership. I can, however, if Department desires, supplement and elaborate foregoing from Paris if necessary.⁵

Bohlen

1. This telegram is quoted at length in Bohlen, Witness to History, pp. 352–353.
2. Regarding the considerations involved in Ambassador Bohlen’s decision to go ahead with his vacation in France, see ibid., pp. 354–355.
3. Not printed.
4. For information on the events in East Germany, see vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 1584 ff.
5. See Document 602.