Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

Bohlen papers, lot 74 D 379, “Personal Correspondence 1952–1953”

No. 522
The Counselor of the Department of State (Bohlen) to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kennan)¹

personal and secret

[Washington,] September 19, 1952.

Dear George: Hugh Cumming who is going to London will give you this letter.

I plan to leave New York on Sunday, September 28, and arrive in Paris on Monday morning, September 29, if this will ensure my meeting you there.² If there is any change in your present plans, as I understand them, please send me a wire immediately and I can shift my schedule accordingly since the whole purpose of the trip is to meet you and Paris seems the easiest for both.

With reference to your letter on the Father Walsh business,³ I feel it would not be wise to send it to the New York Times since the subject involved is one on which mankind has argued for many centuries. As you know, all of us here have been in full agreement with your idea of sticking entirely to your business as Ambassador to the Soviet Union and I honestly believe that a subject involving so much theology and metaphysics as that of moral law would raise considerable controversy in church and other circles here. We can discuss when I see you how is best to get this to Father Walsh. I am rather of the belief that it would be better if I delivered it personally to him but I don’t feel there is any great hurry and it can await my return. If you feel otherwise after talking to Hugh, send me a wire and I will send the letter to Father Walsh before I leave.⁴

My only other comment is on the Soviet reaction to NATO despatch⁵ which I have only just read once and will wish to study further. While, as you know, I fully share your view that a somewhat distorted picture of Soviet military intentions and possible capabilities has grown up in the Western world in recent years, I would date that from the Korean attack and not to the original concept of NATO. As I recall it, the original concept of NATO was in no case based on any belief that the Soviets were about to embark on military aggression in Europe. In fact, if my memory is correct, it was clearly seen as a political move designed to give the Europeans through association with the United States some sense of confidence and security which left to themselves they so clearly lacked. You will recall that the original impulse for the North Atlantic Treaty came from the British and French, and particularly the former after the conclusion of the Brussels Pact. The very small amount of military force envisaged and the limited degree of MDAP assistance in the period before Korea I think makes it plain that no one concerned had any exaggerated ideas of the imminence of a Russian military attack. It seems to me therefore that a truer statement of your view, which I don’t contest is applicable to the last few years, would be that the North Atlantic Pact was correctly and, if anything, too modestly conceived from the military point of view but that an erroneous interpretation of the meaning of the North Korean attack from the point of view of Soviet general policy subsequently led the Western nations, headed by ourselves, to overemphasize the purely military features and the probability of a Soviet recourse to open aggression in Europe. I believe, however, that events have done a good deal to mitigate that sentiment and possibly now the danger is over on the other side, namely, that under no circumstances need we fear Russian military action on the continent of Europe.

One other small comment: I believe the Russian coup in Czechoslovakia was engendered equally if not more by the certain knowledge that in the planned elections in the Spring of 1948 the Communists were going to take an awful licking and that therefore the element of Soviet control in the affairs of the country were going to be watered down to a point dangerous for Soviet interests. I understand exactly what you mean because it is one of the fundamental things that we have both accepted about the Soviet Union against which these thoughts must be placed. However, to those who have not had this background and therefore don’t have in mind these fundamental aspects of the Soviet system, this despatch could be misinterpreted, even though erroneously, as putting forth the view that much of Soviet aggressive action in recent years has been provoked or caused by our counter defensive measures which still in relation to the Soviet military machine, whatever its quality may be, are inferior. I mention this thought simply to point out the type of misunderstanding you might run into, particularly on the part of the military, at the London meeting.

I am looking forward very much to a chance to talk to you as the subjects are innumerable.

Yours,

1. The source text bears no signature.
2. The meeting appears to have been subsequently rescheduled for Oct. 1.

3. The letter by Kennan cannot be further identified. Presumably it was a response to a paragraph in a letter of Aug. 2 from Bohlen. The paragraph reads as follows:

   “You may have seen in the press or will when they reach you that Father Walsh [Father Edmund Walsh, Vice President of Georgetown University] at Colgate’s conference on American foreign policy took issue with some of the statements in your book [American Diplomacy, 1900–1950] concerning the use of moral judgments etc. in international affairs. I spoke at the same meeting but, unfortunately, could not wait over for Father Walsh’s talk. President [Everett] Case [of Colgate University] suggested that I send you a copy of what he actually said rather than incomplete press reports. In travelling up with Father Walsh he told me that with great regret he felt compelled to take issue with you on this moral question. I told him that I thought you were not speaking about basic moral considerations but rather at the tendency in this country to substitute moralistic slogans and inspirational literature as reasons for the behavior of states and as guides to our actions. Walsh said this was possibly true but he felt that your book was subject to the other interpretation. Of course, a good part of this is established Catholic doctrine but, as you know, that part of your book has caused considerable comment and may be subject to the interpretation Walsh puts on it. In any event, I think you would like to see exactly what he said. There is no further comment in the press so there is no public controversy over the matter.” (Bohlen papers, lot 74 D 379, “Personal Correspondence 1952–1953”)

4. No further correspondence on this matter has been found in Department of State files.
5. Reference is to despatch 116 from Moscow, Sept. 8. (661.00/9–852)