Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

611.61/8–1552

No. 521
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)¹

secret and personal

Moscow, August 25, 1952.

Dear Doc: With respect to the recent reception of the new French Ambassador, M. Joxe, by Stalin,² I wish to tell you some things which were communicated to me in strictest confidence about the interview. M. Joxe attached such importance to the close holding of this information that he did not permit his Counselor to tell O’Shaughnessy about it and has asked that I keep it strictly for myself here in Moscow, which I am doing.

I have already wired about the circumstances of Joxe’s receiving the appointment,³ which I understood did not need to be so closely held within this Mission. It will be seen that the initiative was in reality that of the Soviet Government primarily, since Joxe’s polite reference to his being at Stalin’s disposal in no sense obligated the Soviet authorities to arrange an interview. The fact that they took this step, knowing that the British Ambassador’s request for an interview had remained without reply, surely meant that they felt they had special reasons for doing this. I think that this may have been in part intended as a reproach to me or a means of embarrassing me, by conveying the implication that had I made a similar request I also would have been received. Please note that I do not feel this is proof that such a request on my part would have been granted. But I think that the Soviet authorities saw in Joxe’s arrival, and in his perfunctory suggestion about seeing Stalin, an opportunity for placing on me the onus of not having asked.

I am quite content with this situation and only plead that everyone keep quiet and let me play it my own way here, as far as interviews with Stalin are concerned. What these people need is to be left alone for a while and taught that other people are capable of doing without them, and I am quite sure that when the proper time comes for me to see Stalin (and this might be at any time for any number of reasons) my usefulness on that occasion will be enhanced, rather than otherwise, by virtue of the fact that I have refrained from bothering him until I really had something to talk to him about.

To return to the Joxe interview. Stalin began by asking him what he had seen of Moscow and when Joxe mentioned the Moscow subway, Stalin took up this subject with enthusiasm, said that he had ridden on the London subway in 1907 and found it “dirty”, and insisted (erroneously) that construction of the Paris subway had begun in 1908. Joxe had the impression that what was going on here was a deliberate attempt on Stalin’s part to show a degree of detailed knowledge on this subject that would impress and astound his visitor.

Stalin then asked Joxe whether the latter thought de Gaulle was happy, in retrospect, over his action in signing the Franco-Soviet Pact.⁴ Joxe replied that he could not speak for de Gaulle, that de Gaulle was not a friend of the present government. Talk then turned on the Atlantic Pact, which Stalin mentioned as an aggressive instrument of the United States, and, as the French understood it, Iceland. Joxe was understandably bewildered at this reference and asked whether Stalin was referring to U.S. bases on Iceland. The answer was no, he was referring to Iceland’s membership in the Pact. Joxe had the impression that Vyshinski was himself somewhat taken aback and bewildered at this statement on Stalin’s part. When Joxe insisted that the Atlantic Pact was only for defensive purposes, Stalin turned to Vyshinski and said to him with an air of great seriousness, “Then there is no reason why we should not belong to it.” When Joxe, however, pointed out that the U.S.S.R. was part of a world-wide security structure, namely the United Nations, Stalin merely laughed cynically and unpleasantly.

When asked what he expected to do here in Moscow, Joxe replied that he hoped to acquaint himself particularly with cultural life in the Soviet Union and trusted that he would be permitted to see various things such as the new university, etc. At this, Stalin turned to Vyshinski and asked sharply: “Who is preventing him?” This being translated for Joxe, he hastened to say that he had had no difficulties thus far and merely wanted to express the hope that he would be permitted to see these things.

Stalin terminated the conversation in a rather strange way by saying that he was the host (apparently meaning he was at M. Joxe’s disposal) but that if the Ambassador had nothing further to say to him, the interview might be considered as ended.

The French found Stalin showing his age very markedly. They said that his hair was noticeably thin compared to his pictures, his face shrunken, his stature much smaller than they had expected. They had the impression that he moved his left arm only with considerable difficulty and that his bodily movements were in general labored and jerky. They were struck by the continued brilliance and power of his eyes but felt that otherwise they were confronted by an old man.

Vyshinski, they felt, looked like a “scared rabbit.”

After the unpleasantness with the Italians, you can understand that I am extremely anxious that we do not become the source of any information about this. I think it entirely possible that the information will leak, again, through French sources and that when this occurs we will again be placed in an embarrassing position. For this reason I think you may wish to take steps to keep the record straight with regard to the day of receipt and subsequent control of this letter. My suggestion would be that since it contains no information which is needed by people in our Government for operational purposes it be shown only to two or three other people, the original can be kept by yourself and no copies made, or that some similar arrangements be made whereby we can protect ourselves in case of leaks.

I hope in the next few days to be able to write a general paper on Soviet foreign policy and intentions, the primary function of which, as I see it, would be to brief in advance of the event those gentlemen with whom I am to have the pleasure of meeting in London in the latter part of September.⁵ This would make it unnecessary for me to take up time with background considerations and to deal directly with the more immediate and detailed problems of the agenda. But this will also represent my first real report on this most important of subjects, the most important from the standpoint of my work here, and I hope that it will be of general value in the Department and throughout the Government. I shall write it with the consciousness that if it is to be widely enough distributed in Washington to do any real good as a basic document it will also probably leak at some stage or other. If I carefully allow for this possibility, then you will not have to feel so inhibited on its distribution, and I hope it will help us to get on with the important decisions I feel we are going to have to make within the next six months.

Very sincerely,

George F. Kennan

1. The source text bears the following handwritten marginal notation: “Shown to Bruce Bonbright Barbour Aug 29, & Sec”.
2. An account of the meeting is in telegram 346 from Moscow, Aug. 23. (651.61/8–2352)
3. In telegram 345 from Moscow, Aug. 23. (651.61/8–2352)
4. Concerning the visit of Gen. Charles de Gaulle, then Head of the French Provisional Government, to Moscow on the occasion of the signature of the French-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance on Dec. 10, 1944, see telegram 4770 from Moscow, Dec. 11, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. iv, p. 937.
5. Reference is to the Chiefs of Mission meeting at London, Sept. 24–26; for documentation, see vol. vi, Part 1, pp. 636 ff.