Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

OCB files, lot 62 D 430, “Soviet Satellites, 1953–54”

No. 779
Paper Prepared by the Working Group on NSC 174

top secret

Washington, December 30, 1954.

1. East German Attitudes

a. General

The postwar circumstances in East Germany have acted to make the population politically unreliable from the Soviet viewpoint and to retard the achievement of Soviet objectives in this area. Opposition to the regime is based on anti-communism as such, a continuation of nationalist resentment against the occupying power, liberal opposition to socialization, a libertarian resentment of dictatorship and religious scruples. Only the last of these is represented overtly in an organized form; the Evangelical and Catholic churches, while in a difficult position, have on occasion forthrightly opposed the regime and privately struggle daily to retain predominance over communist education and influence. Another source of discontent is economic difficulties, including such items as shortages of materials needed in the industrial process, food and other consumer shortages, labor opposition as an economic factor, bureaucratic incompetence in planning and carrying out programs, a continuing low standard of living compared to prewar, and economic exploitation by the Soviet Union.

The popular support which the East German regime enjoys is limited almost entirely to its immediate functionaries in the SED (Socialist Unity Party) and a minority portion of the youth. Despite the regime’s efforts to improve economic conditions, it is unlikely that any large part of the East German population can be won to support of the communist cause. The basic attitude of the East German population continues to be one of fear, resentment and hatred toward the Soviets, communism and the SED, and, conversely, one of support and sympathy for the objectives of the West, coupled with a desperate hope that some sort of liberation may eventually result. It is considered of some significance that every poll of East German public opinion conducted by HICOG has shown an even higher percentage than in West Germany in favor of the rearmament of the Federal Republic and integration with the West. In fact, any strengthening of the Western position vis-à-vis the USSR also strengthens those elements in East Germany which oppose the regime. The integration of West Germany with the West is interpreted by the population in this light and is, therefore, welcomed. This will continue to be true so long as integration is not considered to exclude unification but rather to bring it about sooner. The favorable position of the West in East Germany, therefore, depends in large measure on the vigor with which it presses unification in conjunction with integration or in other ways maintains hope of eventual liberation.

b. Special Groups

(1) The SED: During the past year the East German Government has devoted a principal effort to restore the Party and the communist regime to power and security in the aftermath of the violent demonstrations of June 17, 1953. To this end the regular East German police, the secret police and the courts have all been employed, their actions being supported during crucial stages in the early phase by the Soviet army. Judicial terror was especially used with a considerable number of trials, both secret and public. In addition, purges took place throughout government and party agencies as well as in various mass organizations. Despite all of these efforts, there are some indications that the regime still does not feel completely secure. For example, a recent article for the Cominform Journal, written by an SED functionary, indicates from the language and from points made, that the SED still feels itself on the defensive in Germany. A more striking example is to be found in the excessive precautions which the regime instituted for the East German election on October 17. Not only was a single list of candidates presented but also the voter was prevented in effect from marking the ballot at all, thus eliminating opportunity to register opposition. In general, voting was practically compulsory, with many groups being marched to the polls where they were handed ballots and told to drop them in a box. Care was taken to avoid secret voting. This election was conducted in such a way as to make it the greatest sham yet among East German elections.

(2) The Police: Despite purges and recruitment largely on a voluntary basis, defections to the West from the police still average about 150 a month.

(3) Youth: The SED is believed to have had greater success in the indoctrination of youth than any other group. Nevertheless, the events of June 17 and the lack of enthusiasm evidenced at the Communist Youth Rally last June indicate that indoctrination is still far from complete effectiveness.

(4) Workers: Despite intensive party attention to the workers, they remain politically unreliable. The regime cannot forget that this group fomented the demonstrations of June 17 and that they have clandestine contacts with various Western organizations.

(5) Businessmen: The lot of the East German businessman has been alleviated by the new economic course inaugurated a year ago, but he has no illusions about the permanence of that course and, in fact, feels that the government’s attitude toward private enterprise is already hardening. A recent study indicates that he remains anti-communist with a tendency toward passive resistance.

(6) Farmers: There are more than 600,000 independent farmers in East Germany and they cultivate 70 percent of the arable land. The repressive agricultural policies with rigid controls have made the situation of these farmers both difficult and unrewarding with the result that the overwhelming majority are reported to harbor anti-regime sentiments. There is little evidence of organized or direct resistance from farmers, other than occasional acts of defiance by individuals, but their negative political attitude is a source of real concern to party and government officials.

(7) Armed Forces: East German ground and security forces, as presently organized and trained, are not considered independently capable of maintaining internal security, in large part because of the disaffection of the armed forces. Factors resulting in disaffection throughout the armed forces are:

• —The general antipathy of the population for the regime, which is shared by the rank and file of military personnel.
• —The wearing of the unpopular Soviet-style uniform, which attracts the hostility of the population.
• —Lack of free time and excessive political indoctrination. There has been some relaxation of the pass and leave policy, but this, too, is still a general subject of complaint.
• —Preferential treatment of officers, and the wide gulf which continues to separate enlisted and officer personnel.
• —Complaints of poor food and accommodations, etc., although some improvement in this field has been noted in 1954.

In addition, certain groups are subject to special causes of resentment:

• —Personnel subjected to high-pressure tactics amounting to virtual conscription during the rapid build-up of the armed forces in 1952.
• —Non-coms subject to the authority of incompetent and insufficiently trained junior officers. This complaint is lessening with the turning out of better trained young officers from the KVP military schools.
• —Officers, particularly those with prior service in the Wehrmacht, who resent the substitution of Soviet organization and training for traditional German methods and the presence and authority of Soviet advisors.
• —Officers slated for training in the USSR.
• —Air Force personnel who joined the service or transferred from the ground forces in the hope of training on modern equipment and find themselves confined to obsolete aircraft.

c. Present Mood¹

Although the basic East German attitude remains one of antagonism to the regime, the indications are that morale has reached a new low. This decline stems from disillusionment regarding prospects for removing the regime following the hope raised at the time of the June 17 uprisings in 1953 and by lack of Western diplomatic successes. The failure of the Berlin Conference deflated wishful hopes and public spirits dropped further with a succession of unfavorable developments—defeat in Indo-China, results of the Geneva Conference, the Otto John and Schmidt–Wittmack cases, the outcome of the Brussels Conference and the failure of EDC ratification. (EDC had been popular in East Germany as a way to increase Western power and to improve chances of liberation.)

At the moment there is a tendency toward gradual resignation. For example, observers agree that there are practically no slowdown or work obstruction movements now taking place in East Zone factories. There are fewer visitors to overt anti-communist organizations in West Berlin and there is reluctance to take unnecessary risks for the purpose of defiance only. A new demonstration of Western strength, especially any at the direct expense of the communists, would alter the mood discussed above, however. Western agreement on a formula to rearm West Germany, and implementation thereof, will be of considerable assistance.

2. Other Possible Sources of Vulnerability

a. Friction Within the Regime

Since mistrust, suspicion and intense rivalry for personal power are almost endemic to any police state, a certain potential vulnerability is always possible. While differences as to the rate of implementation of the Party’s basic program and personal power rivalries in the top leadership of the SED have been thought to exist for years, they have never erupted into a major difficulty. After the June 17 demonstrations, the first shake-up in three years of the communist high command took place with the expulsion of the Minister of Justice, the Minister for State Security and the editor of the Party’s central press organ.² The immediate issue was the Party’s attitude toward the demonstrators and the extent to which the “building of socialism” as modified by the “new course” should be compromised. The conflict was resolved in favor of those leaders, headed by the First Secretary Walter Ulbricht, who advocated a policy of no leniency and adjustments only in the economic sphere.

Whether or to what extent the SED’s subservience to Moscow was a factor in the conflict cannot be judged with any certainty, but most of the disciplined party leaders have spent many years in the USSR. Their training and past political activities make it unlikely that they harbored any pro-Western tendencies. Moreover, the conditions which prevail in East Germany and the SED—complete dependence of a locally despised puppet regime on outside support from Moscow—rule out the emergence of Titoism.

b. East German Relations with USSR and Satellites.

The key communist leaders of the East German regime consider the interests of the USSR paramount. They are communists first and Germans second. Under these circumstances there are not likely to be any major policy differences between them and the Soviets. What frictions do exist are more likely to center on Soviet dissatisfaction with the East German regime’s implementation of policy.

As executors of Soviet policy the East German leaders have to “sell” the Soviet program to the East German population. In attempting to obtain acceptance and fulfillment they may urge some modification of the program’s terms, particularly in its economic aspects. This situation is a source of potential friction between the Soviets and the East German regime. To some extent, however, it will be offset by the reduction of Soviet acquisitions and more subtle methods of exploitation. On other than the top levels of Soviet control in East Germany, friction between functionaries of the regime and Soviet personnel will decrease as the size of the Soviet control establishment is reduced and Soviet control is exercised increasingly at the top level.

A possible long-range source of friction might be engendered by fear on the part of the Moscow-supported East German bureaucracy that they are in danger of being discarded in a deal with Bonn including free elections in the four zones of Germany. This seems so remote in terms of current Soviet intentions that it would not appear to be an operative factor at present.

In its relations with the other Soviet satellites in Europe, Soviet rather than national considerations are probably dominant. There are no known outstanding issues between the East Germans and other satellite regimes, with the possible exception of an SED admission of difficulty because of inability to meet obligations of trade agreements with the satellite states. This does not mean, of course, that the East Germans as a whole do not share the general German desire to regain the territories beyond the Oder–Neisse nor that they are any less antipathetic toward the Slavs than the West Germans. Nevertheless, the continuation in power of the present regime also means the absence of major difficulties with the other regimes. The only strains which may develop are those resulting from competition for Soviet favor and pride of place within the orbit.

3. Unification of Germany

The ostensible policy objective of the Soviet Union has been the creation of a neutralist unified Germany and, more practically, to use the unification issue to defeat any plan of the West to integrate the Federal Republic into Western Europe or in any way bring about a German contribution to the Western power potential. At the same time the Soviet Union has taken steps toward building up an East German satellite state. In utilizing the German unification issue, the Soviet Union has been forced to accept certain basic handicaps:

a. The Soviets must take some account of the attitude of West Germany toward the pursuit of policy objectives in East Germany and the desire of both East and West Germans for reunification. The fact that East Germany is part of a divided country has long acted as a factor which retards the communization of the Soviet Zone. As a specific example, the Soviets have found it necessary to refrain from sealing the zonal borders, with a partially exceptional period in 1952, in order to try better to exploit the unification issue. The result has been to permit more influences from a Western area than is usually the case in the Soviet bloc.

b. Likewise, the Soviets have thus far had to endure the influence upon East Germans stemming from free Berlin. East Germany is unique among satellites in having at its center an area under Western control. The presence of Allied troops in Berlin and the strong public commitments of the Western Powers to protect the city prevent the Soviets from removing, by force, this center of Western influence, except at the risk of general war. This situation serves as a powerful deterrent to drastic Soviet action. In addition, because of the Soviet desire to use the unification issue for propaganda purposes, and for other political and economic reasons, the Soviets have been unwilling to seal off West Berlin from the Eastern part of the city. The result is that Germans from East Berlin and the Soviet Zone may enter and leave the free world with relatively little difficulty and compare life under a democratic system with that under communism.… The net effect of free Berlin’s continued existence has been to stimulate the anti-regime attitude of the East Germans and to keep them chronically dissatisfied with their lot under communism.

c. Aside from the two basic conditions cited above—a country still incompletely severed and the forced toleration of free Berlin—which are partially caused by the unification question. Eastern Germany has some political vulnerability as a result of the rigid Soviet position on unification.

While the Soviets have sought for years to pose as the champions of unification and have devoted much propaganda to this end, it is apparent that past terms for reunification are unacceptable to the Germans, including the East German population. Every Soviet proposition for unification, even though couched in general terms, has contained a built-in guarantee for the retention of communist influence, as well as being designed to remove Allied protection. The Soviet proposals at the Berlin Conference, providing, inter alia, for a provisional government, under partial communist control, were so weighted in favor of Soviet influence that no significant non-communist German group supported them. In fact, there was a strong tendency to conclude that the Soviet Union had no intention at that juncture of releasing its hold upon East Germany nor a serious desire to negotiate unification on generally acceptable terms. At various stages in postwar Germany, those West German groups which were most interested in unification, and the East Germans, have hoped that each Soviet gesture might indicate a serious intent to negotiate unification. These hopes have always been dashed, but in time wishful thinking is again regenerated. Accordingly, until the Soviets change their position on unification, they will retain an underlying political vulnerability on this issue vis-à-vis the East German population as a whole. It derives from the deep-seated East German feeling of resentment against alien domination which, though now largely dormant in terms of active defiance, is stubborn and durable.

4. Soviet Troops—The Vital Factor

The greatest obstacle which confronts any attempt to detach East Germany from the Soviet bloc is the presence of Soviet troops. These troops constitute the decisive factor in control of the area. Without them East Germany would be apt to detach itself from the Soviet orbit with little or no outside aid, although for sustained detachment the return of Soviet troops would have to be prevented by the Allies. The mass demonstrations throughout East Germany on June 17, 1953 indicated that, but for the intervention of Soviet troops, the communist regime would in all probability have been overthrown. Since then the evidence is that the East German Government continues to lack popular support.

The prime prerequisite for successful detachment then is the permanent removal of Soviet troops from East Germany. It is believed that there are two major developments which could conceivably bring about Soviet troop withdrawal (excluding ejection by Allied forces which is not considered):

a. The USSR could make a serious miscalculation and withdraw troops as a gesture, for example, as part of a diplomatic maneuver to induce a Four Power Conference for the purpose of preventing any contribution by the Federal Republic to the Western power potential and with the aim of promoting German unification on Soviet terms. This Soviet move would be based on the assumption that the communist government in East Germany is sufficiently strong to preserve itself. Such an assumption would almost certainly be false at the present time or in the immediate future.… Although possible, it seems highly improbable that Soviet troops would be unilaterally withdrawn as outlined above. As a general rule the Soviets do not relinquish territory once controlled and are especially unlikely to do so in an area so unreliable from the Soviet viewpoint as East Germany.

b. The Allies could seek the withdrawal of Soviet troops through negotiations to reunify Germany. The best criterion available for judging what such an attempt would involve is the Soviet position at the Berlin Conference. The steps set forth by formal Soviet proposals at this Conference were essentially as follows:

(1) Formation of a provisional all-German Government, composed of representatives of the East and West German Governments (on a parity basis), whose tasks would include:

(a) Preparation and carrying out of all-German elections.

(b) Insuring free activity of democratic parties and organizations, and the banning of Fascist, militarist and other organizations hostile to democracy and the preservation of peace.

(c) Prevention of Germany from being drawn into any coalition or military alliances directed against any power whose armed forces participated in the war against Nazi Germany.

(2) Prior to the election, all occupation troops would be withdrawn except for limited contingents which would remain to carry out guard duties arising from the control responsibilities of the Four Powers, i.e., supervision of the steps cited in paragraph (1). In the event of a threat to security in either part of Germany during this period the Occupation Powers have the right to call in additional troops.

(3) A peace treaty would be signed which would provide inter alia for:

(a) Withdrawal of all occupation troops within one year after the treaty became effective and the simultaneous liquidation of all foreign military bases in Germany.

(b) Strict German neutrality.

(c) German armed forces limited in strength to internal requirements, local frontier defense, and anti-aircraft defense.

5. The Nature of the Soviet Proposals

These proposals are clearly designed to insure a large measure of Soviet control of the German situation. In addition, it is doubtful that the proposals can be taken at face value. The Communist Party, which does not even represent the one-third of the population which resides in the Soviet Zone, would be in control of half of the provisional all-German Government. Doubtless the Party would seek to acquire key ministries, especially the Interior Ministry which has the police power. The Communist Party would also have an equal voice vis-à-vis the combined total of all other parties in formulating and carrying out an all-German election. Likewise the provision that all democratic parties and organizations be protected and all those of a Fascist, militarist, anti-democratic or anti-peace character be banned is open to communist interpretation and presumably intended for their utilization. Communist propaganda has long denounced most West German parties and organizations on one or more of the above counts. It should be noted that Soviet troop withdrawal would not be totally effected until within the year following the coming into force of a peace treaty. Throughout all of the difficult preliminary period of forming a provisional all-German Government, negotiating a peace treaty and holding all-German elections, limited numbers of Soviet troops would remain and these could be increased at any time the USSR wished to find a “threat to security in Germany.” Any stage of the proceedings could, of course, be delayed for long periods by the Soviets and only after the coming into force of a peace treaty (i.e., when the Soviets were satisfied with all arrangements) would all Soviet troops be withdrawn. These Soviet terms for uniting Germany are considered to be so heavily weighted in favor of the Soviets as to be unacceptable and in fact are generally interpreted to mean that the Soviet Union has no intention of uniting the country or relinquishing the Soviet hold upon East Germany. This interpretation was further strengthened at the Berlin Conference when the Soviet Union proposed in conjunction with the settlement of the German problem that a General European Treaty on Collective Security in Europe be concluded. This security pact would embrace all the European states, and would include the East and West German governments until a German peace treaty was concluded. The terms of the Soviet proposal would entail the dissolution of NATO and the withdrawal of the U.S. from Europe.

6. Recent Soviet Proposal to Negotiate

On October 6, 1954, Molotov suggested in an oral statement in East Berlin that a new Four Power Conference be held on German reunification, that the Soviets were willing to discuss free elections, and that occupation troops should be withdrawn. It has yet to be demonstrated, however, that this statement indicates any real change since the Berlin Conference in the Soviet position on Germany.

7. Conclusions

a. At present there is little or no likelihood of Soviet troops being withdrawn from East Germany on terms acceptable to the United States. Under these circumstances there are no feasible means of detaching East Germany from the Soviet orbit at this time, except by general war.

b. There are weaknesses in the Soviet position in Germany which lend themselves to a degree of exploitation through various measures designed to preserve the affinity of the East German people with the West as well as their continued opposition to communism.

c. The continued Western sympathies of the East German people and their desire for reunification of an independent Germany will contribute to the eventual detachment of East Germany from Soviet control at some future time under unpredictable circumstances.

. . . . . . .

1. For the references in the following paragraph, see telegram 186 from Berlin, Document 776, on which it was based.
2. The references here, respectively, are to Max Fechner, Wilhelm Zaisser, and Rudolf Herrnstadt.