762B.00/8–3154: Telegram
No. 776
The Director of the Berlin Element,
HICOG (Parkman) to the
Office of the United States High
Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn1
186. From EAD. Believe public morale in Sov Zone has reached new low in decline which set in after Berlin Conf, although basic antagonism toward regime remains. Decline due mainly to disillusionment regarding prospects for removal of GDR regime following high hopes raised by June 1953 uprisings and to disappointment at what East Zoners consider to be indications of weakness on part of Western Powers. Contributing factor is confusion and uncertainty as to what they can do to help themselves against Communist rulers.
Failure of Berlin Conf to achieve any amelioration finished off era of expectation in same way as morale waned from high point reached during and immediately following June 17 riots. Public spirits in east seem to have dropped further with succession of unfavorable developments: defeat in Indochina, outcome of Geneva Conf, Otto John and Schmidt–Wittmack2 cases, outcome of Brussels Conf, and dim prospects for EDC—EDC had been popular in East Ger as a way to increase Western Power and hence improve chances of liberation.
With growing pessimism re prospects for liberation we see indications of trend toward gradual resignation and some mellowing of outward resistance. For example observers agree there are practically no slow-down or work-obstruction movements taking place in East Zone factories, there are fewer visitors to overt anti-Communist organizations in West Berlin, and there is reluctance to take unnecessary risks for purpose of definance only. Seems unlikely, however, that tendency toward superficial conformity has yet gone or will go to point where Sovs would misjudge situation and believe they could afford to remove their troops unilaterally.
While far easier to point to situation than to propose how to counteract it, seems worthwhile to direct attention to it. Some brilliant [Page 1704] success or demonstration of western strength at expense of Communists would of course be optimum solution. Until this possible, perhaps best we can do is to use our propaganda capabilities to convince East Gers of our solidarity with them, emphasizing our understanding and moral support in their difficult time.3 One of most effective ways of doing this is not only to try to obtain their support for our policies, but as far as possible to follow their lead and give our support to local policies and objectives which they consider desirable and feasible to pursue. For example, number East Zoners have suggested capitalizing more on errors admitted by officials in “self-criticism” accompanying election campaign preparatory for Oct 17. We should also hold out hope of eventual liberation, even though impossible to gauge at present precisely how or when this will come, rather than overstimulate the still existing illusion that we may forcibly unseat the Communist regime in near future.