Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762.022/1–2654: Telegram

No. 665
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State¹

secret

Bonn, January 26, 1954—8 p.m.

2376. Re CA 3633 and CA 3634 January 13, 1954.² We believe Chancellor will be ready discuss Saar soon as possibilities Berlin conference clarified, as suggested CA 3633. He has voiced reservations re commitments to French Government which might fall before negotiations concluded, and Bonn expects Laniel fall following conference. However, Chancellor realizes importance of Saar progress for French EDC ratification and can resume negotiations more easily since Berlin conference has temporarily dispelled nationalist feeling on Saar which followed Federal Republic elections.

We think Adenauer must make implementation of any agreement contingent on French ratification EDC, which is only price acceptable to public opinion for political severance of Saar. Public increasing skeptical French willingness to proceed with EDC or European integration.

Europeanization Saar with economic agreement on lines CA 3634 might be accepted by Bundestag after stiff fight as giving chance for gradual access to Saar economy, if assured EDC will become effective. Some economic concessions necessary give settlement European flavor and avoid charges of complete sellout German interests.

Van Der Goes suggestion that Saar coal mines be transferred to Saar Government has not so far been subjected to heavy German criticism and perhaps is preferable to German participation in mine management and meets objection this score in Paris telegram 2693 to Department, 660 London, 615 Bonn, January 21.³ Several Bundestag deputies have seemed willing compensate French from German EPU surplus for foreign exchange loss arising from economic settlement roughly along lines Department’s airgram.

We doubt Germans really expect French territorial cessions, return of small strips of Pfalz would enable Adenauer claim prestige victory and make settlement more palatable. We must point out that Saar solution which cost Chancellor and integration policy too much in popularity would be real disservice to Franco-German relations.

We have come to believe that confidential indication to France and German Governments of US–UK support for Europeanization of Saar, balanced by some economic advances for Germans, will be necessary for any rapid progress toward settlement in principle. However, Brussels recommendations on economic section Van Der Goes report,⁴ resembles Department’s outline. If adopted by Council of Europe US–UK might support this proposal and soften charge of US–UK interference. Might move if Council’s general committee takes favorable position early February.

We note continued UK reluctance to interfere officially (London’s telegram 3143 to Department, Berlin 60, Paris 468, Bonn 203, January 22⁵). While recognizing value US–UK cooperation generally, we must point out that informal indication clear US position on Saar would be almost as effective influencing Germans as formal US–UK representation. At minimum, we think US must again emphasize to Chancellor during or following Berlin conference that although we realize agreement on Saar Europeanization must be conditional on entry EDC into effect last chance for EDC ratification now at hand and US expects Germans will get down to business in Saar negotiations.

Conant

1. Repeated to Berlin, Paris, and London.
2. Document 663 and supra
3. Telegram 2693 reported general agreement with the substance of CA–3633 (Document 663), but felt that any suggestion of restoring territory to Germany would greatly upset the French. The Embassy in Paris continued that the desequestration of the steel mills and German investment in the Saar were possible, but the French would view German participation in management of the mines as political penetration of the Saar. (762.022/1–2154)
4. See Document 640.
5. See footnote 5, supra.