Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762.022/1–1354: Circular airgram

No. 664
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

secret

Washington, January 13, 1954.

CA–3634. Embassy should discuss with Foreign Office Dept. Inst. CA–3633² and timing US–UK intervention and substance possible concessions to be urged upon negotiating partners at appropriate time.

Our tentative views re form and hypothetical outline agreement parallel those set forth Paris despatch 1670³ with certain modifications.

If Germans willing agree substantial maintenance Economic Union, as transitional regime, French should make concessions on customs and trade matters to extent that Germans can derive some immediate advantage and be assured progressively greater and eventually equal access Saar markets and resources. Since desequestration steel mills and return to owners reportedly important to FDP, which significant for any Saar settlement as Adenauer’s No. 2 coalition partner, we believe French should agree to desequestration under formulae that would allow participation former owners. Further, Saar should be reopened to some degree German capital investment. Question ownership Saar coal mines can possibly be left in abeyance, but believe management mines might be reorganized to include German participation.

We hope Adenauer not serious in insisting French cede some territory to Saar and trust this purely bargaining point. However, it believed French should, while refusing such concession, offer return those small areas unilaterally detached from what is now Federal Republic and annexed to Saar by French Military Governor. These are only minor value to Saar, being primarily agricultural in nature, and can hardly be regarded as belonging to Saar.

Re permanency solution, we hope French and Germans can agree on emphasizing permanency though settlement naturally subject (in accordance Article 7, para 2 Bonn Convention⁴) to confirmation by peace treaty, both governments agreeing support settlement at that time. US and UK could do likewise. While emphasis should thus be on permanence, provision perhaps possible for periodic review and possible mutually agreed adjustment in light experience and progress European integration.

Re timing intervention, present thinking is US–UK should not comment further on substance agreement or concessions until Bidault and Adenauer have had “cards on table” meeting or we determine such intervention required to accomplish such a meeting.⁵

Dulles

1. Cleared with WE, GER, and BNA and initialed for the Secretary of State by Bonbright. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, and Strasbourg.
2. Supra.
3. Despatch 1670 discussed the view of the Embassy in Paris regarding the prospect for a Franco-German agreement on the Saar. (762.022/12–3053)
4. See Document 51.
5. On Jan. 22 the Embassy in London replied that the Foreign Office was “chary of timing and substance of U.S.–U.K. intervention with Bidault and Adenauer on Saar envisaged in Department’s CA 3633 and 3634,” and doubted whether Bidault would have any incentive to start serious negotiations until the end of the Berlin Conference. (Telegram 3143 from London, 762.022/1–2254)