Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762.022/10–253: Telegram

No. 648
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State¹

secret

Paris, October 2, 1953—6 p.m.

1339. Forthcoming Bidault–Adenauer negotiations on the Saar are shaping up as crucial point of whole movement toward European integration. While French have many technical and economic reasons to back up their position, the negotiations have far deeper significance to France than merely obtaining this or that economic advantage, no matter how important. The French have come to look on these negotiations as a key test of German sincerity in working for European unity. This point of view, stressed by Mayer last spring,² has now been accepted by Reynaud, Pleven,³Laniel, and practically all other EDC advocates.

As practical matter, any Saar settlement will have to be substantially along basic lines of French position given Adenauer last spring by Mayer and Bidault. If settlement cannot be reached on this basis, chances are that no further progress toward European unity can be made in France, and that EDC would be dead for foreseeable future. Resentment at failure to reach settlement will be particularly strong in view of fact that both Bidault and Mayer were—rightly or wrongly—left with impression by Adenauer last spring that he would settle on roughly this basis in the fall.

Pressure on French to reach any other type of settlement would not be productive, so only place we can use our influence usefully would appear to be with Adenauer.

I have in mind indication in Washington intel September 29, 1 a.m.⁴ that Germans may still be insisting upon ratification of Franco-German accord re Saar by newly elected Saar Landtag. This remains totally unacceptable to French, who stick by formula given Adenauer last spring by Mayer and Bidault, namely (a) Franco-German agreement; (b) submission of that agreement to Saar population in referendum (c) elections in Saar at later time as integral part of package deal, but such elections to take place in Europeanized Saar, French position in this regard has been fortified by Van Der Goes report which, in effect, gives clean bill of health to last year’s election.

Time schedule on Saar negotiations is also of major importance. Feeling in French Parliament is now running in favor of EDC ratification, provided Saar can be settled. It is of greatest importance that we strike while the iron is hot and not run risk of letting unnecessary delay introduce some new element that could change the situation. If Bidault–Adenauer meeting on Saar can take place about October 20, it could be possible to reach agreement in time for Hague meeting to take place October 27 or 29 and for EDC to be brought up for ratification in France about mid-November. Any delay in program will bring French presidential election into picture and force delay until at least after mid-December. At that time, EDC would be competing with budget debate which is sure to produce usual difficulties and ill will among deputies.

In view of above, I wonder whether time has not come to have frank talk with Adenauer with view to speeding up negotiations and to stressing overriding importance of Saar negotiations to European policy which he favors.

Dillon

1. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London.
2. Regarding Mayer’s conversation with Adenauer on May 12, see telegram 5950, Document 637.
3. Paul Reynaud, French Delegate to the Council of Europe, and René Pleven, French Minister of National Defense.
4. Not found in Department of State files.