Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 210: Telegram
No. 500
The United States
Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State1
Secto 160. Department pass OSD. Following is text of Secretary’s statement February 17:2
“I will comment on the observations made by the Soviet Foreign Minister.
He supports his proposal for troop withdrawal3 in East and West Germany on the basis that this would give satisfaction to the German people.
I am sure he can speak with authority as far as the Eastern Zone is concerned; I doubt whether he can speak with the same authority as far as the Western Zone is concerned.
I can say that there has been no intimation of any kind received from the authorities of West Germany, or from the people of West Germany, that they would like to see the withdrawal of troops of the Western powers which are in Germany.
On the contrary, there is evidence that there would be very considerable concern if these troops were withdrawn, given the situation which exists in the East.
Therefore, I am afraid that, while the proposal might give satisfaction in the Eastern Zone, it would not give satisfaction in the Western Zone.
If the Soviet Union is eager to give people satisfaction by troop withdrawals, I would suggest that a good place to begin would be in Austria, where there is no question but what all the people eagerly desire all the troops to be withdrawn. There we are assured of a chance to give satisfaction. The Soviet delegation might give further consideration to that matter and perhaps indicate their acceptance of the Austrian State Treaty when we take that up tomorrow afternoon.
There is, however, a reason more fundamental than any I have indicated so far why the United States does not feel itself able to accept the Soviet proposal which is entitled, “on ensuring European security”. That is the paper which calls for the final withdrawal of forces.
[Page 1157]What the Soviet Union asks the Western powers to do, presumably in the name of European security, is what we did under very analogous circumstances in Korea immediately preceding 1950. Our withdrawal in that case did not produce security; it produced war.
Korea, like Germany, was divided. Korea, like Germany, was divided under conditions so that roughly two-thirds of Korea was occupied by Western forces and the other third occupied by the non-Western forces.
The analogy is closer because the indigenous forces in North Korea, like the forces in Eastern Germany, were highly organized and trained, whereas those in Southern Korea and in Western Germany were only police forces.
Moreover, Molotov has questioned Mr. Eden’s statements with reference to the East German military personnel. The United States has very reliable information to reveal that the East German military personnel now total 140,200 men under arms. Of this number 100,000 are in the ground forces with an additional 25,000 serving in security formations. There are seven organized divisions of which three are mechanized. Air forces constitute 60 jet fighters manned and trained by 5,000 officers. These forces are commanded by ex-officers of the Nazi Wehrmacht and of the SS. They are additional to 100,000 East German police.
I can assure the Soviet Foreign Minister that there is nothing comparable in West Germany.
There are ample means of access to information so that anyone can ascertain that fact readily for himself.
There is in West Germany a total of 150,000 police, none of whom have any more than normal police armament. That number is to be thought of in terms of the population of the Western Zone, which is, of course, many times that of the Eastern Zone.
The situation in Germany is thus comparable to the situation which existed in Korea prior to 1947. Up to that time the United States had its own armed forces in South Korea; and there was peace. The United States took its troops out of South Korea in 1949, and in 1950 there was war.
It is not necessary at this point to indulge in argument as to just where the responsibility for that war lay. No one can dispute the two facts: First, that the United States troops were taken out; and, immediately following that, there was war.
Therefore, I am sure that Mr. Molotov will understand, even if he does not agree with our state of mind, when we say that we are highly skeptical of a proposal put forward in the name of peace which involves our following the same course of action which, under remarkably similar circumstances, in fact led to war.
[Page 1158]It is to fly in the face of the teachings of history, and indeed of elemental reasoning to seek peace by continuing the disunity of a people who are bound together by sentiments of patriotism and by ethnic unity.
The way to get peace and promote peace in Europe is not simply to think of various devices whereby we can mitigate the dangers of a disunited Germany. We should seek a united Germany.
That is why I regret that in this topic of Item Two the Soviet Union has gotten lost in its great grandiose scheme, piling words upon words, and it has left the central problem, which is the peaceful unification of Germany.
It is not an accident that the three Western Ministers, under this Item Two, have concentrated their attention on the problem of Germany and the creation of a united Germany through free elections. It is because we believe that this goes to the heart of the problem of security for Europe.
We are also convinced that a united Germany should be allowed to develop along peaceful lines of its own choosing. A Germany which is coerced, which is told what it cannot do, is a Germany which almost surely will follow the same course that was followed by the Germany which succeeded the Treaty of Versailles. There the restrictions which were imposed were the very thing that enabled the extreme nationalists to come to power.
Therefore, our second point is that Germany must be allowed to pursue her inclinations so long as these are peaceful and compatible with the security of the rest of us. Since, in fact, Germany wishes to associate herself with the Western countries of Europe, it is essential to peace that she be allowed to do so. If she had wished to associate herself with the powers of Eastern Europe, we would not have wanted to force her otherwise. The main point is that we should not attempt to apply such a coercion to Germans that they will not feel that Germany is an independent sovereign state. In that way, I repeat, lies great danger.
It is a fact, which all of us who really want peace should eagerly welcome, that certainly the greater part of the Germans want to adopt a course which will end, for at least 50 years, and I believe for all time, a distinctively national army, and equally end the German general staff. The fact that the Germans want to do this gives us a unique opportunity to go to meet them, and to consolidate that present will. That will may not always be with us. If today we reject that will of the German people which goes in the direction of peace, if we try to substitute provisions which will be forcibly imposed upon Germany, if we perpetuate the division of Germany, if we impose limitation and controls of the nature of the [Page 1159] Versailles Treaty, then, I say we would be accepting a heavy responsibility before history.”
- Repeated to New York, London, Paris, Vienna, Moscow, Bonn, and CINCEUR.↩
- For a record of the twentieth plenary on Feb. 17, see Sectos 159 and 162, Document 498 and supra. Secretary Dulles’ statement was circulated as FPM(54)77.↩
- For this proposal, see FPM(54)46, Document 516.↩