Office of the Historian

396.1 BE/2–1854: Telegram

No. 499
The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State1

confidential
Berlin, February 18, 1954—1 a.m.

Secto 162. Department pass OSD. Following summary second part February [17] session Foreign Ministers, Eden presiding.2

Discussion resumed by Eden after intermission. Remarked he would consider Soviet proposal on German police (see first part summary) especially since Soviet figures on East German police conflict with those available to British. In view previous Soviet comments on security, he considered Soviet plan aimed at NATO and as alternative to EDC. But these not aimed at anyone. Troop withdrawal according to Soviet plan3 would greatly weaken West. Latter had fitted security into broader framework which Soviets had rejected. Referring to earlier Soviet speeches Eden concluded Soviets placed both NATO and EDC in same category of condemnation. Agreed with Secretary no useful results could be achieved regarding security until German problem settled for this is main cause of European insecurity. If this not done, further discussion on security unrealistic. Concrete British proposal made early in conference because German problem is key to effort for peace.4 Soviets did not accept proposal for discussion and rejected principles, and reasons for their doing so are clear from Soviet speeches. Further discussions this subject thus theoretical. In conclusion Eden reaffirmed firmness of West alliances and their defensive character.

Molotov then gave police figures for West German (230,000 militarized detachments plus 150,000 under control of occupation powers which were cadres of German militarism). NATO and EDC not same thing. One exists; the other only on paper. Germany not in NATO but will be in EDC. Present differences between powers will be increased by EDC. Agreed solution of German problem was biggest problem and admitted little progress made on reconciling differences of two plans. Still troops must be withdrawn before elections to insure their freedom. USSR wanted to continue efforts to reach solution and others should do likewise. Despite delay on principal aspects no need to postpone certain practical matters, [Page 1155] viz., those facilitating connection between two sections of Germany. Then tabled proposal to establish two committees to facilitate economic and political ties between East and West Germany (for text see Secto 1615).

Secretary quoted from Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s NATO report (section on European integration)6 to show US concept on NATO from start was that it would facilitate integration of Germany into Europe which is essential to insure security. Glad to note Soviet proposal to relieve unnecessary and unwarranted hardships on people in East Germany but by 1949 CFM communiqué7 ministers already committed to alleviate effects of division of Germany and Berlin. Would consider proposal overnight which seemed feeble substitute for Eden proposal to establish all-German Government after free elections. Has little confidence in dealings with regime which tyrannizes its people.

Bidault said he would consider proposal to improve conditions which were recognizably bad. Matters in proposal were no longer for allied powers to handle but could be done by two German regimes.

Eden thought his original proposal much best solution but this failing he would consider Soviet proposal. Did colleagues consider discussion of item finished?

Molotov stated he would like consideration of his proposals on police and East-West German cooperation so that they can be agreed February 18.

In Secretary’s view proposals called for more consideration than time permitted. He suggested their consideration through diplomatic channels; Eden thought HICOMers could handle matter.

Molotov proposed ministers indicate February 18 their views on disposition of his proposals.

February 18 agenda—restricted session in morning and Austrian item in afternoon.

  1. Repeated to Bonn, Frankfurt, London, Paris, Vienna, and Moscow.↩
  2. For a record of the first part of the twentieth plenary, see Secto 159, supra.↩
  3. For this Soviet proposal, see FPM(54)46, Document 516.↩
  4. For the text of this British proposal, see FPM(54)17, Document 510.↩
  5. Not printed. (396.1 BE/2–1754) For this proposal, see FPM(54)75, Document 524.↩
  6. The quote under reference here is in the verbatim record of this plenary, USDEL PLEN/20, in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 195.↩
  7. Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iii, p. 1062.↩