Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 204
No. 492
Memorandum of Conversation, by
Robert Lochner of the United States
Delegation at the Berlin Conference1
- Participants: Austrian Delegation—Foreign Minister Figl
- State Secretary Kreisky
- Ambassador Bischoff
- Dr. Schoener
- United States Delegation—Secretary Dulles
- Mr. Merchant
- Mr. Nash
- Mr. Jackson
- [Mr. Lochner]
Subject: Conversation between Secretary Dulles and the Austrian Foreign Minister, Dr. Figl at the Secretary’s house, evening of February 16, 1954
Dr. Figl stated he and his staff felt under pressure to come up with some kind of counter-proposal at Thursday’s2 meeting in view of Molotov’s insistence that the Austrian delegation should make known its ideas and in view of the danger that Communist propaganda in Austria could exploit the alleged sterile attitude of the Austrian delegation at the Berlin conference where it said nothing but that it had no instructions allowing it really to negotiate. Dr. Figl outlined what he called a very rough idea he and his staff had hastily thought about in the car and in the hotel and which they wouldn’t even discuss with Vienna before they had heard what Mr. Dulles thought about it.
To prevent the Soviets from saying that the Austrian delegation had been completely rigid and had not made any allowance for [Page 1139] Molotov’s fear of Anschluss, the Austrian delegation might propose a supervisory, Allied military commission roughly similar to that of 1918–9 with which, Dr. Figl said, Austria had not had bad experiences at all. This commission, which would have no actual control powers and no right to interfere in the political etc. life of the country, would be stationed in Vienna, the seat of all political developments, but be free to roam the country. It would be charged with supervising Austria’s adherence to the prohibitions against Anschluss, foreign military bases in the country and the like. Each of the four powers could have a maximum of 250 members (Austria would start out by proposing 100 each), entitled to wear uniforms, but really forming an enlarged military attaché’s staff of an Embassy with the one difference that they would, together, form a commission. There would be a time limit to the existence of this commission—1 Jan. or at most 1 April 1955.
If, as Dr. Figl thought likely, the Soviets were to turn this down, too, then it would be apparent to every last Austrian that they simply were not willing to give Austria its independence.
Mr. Dulles saw the danger in this proposal that such a concession might mean abandoning the whole basic principle that the limitations on Anschluss and the like laid down in the original treaty draft, e.g. Art. 4, are sufficient and that Austria can be trusted to abide by them. If the need for supervision during a limited time is conceded, Molotov could argue that this proves Austria cannot be trusted fully and if supervision for a year, why not supervision over a longer period?
Mr. Dulles agreed with Dr. Figl that the Berlin conference must not end on the note that the Austrian problem is insoluble. Answering Dr. Figl’s suggestion that the Four Foreign Ministers should set a date for another conference say in May or June at which they would continue where they had left off in Berlin, i.e. Austria would be the first point on the agenda, Mr. Dulles said he himself just could not afford to waste another month or even longer this year in such futile discussions with Molotov as the ones just being concluded. On the other hand he agreed the Austrian problem must not be referred back to the Deputies. He said he and his staff were trying to find some formula in between these two alternatives and that he agreed that the Austrian question must be kept alive.
In general, Mr. Dulles said, he was doubtful concerning the advisability of rushing into the conference with concrete counter-proposals in the last dying hours since careful study and deliberation was required in working out such counter-proposals, particularly in view of the tricky Soviet conference tactics.
[Page 1140]Dr. Figl did not give the impression of having abandoned the idea after hearing Mr. Dulles’ attitude but suggested at one stage that maybe Mr. Dulles could discuss the idea with his British and French colleagues and then send a staff member to let the Austrian delegation know.