Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

396.1 BE/2–1654: Telegram

No. 491
The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State¹

confidential priority

Berlin, February 16, 1954—midnight.

Secto 155. Department pass OSD. Following is summary Foreign Ministers 19th plenary session, Bidault presiding, held ACA building afternoon February 16 and devoted to Austrian question.²

Bidault called first on Figl,³ who declared new Soviet proposal of February 12⁴ would rob Austria of most important advantage of state treaty, the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Austria, and that Austrian Government had empowered him to state categorically it could not accept any amendment of draft treaty along this line. Figl reasserted Austria would not grant any military bases to foreign powers and would do everything to keep itself free from foreign military influence. Insofar as Molotov had proposed retention of troops as safeguard against possible Anschluss, Figl assured him Austrian Government yielded to none in its desire prevent repetition of 1938 Anschluss in view memories of catastrophic consequences that event for Austria. He enumerated again in detail economic burdens Austria was willing undertake as price of freedom under articles 35, 38, and 48 of draft treaty. He concluded with appeal to Ministers not to leave this conference without giving Austria its state treaty and freedom; signing of treaty, he said, would constitute act of peace visible throughout world.

Eden spoke briefly,⁵ reaffirming unacceptability of proposed Soviet amendment to article 33 and recommending account be taken of Austria’s wish not to have foreign troops on its soil after treaty in effect, particularly since Molotov himself had said several times it was wrong to maintain troops in countries where they were not wanted. After attacking Molotov’s argumentations regarding supplementary agreements between Soviet Union and Austria allegedly required under articles 48 bis and 35, Eden stated that Soviet proposals, taken individually or as a whole, left little hope for early conclusion of state treaty, and urged Molotov to withdraw his new demands.

Molotov said he wished emphasize at outset that after action of three Western ministers in withdrawing their long-standing objections to certain articles of draft treaty, way was now cleared to sign treaty. He said conclusion of financial agreement under article 48 bis would involve no difficulty and that only problem was to find acceptable wording for articles 4 bis and 33. As for article 4 bis, Molotov said he believed Secretary Dulles had supported idea Austria should be neutralized and should therefore be able accept Soviet version of this article; also Figl’s statement that no foreign military bases would be allowed on Austrian territory was welcomed by Soviet delegation and seemed to present no conflict with Soviet proposal. As for article 33, Molotov said he believed Soviet proposed text was necessary in view of changed state of world affairs.⁶ While it would limit somewhat Austria’s rights this would be only temporary and matter of wording could be worked out. Basic reason for proposed amendment, Molotov said, was to take account of plans now in progress for establishment of EDC, which would open road to revival German militarism and in turn create danger of new Anschluss; latter would not, as history has shown, be entirely dependent on will of Austrian Government.

Molotov then chided Figl for having said nothing new today and asserted he would have expected Austrian Foreign Minister to be more interested in concluding treaty than was shown by his statement. It was not true, Molotov said, that acceptance of Soviet proposal would, as alleged, mean indefinite stay of foreign troops on Austrian territory; they could be withdrawn once peace treaty with Germany concluded, and Soviet Union would do its part to make term a short one. Soviet delegation did not insist on every word of its formula and there appeared no reason why Austrian Government should not accept “modest” proposal of Soviet Union. Molotov concluded by appealing that all cooperate to conclude Austrian treaty “within next few days”.

Secretary’s statement, which followed, likening Austrian state treaty to mythological Sisyphus, telegraphed separately in Secto 154.⁷

In brief statement Bidault said Soviet behavior in bringing up new obstacles after 300 meetings of deputies and western concessions in Berlin was “extremely disturbing” and would discredit whole concept of international conferences. As for Soviet concern over Anschluss, first step to pervent such development was to recognize independence and integrity of Austria; it was also important not to link Austrian and German problems together in our discussions because this gives impression of solidarity between these two questions, which was precisely what we wished to avoid. Bidault said independence could not be measured in percentages and that nothing less than total independence for Austria would suffice. He reiterated that Soviet proposal regarding article 33 was unacceptable and urged treaty should now be signed without further delay.

Figl then said merely he could only repeat this request and urge ministers to do their action of peace and give Austria her state treaty.

After brief recess, Eden said he only wished to make preliminary comment on article 4 bis: It was one thing for a government to make a public declaration to its own parliament or elsewhere of what its policies are and quite another for such a declaration to be put into a treaty with other powers; in latter event there might be questioning later by other powers as to whether treaty engagements were being fulfilled, and by giving such engagement power would thus be limiting its sovereignty. Eden then repeated previous objections to Soviet text Article 33, and queried Molotov why he had suddenly and for first time raised Anschluss problem within context of EDC, which had been signed almost three years ago. He again appealed to Molotov to withdraw his new proposals and sign treaty.

Molotov then made lengthy statement largely covering previous ground regarding Soviet dislike for EDC and fear of German militarism, Anschluss and establishment military bases on foreign soil. In latter connection he made giving reference to Bidault’s statement that independence should be 100 percent and implied France’s sovereignty limited by foreign bases on its territory. Molotov then said Eden had made some interesting observations regarding Article 4 bis and that he would like to postpone his remarks on these until he had had a chance to familiarize himself with text of these remarks.

At this point, Molotov submitted amendment to his proposal regarding Article 33. Proposed new text as follows:

“In connection with the delay in the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, the Governments of the USA, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union shall have the right, after the coming into force of the treaty with Austria, to postpone temporarily the withdrawal of their troops from the territory of the respective zones of Austria. At the same time the governments of the four powers deem it necessary to reconsider again, not later than 1955, the question of the date of the withdrawal of the troops of the four powers from the territory of Austria.”⁸

Secretary then said new amendment did not alter fact Soviet Union would have right to maintain troops indefinitely on Austrian soil and fact that matter could be reconsidered meant nothing; proposed amendment therefore did not appear to alter original proposal to any material degree.

Bidault then took sharp issue with Molotov’s intimations regarding France’s lack of complete independence; again urged avoiding giving impression Austrian and German problems were linked; expressed distaste for imposing neutrality on Austria since “whole course of history has taught us that things which are imposed are not respected and observed;” and said he could not assume responsibility for postponing to 1955, as proposed by Molotov, what should be done in February 1954.

Figl said he could not sign treaty which on one hand recognizes Austria as sovereign, independent and democratic state and on other talks about withdrawing foreign troops on basis of discussions in 1955; he was not in position to agree to this in name his government.

Eden said he wished make it plain that principle he could not accept was that foreign troops should remain on Austrian soil after treaty signed and therefore new Soviet text no improvement and unacceptable.

Molotov again said he would study Eden’s observations regarding Article 4 bis and state his views subsequently. Molotov suggested other delegations also study his new proposal and said that if these “modest” Soviet proposals were rejected responsibility for failure of treaty would lie on those doing the rejecting.

Secretary expressed interest in Molotov’s twice-repeated reference to Eden’s remarks regarding Article 4 bis and inquired whether he correct in understanding Eden had made no proposal for changing Article 4 bis.

Molotov said Soviet delegation believed we should not make haste but consider patiently matters before us; he repeated he would like to study attentively Eden’s observations on Article 4 bis.

Eden then emphasized he had made no proposal of any kind regarding Article 4 bis and that to best of belief he had said nothing not already said at least once around this table; he wished to state again he could not accept Soviet amendments to Articles 4 bis or 33.

After some rather confusing discussion between Bidault and Molotov as to which agenda item would be discussed in next plenary session, it was agreed that item two would be discussed February 17 but that time would be left on February 18 for consideration of Austrian question.

Meeting adjourned at 1845 hours.

1. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to Bonn, Frankfurt, London, Paris, Vienna, and Moscow.
2. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the nineteenth plenary, 19 PLEN, which began at 3 p.m., is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 195. No record of the Western Foreign Ministers meeting at 2:30 p.m. has been found in Department of State files.
3. For the full text of Figl’s statement, which was circulated as FPM(54)71, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 159–160, or Berlin Discussions, pp. 200–202.
4. For this proposal, see the record of the third restricted session, Document 463.
5. For Eden’s statement, circulated as FPM(54)72, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 160–161, or Berlin Discussions, pp. 202–203.
6. For this Soviet proposal, see FPM(54)66, Document 521.
7. Not printed. (396.1 BE/2–1654) For Dulles’ statement, circulated as FPM(54)74, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 161–163, or Berlin Discussions, pp. 203–207.
8. This proposal was circulated as FPM(54)73.