Office of the Historian

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203

No. 475
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of Embassy in Austria (Davis)1

secret
Berlin, February 13, 1954.
  • Participants: French
    • M. Lalouette
  • U.K.
    • Mr. Malcolm
    • Mr. Blair
  • Austria
    • Dr. Schoener
    • Dr. Leitmaier
    • Dr. Roessler
    • Dr. Gudenus
  • USA
    • Mr. Davis

Subject: Tactics on Austrian Question at Sunday Session

Mr. Malcolm began the discussion by asking the impression of the Austrians after today’s session.2 Dr. Schoener expressed a very pessimistic attitude toward the possibility of obtaining a State Treaty.

Mr. Malcolm, speaking on behalf of the Tripartite Group on Austria, then said he had come to tell the Austrians about our tactical plan for tomorrow, though this was of course subject to final approval of the Ministers. He said in our view there was practically no chance that Mr. Molotov could be deflected from his proposal and persuaded to conclude a treaty at this time. Mr. Molotov’s speech today made it abundantly clear that he connected the settlement of the Austrian question with a multitude of other conditions having little or no relation with the Austrian problem.

Therefore, Mr. Malcolm continued, we thought the best tactics to follow tomorrow were as follows. Mr. Molotov in the Chair would open up and would either speak on procedure or would ask Mr. Dulles to speak. He might even request the Austrians to speak first on the Soviet proposals.3

If Mr. Dulles spoke first, he would agree to accept the Soviet versions of the five unagreed articles as the French and British already have done this afternoon. He would also agree, if Mr. Molotov insisted, upon the Soviet addition to Article Nine after reading the precise text into the minutes. Article 35 with the Soviet amendment by Mr. Molotov would then be confirmed. This was all that was needed to complete the treaty and the above offers were conditioned upon no additional articles being added to the treaty and upon having the treaty concluded at this Conference.

M. Bidault and Mr. Eden would make similar points.

Mr. Malcolm then pointed out that undoubtedly Mr. Molotov’s tactics would be to have the discussion centered on his proposal, [Page 1092] particularly the article concerning neutrality. This was a very dangerous point and we intended to make it absolutely clear that additional amendments to the treaty were unacceptable. It was therefore important that we know the position of the Austrian Delegation which we hoped would be able to support our points.

Dr. Schoener replied that he would have to consult with Dr. Figl and Mr. Kreisky. He remarked that their instructions from Vienna would not permit them to go beyond the statement they made today declaring it was not the intention of the Austrian government to join any military alliance. This was not, however, an authority for them to reject any amendment to the treaty. However, he understood the import of this point and he thought that Dr. Figl, who would see Mr. Eden at 11 a.m. on Sunday morning, would be able to support the position outlined by the Tripartite group.

H. M. Davis
  1. A notation on the source text indicates that Secretary Dulles saw it.↩
  2. For a report on the sixteenth plenary session, see Secto 134, Document 473.↩
  3. For the Soviet proposal on Austria, see FPM(54)55, Document 519.↩