Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

396.1 BE/2–1454: Telegram

No. 473
The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State¹

confidential priority

Berlin, February 14, 1954—1 a.m.

Secto 134. Department pass OSD. Following summary of 19th Ministers meeting February 13, Eden presiding:²

1. Figl:³ Appreciated opportunity speak yesterday; wished emphasize ardent desire Austria for freedom and independence and Austria’s willingness accept burdens and sacrifices for sake troop withdrawal and termination of military occupation. Necessary express disappointment Austrian Government and people over Molotov’s proposal postpone troop withdrawal from Austria until after conclusion German peace treaty.⁴ This would destroy all Austrian hopes and postpone liberation indefinitely, while imposing upon Austria heavy burdens implicit in state treaty. All this for fear Austria might again lose its independence and become an unwilling military ally of Germany or some other power. This impossible after Austria’s experience World War II and in view Austria’s firm adherence article 4 draft treaty. It unreasonable tie fate of Austria to settlement of difficult problem over which Austria has no influence.

2. Molotov: Restricted nature Figl’s remarks fails give clear idea Austria’s reactions to total Soviet proposals; assume will discuss more fully. Similarly other delegations (not having had time to study Soviet proposals) and had not perhaps fully expressed their views. Suggested further statement views.

3. Dulles: Verbatim text Secretary’s remarks transmitted Secto 133.⁵

4. Bidault had studied Soviet proposals carefully and had concluded they constitute complex and complete argument why it impossible conclude Austrian treaty or restore Austrian independence.⁶ In such circumstances, little profit in point-by-point discussion Soviet proposals; nevertheless would express himself briefly on each component so that USSR could appreciate why French thought proposals unjustifiable.

a. Proposal to refer to deputies: Matters already beyond this state; Ministers are seized of problem; 47 articles agreed; five not agreed plus need for consideration Austrian requests re article 35. Anyway if we delegate we admit we renounce our task; we did delegate in 1949; no grounds for optimism that to delegate again would serve any useful purpose.

b. Proposal for linkage to Trieste problem: Trieste already discussed tediously at Palais Rose in 1949.⁷ When agenda for this meeting agreed, Trieste not included.

c. No-alliance proposal: This absurd in a treaty purporting reestablish Austrian independence and sovereignty (but Molotov by proposal for continued occupation conceded he not really seeking that end).

d. Proposal link and subordinate Austrian state treaty to German treaty: This proposal has no consequence except require Austria pay war indemnities without being rid of occupation troops, thus leaving Austria worse off than now since four-power occupation and control agreements provide some guarantee against unilateral pressures on Austria. Specific part of proposal that entails troop withdrawal from Vienna would leave that city isolated and surrounded by Russian armed forces, therefore subject all kinds of pressures.

e. Fears of renewed Anschluss: This fear groundless since article 4 precludes what Soviet delegation fears; precludes precisely and completely; binds four powers as well. Hence this groundless fear, a poor excuse for refusing to Austria independence and sovereignty promised 10 years ago.

Concluding: We must work towards a treaty, this treaty, which already almost agreed. Western powers had withdrawn proposed abbreviated treaty; USSR should accept this as evidence in good faith of desire get forward. Soviet proposals attempt link everything to everything else; but for once we have a clear and relatively simple problem; we should negotiate on that problem not on something else and thus be able to show the world we can agree on something. Concluded by urging conference proceed to consider five disagreed articles.

5. Eden:⁸ Figl left no doubt that Austria cannot accept Soviet proposal. This not surprise since this proposal would postpone settlement indefinitely. Soviet delegation began yesterday by stressing importance Austrian settlement; therefore suggested almost every possible way to avoid settlement. He said, e.g. that even after conclusion Austrian treaty occupation troops should stay in Austria until German settlement; but in an earlier meeting he had said German peace treaty might be impossible; therefore he appears envisage indefinite occupation Austria. This Eden could not accept. What right have we to plan to keep troops in Austria pending settlement an unrelated problem?

He appreciates and was sure Figl (with his concentration camp personal experience) could appreciate Molotov’s fears of a second Anschluss and another war; but necessary repeat this covered by article 4 to which Figl and the Austrians adhere.

Re proposal reference to deputies this not conspicuously successful in past. Deputies failed once on this Austrian treaty project; if we now facing failure, how could they succeed?

He considered it important give fair consideration Figl’s requests relative article 35 and himself could see no reason why agreement could not be reached. Other differences outstanding on present draft treaty so slight that there no reason why could not be settled in single afternoon.

Job before us is to conclude a treaty, not make excuses for not concluding one. He (Eden) had tabled a procedural proposal yesterday. Why could not conference accept this proposal, get on with job, justify conference at one stroke, and give fresh hope to world.

6. Figl:

a. Principal problem is to end occupation Austria.

b. Proposal to refer to deputies not appealing after 1949 experience.

c. Austria wants discussion on available draft state treaty which up until day before yesterday Austria understood Soviet accepted as basic discussion.

d. Re danger Austria cooperation in resurgent German militarism, he authorized and prepared say Austrian people want to live in freedom and friendship with all countries and have no intention enter military pact with any country; willing abide by principles UN charter and want to live as respected member that community of nations.

e. Re article 35 Austria happy accept Molotov’s offer receive payment in goods deliveries rather than dollar payments; but this not completely responsive Austria requests; article 35 contains other provisions.

f. Re Trieste settlement: Austria not competent deal with this problem; but it seems to Austria unfair to couple Austrian treaty and end of occupation with something which not an Austrian problem at all.

7. Molotov: In lengthy (90 minute) speech characterized by heavy sarcasm, much repetition and backtracking, Molotov undertook clarify the “sense” of the Soviet proposals which he said others had attempted make as unclear as possible, thus complicating and drawing out the matter. His principal points, somewhat rearranged, were as follows:

a. Soviet proposals need study.

b. Essence Soviet proposals is that: (1) there should be immediate decision to terminate occupation and, while leaving troops, to leave no one with control powers or organisms; (2) there should be immediate decision to turn over to Austria all former German assets committed so to be turned over by provisions existing draft treaty.

c. USSR unable understand apathy toward Soviet proposal for referral to deputies; if three-month period too long, term of deputies assignment could be shortened; but after lapse of five years he unable understand what harm if three more months spent in ensuring that final steps are correct.

d. Re status troops that under Soviet proposals would remain in Austria, perhaps possible devise better formula express Soviet intention these troops be non-occupational in character; but this really unimportant since their presence would be only temporary pending completion German treaty. Others around table had insisted that leaving troops in Austria tantamount to continuing occupation; but this interpretation hardly consistent with existence US military bases in France, Italy, Greece, Norway, Iceland, et cetera. (He said there were 80 such bases in Europe and “adjacent territories,” later upped figure to “almost 100”.) Does this represent military occupation France, Italy, et cetera?

e. He unable understand opposition to Soviet proposal that all troops be evacuated from Vienna; doubtless certain “our officials” in Vienna would not like this but surely the Austrian people would. In any case such evacuation would be simultaneous with conclusion Austrian state treaty which by its terms would permit Austria have its own army to protect Vienna.

f. Other delegates had contended that since 47 articles of draft treaty already agreed it should be possible conclude other five in three days or so; but 47 articles were agreed in 1949 and since then certain things have changed e.g. (1) numerous US bases have been established in Europe and adjacent territories causing concern for European security; (2) plans had been made for establishment EDC and resultant resurgence German militarism; (3) there had been much significant talk in West German (and indeed in Austrian) circles about a new Anschluss evidence cited on this score included an alleged statement by a West German Minister, Keyser, expressing confidence that 1945 frontiers would fall; frequent meetings, to discuss Anschluss, of “hundreds of thousands” of members Hitler’s former armies, now members various soldiers unions; statement by Stenderbach, leader of “independent union” in Austrian Parliament in August 1953 urging Austria not accept provisions Austrian state treaty especially provisions in article 4.

Therefore, if the three Western powers willing to reject EDC and prevent resurgence German militarism; or if German peace treaty concluded and signed to provide for peaceful democratic development Germany—then Soviet apprehensions would no longer be in force, matters would be facilitated, and some of Soviet proposals re Austria might be superfluous.

g. In discussions thus far, there had been too much guessing about what real thoughts of Soviets were, also too much discussion in terms moral standards and concepts; matter under discussion has nothing to do with moral concepts and indeed such concepts better invoked against those who would hamper conclusion treaty.

h. Only real objection raised to Soviet no-alliance proposal was French statement that Austria would object; but if neither we nor Austria object to Austria neutrality, why are French attempting speak for Austrians. RIAS recently said Austria would not join any military alliance; why therefore should anyone attempt convince conference and Austrians that Austrians should reject no-alliance proposal.

i. Re linkage Austrian question with Trieste question, significant factor is that Trieste is now Anglo-American military base; and since this situation directly in conflict with provisions Italian peace treaty (to effect that Trieste should be demilitarized and neutral and void of armed forces, except as directed by security council), it necessary in drafting any new treaty e.g. Austria, to consider measure to which existing treaties not being fulfilled.

j. Austrian statements had emphasized sacrifices and burdens imposed upon Austria; but it necessary remember 1,500,000 Austrians served in Hitler’s army, 17 divisions were active on Soviet-German frontier, despite this record USSR makes no claims against Austria except what was agreed in draft treaty re former German assets. This provision should remain in force but USSR, as explained yesterday, will waive dollar payments and accept goods deliveries.

8. After customary recess, procedure discussion developed in course of which Molotov kept recurring [referring?] to his contention that “the principal points” i.e. the Soviet proposals should be considered first before conference allowed itself get bogged down in details; while other three ministers kept urging proceed systematically with consideration five disagreed articles, plus Austrian request re article 35. Both Bidault and Eden said their government would accept Soviet counter drafts on all five these articles, (Eden qualifying by making conditional on four ministers being able reach definitive agreement at this conference; failing such definitive agreement, UK would have to reserve and reconsider if matter were not to be settled until some indefinite future date). Dulles said US accepted Soviet draft article 16; did not speak on other four. Bidault said Soviet proposals appeared make certain other articles (e.g. article 33 paragraph 3) now disagreed and suggested might be necessary draw up new table of disagreed articles. Molotov said article 9 also now disagreed; and said he still wanted hear Austria’s views on sum total Soviet proposals. (Figl declined speak further at this session.)

Toward end Molotov suggested appointment sub-committee to consider, Sunday morning, procedure to be followed Sunday afternoon; but after Bidault expressed a reservation that this not be interpreted as resurrecting procedure of referral to deputies and after Dulles said he skeptical whether sub-committee could solve problem, Molotov withdrew his proposal. It then agreed that ministers would reconvene Sunday afternoon to determine their procedure and then to try complete discussion.

9. Before adjournment Eden announced schedule tripartitely agreed as contained Secto 132.⁹

1. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to Bonn, Frankfurt, London, Paris, Moscow, and Vienna.
2. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the sixteenth plenary, USDEL PLEN/16, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 195.
3. For the full text of Figl’s statement, circulated as FPM(54)59, see Cmd. 9080, p. 143, or Berlin Discussions, pp. 187–188.
4. For text of the Soviet proposal, see FPM(54)55, Document 519.
5. Infra.
6. For Bidault’s statement, circulated as FPM(54)61, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 146–148, or Berlin Discussions, pp. 191–194.
7. Presumably Bidault is referring to the Four-Power Exploratory Talks, held at Paris Mar. 5–June 21, 1951.
8. For Eden’s statement, circulated as FPM(54)62, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 148–149.
9. See footnote 4, Document 469.