Eisenhower Library, John
Foster Dulles papers, “1951–1959, Berlin”
No. 472
The Secretary of
State to the President1
top secret personal and
private
Berlin, February 16, 1954.
Dear Mr. President: I enclose herewith a
memorandum of a conversation which I had with Mr. Molotov alone with the addition
only of his interpreter Troyanovski. This talk
followed a talk which I had with him on atomic energy procedure at
which Merchant, Bohlen and
Zarubin were present.2 At this point they left as indicated in
the enclosed memorandum.
The fact of having had this private talk is of itself of considerable
importance. I particularly wanted to be sure that Molotov appreciated the seriousness
of possible developments in Asia.
I am not at all certain as to the degree of influence which Soviet
Russia can exert on this situation. It is entirely possible that the
Chinese Communists will continue to run amuck until we recognize
them and deal with them directly rather than through the Soviet
Union as an intermediary. On the other hand, there can be no
assurance that if we do recognize them, they will not continue to
misbehave.
Our conference here breaks up on Thursday. I hope to be back by
Friday afternoon after stopping off to see Adenauer briefly en route.
I understand that you will be away but that we are having breakfast
on Wednesday. I will go into these matters more fully at that time,
but I thought it might be useful and of interest to you in the
meantime to see the enclosed memorandum, which is of course highly
secret. Nothing that happened made it seem useful for me to report
the talk to Eden or
Bidault.
Sincerely yours,
[Page 1080]
[Enclosure]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary
of State
top secret personal
and private
Berlin, [February 13,
1954?]
- Participants: Mr. Dulles
- Mr. Molotov
- Mr. Troyanovski (interpreter)
Mr. Dulles: Disturbed by
lack of any concrete substantive agreement by conference. There
has been bilateral agreement as to the next procedural phase of
atomic talks, but this is no great achievement. Had hoped for
some positive results at least on Austria until yesterday when
Soviets made totally unacceptable proposals.3 This leaves us
with nothing to show as reason for another such conference. This
regrettable because conferences if they can justify themselves
also offer useful opportunities for informal personal contacts
such as this moment.
Particularly disturbed about conditions in Asia. Fear Communist
Chinese regime is recklessly seeking to show off its strength
and extend its power. This could lead by one step after another
to a chain of events which would have a result none of us
wanted. We assume Soviets want peace and we hope Soviet Union
will exert some restraint upon Communist China. A Korean
conference might help to begin to normalize the situation and
establish in this limited sphere some direct high level talks
which, if serious, could be a useful replacement to the
belligerent words and deeds which were now characteristic of
Communist China. All this is said out of our sincere desire for
peace.
Mr. Molotov: Thanks for
frankness of Dulles’
expression. Believes fact of holding Foreign Ministers
conference is itself a gain. It would hardly be expected that in
a few days much results would come, having regard to the long
interruption of nearly five years. As to Austria, no doubt part
of Soviet proposal unwelcome, but it went much of the way to
give Austria what it wants. At least it should make it possible
to carry forward the talks in the future with good prospect of a
positive result. As to Korea, Political Conference would be
possible if US would accept India which has great interest in
Korean affair. As to Indochina, the trouble does not come from
Communist China but from bad French colonial practices.
Molotov had offered
Bidault the good
offices of the Soviet Union and China in effecting an Indochina
settlement but Bidault
made no response.
[Page 1081]
Dulles: Agreed there was
some advantage in having this FM conference but difficult to
continue the conference method if no positive results from the
conference. As to Austria, continuing Soviet occupation quite
unacceptable. Regarding Soviet proposed neutralization, if
Austria wants to be a Switzerland, US will not stand in the way,
but this should not be imposed.
As to Korea, Dulles hoped
Molotov would not
interject India. Had thought Soviets accepted the US–French
formula as to substance of composition of conference, but merely
desired to avoid use of talk UN
formula. As to Indochina, does not desire to use this either to
criticize Communist China or defend French colonial policy.
Importance now is not with the past but present and future.
Whatever be the origins, situation now pregnant with danger of a
vast scope because while Indochina is not itself of concern to
the US, it could easily threaten vital interests of US.
Therefore restraint should be exercised. It seemed that the
danger of war in Europe was perhaps less and that the situation
was somewhat stabilized, but the same could not yet be said of
Asia.
Molotov: Thought that this
exchange of views was very useful. As regards the possibility of
a Korean Political Conference, he suggested that after the next
meeting on the matter a representative of our two governments
might meet to see if some formula on composition could be agreed
upon.
The foregoing took place between 2:30 and 2:55 p.m., February 13,
1954, at the ACA Building,
Berlin. The atmosphere was calm, each participant expressing
himself soberly with deliberation of manner.
