Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 212: Telegram
No. 454
The Secretary of
State to the Department of
State
Dulte 62. For Acting Secretary, please pass to Wilson and JCS, from Secretary. I have carefully reviewed the arguments for full withdrawal of forces from Austria versus reduction of force levels to token forces, and have come to the conclusion that in the event we are faced with making a choice between these alternatives, we will be obliged to go along with reduction of forces to token level. My primary concern is that full withdrawal of forces will remove the 3 Western zones of Austria and Vienna from the protection of the North Atlantic Treaty. The substitute assurances which might be given by the 3 Powers would raise constitutional questions for us and require acceptance by other NATO members which might prove exceedingly difficult of accomplishment. A further consideration is that I do not feel the U.S. can hold out against the combined UK–French preference for this type of solution in the event that this alternative is advanced by the Austrians or the USSR. We will of course make every effort to maintain our initial position of seeking the full Austrian Treaty and we have reached tripartite agreement here on this point.
[Page 1029]Nash has discussed this matter informally with General Arnold in Salzburg, who, while preferring full withdrawal, has suggested that we should take as our first line of attack with the Soviets a counter proposal that the Western Powers have already, in effect, reduced their occupation troops far in excess of their requirements. The Western Powers would be ready to consider the question of further reduction in their forces when the Soviets have made a proportionate reduction in their present troop strength in Austria. Should the Soviets accept this approach, the matter could be referred to the Allied High Commission in Austria for further development. Should we be forced to accept the token force concept, I feel that we should exact the following conditions: A. That there be quadripartite agreement to permit the Austrians to raise armed forces up to the treaty level of 58,000. We could perhaps accept, as a minimum, agreement to permit 28,000, which figure we are prepared to equip and which represents the minimum estimated force to guard against subversion. B. We insist upon the right of freedom of movement and access to all parts of Austria so that some enforcement safeguard against increasing the agreed levels will exist.
These two matters should be settled as matters of principle before quadripartite agreement on token forces is given.
C. The allies should obtain an agreement with the Austrians to raise the treaty armed forces … I intend to press strongly with the British and the French that in the event we accept the token force principle, the Western Powers move ahead rapidly with the development of planning for the wartime use of Austrian manpower.
I would appreciate your comments on this proposed course of action urgently so that I may take it up with Bidault and Eden as soon as possible.
Nash concurs in the foregoing.