Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 212

No. 453
The President to the Secretary of State, at Berlin¹

top secret

Washington, February 10, 1954.

I refer to your number 54 of 9 February.² It is true that certain legislators have expressed uneasiness concerning any use of American maintenance personnel in Indochina. They fear that this may be opening the door to increased and unwise introduction of American troops into the area. Administration has given assurances to guard against such developments and has promised categorically to withdraw recently shipped increment of 200 air technicians no later than June 15. This we must do even if we have to recruit civilian technicians to take their place.

There is no ground whatsoever for assuming we intend to reverse or ignore US commitments made to French. Those commitments were based upon assumptions that French would act comprehensively and vigorously in prosecuting war; and their commitment in this regard is as binding as is ours in providing additional money and equipment. The so-called Navarre plan visualized substantial victory by summer of 1955.

General O’Daniel’s³ most recent report is more encouraging than given to you through French sources. I still believe that the two things most needed for success are French will to win and complete acceptance by Vietnamese of French promise of independence as soon as victory is achieved. To summarize administration has no intention of evading its pledges in the area providing the French performance measures up to the promises made by them as basis for requesting our increased help.⁴

With warm regard,

Eisenhower

1. Transmitted to Berlin, eyes only for the Secretary from the President, in Tedul 37, Feb. 10.
2. Document 446.
3. Lt. Gen. John W. O’Daniel, Chief of the U.S. military survey mission in Indochina.
4. In a supplementary message the same day the Department of State reported that it was aware of French sensitivities, but believed that some form of understanding would be necessary regarding U.S. participation in an advisory capacity in Indochina. (Tedul 38 to Berlin, Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 212)