Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

762A.00/8–2754: Telegram

No. 251
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State¹

secret

Bonn, August 27, 1954—7 p.m.

600. Ger polit leaders with whom we have recently spoken report that they are operating in atmosphere of some public anxiety. Coincidence of stalemate at Brussels² and recent defections³ has added Ger sense of insecurity and weakened confidence in Govt. In such atmosphere, distrust of foreign countries thrives. Suspicion of France. Previously strong, intensified. Although conviction most leaders incl FDP Chmn Dehler that effective Eur defense impossible without France is moderating influence, this view also increases pessimism and frustration arising from present French actions. Disquieting are indications of growing suspicion England being whipped up by right-wing leaders still smarting from Brit action against Naumann group.⁴ Symptomatic such Anglophobia are (1) conviction FDP’s leading mil expert Manteuffel that England will never permit German rearmament and (2) imputation in Fortschritt, organ FDP party organization in NRW, John defection Brit plot. Up to present we have noted no signs of anti-American feeling. Gers expect US to stand by them and to pull some rabbit out of hat. Following Chanc’s lead, Ger coalition politicians and pro-govt and independent press refrain from public expression pessimism re EDC or attacks on French for her role at Brussels. Despite this superficial calm and restraint politicians very pessimistic as to chances positive French action on EDC and leaders actively engaged planning steps to be taken if French do not ratify EDC in acceptable form next week. Chanc has started laying ground-work at home for continuing united front for pressing French on Ger defense participation by mentioning to Bundestag FonAff Comite that consultations with other countries, incl US and UK, shld be next step if France fails to act favorably. Gers view English position as decisive for success of conference on Ger def participation but some skeptical as to firmness English support for Ger rearmament. Numerous Ger politicans have expressed fears that if Bonn convention put into force without provision for rearming FedRep clearly agreed upon at least by US and UK, the FedRep may lose important basis for leverage to make French and English act on Ger def participation. In our opinion any offer apparently entailing indefinite postponement rearmament would not help to bolster Adenauer’s prestige. Fact such an offer has now been made publicly by Mendès-France makes it doubly suspect in Ger eyes.

Indicative of mood some politicans is report from conf source that Bundestag FonAff Comite, following leadership CDU members, is drafting detailed plan for alternative to EDC involving rapid expansion Ger border police to 150,000.

SPD actions since Brussels stalemate have been restrained, party is pointing to need for Ger-French entente in moderate way but placing major emphasis on timeliness new negots with USSR on reunification. In our view Ger reunification issue less threatening to Chanc’s position than rearmament issue for present. As long as Sovs make no clearly new offer, especially re elections, we estimate Chanc can justify to majority Ger polit leaders his policy that Ger rearmament within western complex must be in hand before reunification can be effectively dealt with.

Despite disturbing elements noted above, in our opinion Chancellor will be able to hold his supporters in line for time being. Nevertheless he will require evidence continuous activity and progress in field Ger def participation to maintain his prestige and to counteract pressures for discussing reunification Ger with USSR again. Present atmosphere in FedRep today makes it highly advisable to avoid any “dead period” during which western action on Ger def might appear to have come to complete standstill. Convocation of conference on Ger rearmament as soon as possible if EDC not adopted in satisfactory for in Paris wld certainly help in this regard, but not for long unless it produces a concrete agreed plan involving features which cld be fairly attacked as discriminatory against Germany.

Conant

1. Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.
2. On Aug. 19 French Prime Minister Mendès-France, at a meeting of the EDC signatories in Brussels, had proposed five amendments to the EDC Treaty, two of which discriminated against the Federal Republic. None of the proposals were accepted by the other signatories.
3. The John case and the defection of CDU Bundestag member Karl Franz Schmidt-Wittnack, which was announced on Aug. 22.
4. In January 1953 the British had arrested Werner Naumann and several other West Germans for neo-Nazi activities. Documentation on the arrests is in file 762A.00.