Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

762A.00/8–154: Telegram

No. 250
The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn¹

secret

Washington, August 1, 1954—1 p.m.

311. Department and other agencies primarily concerned have had Otto John case under intensive study during past week. Sufficient information now at hand to give indication of unfavorable way situation developing in Germany, consequences to be guarded against, and action which might feasibly be undertaken by High Commissioners and Adenauer to prevent further deterioration.

(1) Most striking fact is “Schadenfreude” with which large part of press and public have jumped to conclusion that John defected, in spite continued absence unequivocal evidence of defection and cumulative indications that John lured or trapped into Eastern Germany, being held against will, and acting under duress.

(a) If John defected to damage Adenauer Government, Soviets should have been able exploit political aspects much more effectively and fully than they have done, by showing him in public and allowing him talk to press. (Especially in light John’s knowledge details various secret negotiations with Adenauer Government.) This not done, and recorded radio statements, if made by him, leave impression inept and canned propaganda not at all characteristic of John speaking his true mind.

(b) If John willing defect, Soviets would not have uselessly compromised their agent Wohlgemuth.² Latter’s services were apparently needed, in active sense, to get John into Soviet custody.

(c) On defection theory, John would have taken advantage opportunity bring along valuable documents of intelligence material, perhaps leaving behind political testament to explain transfer of loyalty. On contrary he left no such testament, had not expressed in intimate conversations any marked concern over present political impasse re unification, and carefully emptied pockets of all compromising material before leaving to meet Wohlgemuth.

(d) Department particularly struck by message from John to wife with underscored word suggesting forced detention.

(e) Unnecessary to go into further circumstances which will occur to Mission, and which can most probably be explained as lack of initial cooperation of John with Soviets, although in due course Soviets may condition John into acting like voluntary defector. Brain-washing technique has been perfected to advanced art, e.g. Mindszenty case and US pilots who confessed to bacteriological warfare.

(2) Most unfortunate public aspect of case, in our view, is that continued grubbing for sensational material for press will in time succeed, if not already, in discrediting John as individual even though it does not prove anything as regards his basic loyalty. We are concerned with reaction of average German who after being denazified has always wondered what he had to match moral courage of July 20 group.³ He probably comforts himself with thought of his “Treue”: he was true to Fuehrer, he remained true to war effort until end, he is now true to Germany, whereas John was disloyal to Hitler, was agent of British in last year of war, then alleged to be agent of US/UK in Amt Verfassungschuetz, and now agent of Communists. Focus will be on alleged chameleon-like character of man. Politically this reaction may lead to pronounced self-justification of ex-Nazi elements and all elements opposition to Adenauer from left to right. May lead to exaggerated reaction against all forms of security or intelligence agencies, especially those maintaining contacts with foreign powers, and demands for parliamentary investigations and disclosures. This could seriously jeopardize security of Federal Republic, where particular vigilance necessary, and badly hamper vital activities of US and Allied agencies in security field.

(3) In our view situation calls for firm gesture on part of Federal Government to show that situation in hand, restore some self-possession and self-confidence to German security organs, and give lead to public in creating attitude of critical objectivity toward future Communist attempts exploit John.⁴… We consider it politically important for Government to forestall critics and ex-Nazis from capitalizing on John case.

(4) After coordination with British (omitting French whose reaction this issue uncertain) we would recommend High Commissioners approach Adenauer with suggestion that Federal Government formally request return of official Otto John or access to him for appropriate officials of Federal Republic. Statement need not go into pros or cons beyond fact that John is high official of Federal Republic, reason to believe that he may be detained against will by local authorities in East Germany, and demand for return or access to him. (Possibility of access being granted is calculated risk but minimized by recent behavior Soviet authorities re John and their standard treatment persons detained.) High Commissioners would transmit this statement to Pushkin under formal cover note requesting that it be conveyed to appropriate local officials. Such statement clearly within rights any government would not prejudice Chancellor’s future freedom of action and would avoid placing US/UK in position of principals. Important that John be identified as Federal Republic official and that no handle be given to Soviets or public to identify him as US/UK agent.

(5) Since details and exact estimate local situation can be worked out Bonn better than Washington, Department suggests that matter be urgently studied by working group of Mission and representatives of other agencies primarily interested with view to obtaining UK concurrence and action by Federal Government in coming week if possible. Delay thus far justifiable on grounds avoidance precipitate action, but may be too late if postponed much longer.

(6) If proposed action taken, would enable Adenauer or Government make explanatory statement expressing skepticism re Communist attempt exploit John and confidence in efficiency, democratic nature, and importance Government security organs. Again avoiding appearance of principals, High Commissioners could through all suitable means convey their agreement with views expressed by Government. Importance attached to prompt and decisive action this case arises in part from US and Allied responsibility in creation Amt Verfassungschuetz (including sponsorship John) and crucial security role this agency.⁵

Dulles

1. Drafted by Kidd; cleared with Murphy, Kellermann, and Hulick; and repeated to Berlin.
2. Wolfgang Wohlgemuth, a West Berlin doctor who disappeared with Otto John.
3. A group of German officers which attempted to assassinate Adolph Hitler on July 20, 1944.
4. On July 26 Schroeder had given a press conference at which he stated that (a) the evidence indicated that John had not entered the East Zone of Berlin with treasonable intent, (b) he was lured into the East Zone, and (c) he was being detained there under pressure. Bonn reported the substance of the press conference in telegram 270, July 26. (762A.00/7–2654)
5. The Otto John case continued to simmer throughout the summer and fall of 1954 with the United States maintaining the position outlined in this telegram. Reports on press statements by John and the impact on political life in Germany were reported regularly by Bonn and Berlin. Further documentation on the case is in file 762A.00.