Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

662.001/8–2752: Telegram

No. 128
The Ambassador-Designate in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Department of State¹

secret

Moscow, August 27, 1952—2 p.m.

378. Following by way comment on Soviet note and reply suggested my 377, August 27.² Content of Soviet reply, taken in conjunction with other events, indicates substantially following present background attitude on part of Soviets.

“Western Powers not seriously interested in compromise over Germany, but are holding out for Soviet capitulation of its interests there, and in absence such capitulation are determined to arm Western Germany and make them nucleus of Western military alliance against Russia. We, Soviet leaders, see in these circumstances no possibility advancing or even protecting our interests through direct results of any negotiations with Western Powers, and consider development of immediate future will depend on answers to questions: (a) Who can succeed in arming his Germans first and best and inspiring them with most militant political morale, and (b) can position of Western Powers in Berlin, and accordingly political resistance of West Berliners, be undermined and shattered by cleverly timed and coordinated erosive actions by Soviet and East German authorities? However, exchanges with Western Powers can be used for demonstrative purpose as means of influencing events which will determine answers these questions and we will play our cards accordingly. This means that instead of getting lured into any move toward free elections in Germany, which would only knock existing cards out of our hands, we will continue propaganda pressure on Western Powers by use usual double talk and continue try to lure or maneuver them into Four Power public discussion of peace treaty in which we think it likely we could put them in awkward position and achieve large-scale bewilderment and loss of confidence among West German Public.”

This doubtless coincides with long-standing western analysis, but feel it useful recapitulate it for sake of clarity.

Two things stand out in my mind as worthy of note in connection with above positions: (a) It rests on sincere belief Western Powers unwilling consider any realistic compromise of conflicting interests in Germany and wld not accept unification of country and withdrawal of forces, even if this were offered them unconditionally, unless it were clear Germany would remain in state of complete military subordination and alliance with US-dominated coalition. (b) It counts on continued Soviet ability to get away generally with propagandistic use of “algebraic” terms, such as peace, democracy, aggression, etc., to which Moscow wishes to have taken at traditional value by world public opinion for propaganda purposes but into which it would expect to insert wholly different content whenever question arises of delivery on commitments.

With regard course of action to be followed at present juncture, see substantially three alternatives:

1. Continue in effect present exchange, commenting in detail on various points of Soviet note and restating our position as done in previous items this exchange, trying at one and same time to show that we do not utterly disfavor unification yet not to arouse German hopes which would effect progress toward Western integration.

Personally see nothing to be gained by this. Communications at which we arrive in this manner seem to be over-complicated, full of heavily compromised, involved and ineffective language, in certain respects noticeably ingenuous, repetitive and unconvincing. They do not lead to agreement. They do not modify in any important way Soviet attitudes. They do not appear to me to have any strong positive propaganda effect. They succeed, or have thus far succeeded, in buying time but probably at price of wearying public attention and encouraging apathy and cynicism about such diplomatic exchanges generally. Surely, whatever positive elements they may have had are now strongly subject to law of diminishing returns.

2. To drop demonstrative exchange of notes and attempt confidential discussion of German problem with Russia on oral diplomatic level, with view to seeing how much of Soviet position rests on genuine and serious misapprehensions about our intentions and position (at best this is only part, but perhaps not an unimportant one) and to ascertaining what form of compromise, if any, Soviets would be willing make on German problem.

I am aware of difficulties and dangers attendant on this course and of fact it would be viewed with particular alarm at present in light effect on ratification contractuals and EDC. Am not recommending we adopt it as this juncture. But feel we must reconcile ourselves to coming to it sooner or later. Longer I remain here more I am inclined feel that in shrinking from genuine contact with Soviet Government on these and other great points of difference between us, we are making mistake from long term standpoint and that we would be better advised to barge right through with such discussions, stating our case instantly to Soviet officials, going to heart of our differences with them, arguing with them on their distortions of language, and accepting whatever hardships this may involve by way of leaks, rumors and distortions. We would suffer many tumbles and bruises in this painful process, but failing to do it and talking only at arms length for demonstrative purposes I think we are in general playing Soviet’s game rather than our own. This, however, depends in case of German problem on wider considerations on which I am not competent to comment, and assumes in particular that Western Powers are united in really wanting German unification and in their view as to price they would be prepared pay to get it.

3. To terminate correspondence by calling Soviets on their ruse of doubletalk, pointing out futility of general discussions conducted in terms which mean wholly different things to different people, subsuming in precise and concrete form practical terms on which we would be prepared sanction progress toward German unity, and indicating readiness to renew exchanges when Soviets inclined do business this basis.

This, as Dept will note, is alternative on which suggestions in my 377 were based. It rests on following background considerations:

a. Seems to me that to permit Soviets to continue use customary doubletalk in discussion major international problem is obviously undesirable and no longer necessary, since we today have ample evidence of meanings they attach to their favored propagandistic terms.

b. Dept will note this draft gets away from idea of commission to investigate whether conditions exist, etc., etc. I have never been happy about this particular proposal on our part. It gives impression of archness and insincerity. Everyone knows that as things stand today such conditions do not and could not possibly exist in Eastern Zone and Sector and no UN Commission is needed to prove this point, by same token it misplaces emphasis. If any commission were to be set up with view to paving way for free elections it should be one designed not to examine question to which everyone already knows answer but rather to determine what practical measures would have to be taken, against background existing conditions, to assure free elections in Germany at some specific time. Old formula obviously not clearly understood here and probably led to strange wording of certain passages of Soviet reply. In order to get away from old position without appearing make abrupt change, suggest we slide over this point in coming communication, and get ourselves onto more general position in this respect.

c. Urge re-examine whether we require absolutely identical replies from three governments. Attempt to achieve identity of language involves heavy price in time lost and in outward effectiveness of reply, since it generally means extensive compromising and awkwardness of language. Question whether, provided respective positions are roughly similar and in accord, separate communications by each of three govts, each using approach and language most natural and in character for government concerned, would not have more genuine and convincing ring to public ear than identical communications, which must always necessarily be somewhat forced all around.

d. Whatever language is used would plead for brevity and speed in answer if we hope to give Soviets and world opinion impression of clarity, firmness and incisiveness. Soviet Government is itself obviously uncertain and embarrassed about these exchanges and its own contributions have been somewhat tortured and unconvincing. This gives us excellent opportunity to show ourselves otherwise, and would submit that from standpoint promptness and terseness of reply will be fully as important as details of content.³

Kennan

1. Repeated to Paris, London, Bonn, and Berlin.
2. Telegram 377 transmitted some suggestions by Kennan for language which might be incorporated in the reply to the Soviet note. (662.001/8–2752)
3. On Aug. 30 Ambassador Dunn in Paris commented that he believed the exchange of notes gained the West a substantial advantage and that its possibilities were not yet exhausted, agreed that the United States should be as direct with the Soviet Union as its associates would allow, and agreed that the language of the notes pushed tactfulness close to intellectual dishonesty, but felt different replies would confuse Western opinion. (Telegram 1320, 662.001/8–3052) On Sept. 2 Lyon in Berlin stated that the recent events in the Soviet Zone of Germany thoroughly supported Kennan’s analysis. He then submitted an analysis based strictly on developments in the Soviet Zone. (Telegram 375, 662.001/9–252)