662A.00/8–2752
No. 127
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Special Assistant to the Director of the Bureau of German
Affairs (Laukhuff)
Subject: Analysis of Soviet Note of August 23 re Germany.
- Participants: M. Gontran deJuniac, Counselor, French Embassy
- Perry Laukhuff—GER
M. deJuniac called on me at his request in order to convey the information just received by the French Embassy on the preliminary analysis given to the Soviet note of August 231 by the French Foreign Office. He gave me the incoming telegram to read and pointed out that as it was signed by Maurice Schumann it represented not only the views of the “services” but had the approval of the Minister.
The French analysis was in most respects similar to that already made on a preliminary basis in the Department and I commented on it in these terms to deJuniac.2 The conclusions drawn by the French Foreign Office were also not substantially different from our own. There was not the slightest hint in the French telegram of any suggestion that we should agree to a meeting on the Soviet terms, a suggestion which had apparently been thrown out by La Tournelle in a conversation with our Embassy in Paris (Paris tel 1197, Aug. 253).
The chief points made by the French Embassy telegram were the following:
- (1)
- The Soviet note obviously seeks in the first instance to play upon the open and latent opposition in the Federal Republic to certain aspects of the contractual agreements and the European Defense Community Treaty.
- (2)
- The Soviet note, while maintaining that Germany cannot be permitted to participate in “aggressive” organizations such as the EDC and the North Atlantic bloc, conveys the impression that the Soviets would be perfectly agreeable to German participation in most other international activities, perhaps even including the Council of Europe and the Coal and Steel Community. The French [Page 301] recall, however, that Pravda recently described the Coal and steel Community as “aggressive.”
- (3)
- The Soviet note seeks to flatter the Germans by proposing that the investigating commission be composed of East and West Germans, and by suggesting participation by East and West Germans in the four-power meeting.
- (4)
- The position established in this note appears to be a withdrawal from the earlier Soviet position. In the second and third Soviet notes, the impression was given that the Soviets were ready to meet with us on the election issue. It is now clear that they have gone back from this readiness and seek to protect themselves against fruitful discussion of this issue by first interposing endless discussion on a peace treaty and other generalities. The French conclude that the Russians felt that the Western powers were becoming really serious about holding free elections, whereas the Soviets on the contrary wish to concentrate on a complete integration of Eastern Germany into the satellite system.
- (5)
- the conclusion reached by the French Foreign Office appears to be that we should not place ourselves in the position of answering the Soviet proposal with an outright “no” but that we should keep the exchange going and should hammer away at the logic of our position that the discussion of a commission and of elections is the first step. Discussion of these points with deJuniac elicited his personal agreement with the idea that we should simply renew our former proposal in some form which would be in fact a rejection of the Soviet proposal but would keep the discussions going on a note-writing basis until after ratifications are out of the way.
- Document 125.↩
- For the U.S. preliminary views, see telegram 1078, supra.↩
- Telegram 1197 transmitted La Tournelle’s personal views on the reply to the Soviet note. His conclusions were (a) Soviets had abandoned hope of influencing Western Europe against German integration and were now concentrating on German opinion, (b) the note appeared to be a sign-off, and (c) it might nevertheless be well to agree to a meeting despite the obvious futility. (662A.00/8–2552)↩