Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

662.001/6–1052: Telegram

No. 110
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

secret

Washington, June 10, 1952—7:05 p.m.

6522. Personal from Sec to Ambs Gifford and Dunn. I wish you wld see Mr. Eden and Mr. Schuman and convey my views in regard to the proposals which have just been made concerning the reply to the last Sov note.

I have been frankly astonished to receive word that Mr. Schuman and Mr. Eden are now proposing that we shld reverse the line upon which we reached agreement in our conversations in Paris 2 weeks ago and that we shld now propose an immediate mtg with the Sovs. We discussed this question fully at Paris among ourselves and we reached a decision which still seems to me to be the right decision. We had decided to go ahead and press in every way to secure the NEC ratifications so that the Conventions with Ger and EDC Treaty cld be put into effect at the earliest possible moment. If we maintain the momentum which we have already established, I am sure that we will be able to carry through with this plan. In the series of notes which we exchanged with the Sovs, we had as Mr. Eden said to me in Paris “won the battle of the notes”. In our last note we put up to them certain definite proposals to which we agreed the Sov reply was utterly unresponsive. We agreed therefore that in our next note we shld point out these facts but also indicate that the proposals already made are still open. If we shld now reverse our direction and propose an immediate mtg particularly in such broad terms as have been suggested, we wld be in effect denying the soundness of the position taken in our previous notes. It wld seem in many quarters that we had abandoned a firm position which had been generally accepted in the public opinion of Ger, Fr, Great Britain and US. The effect of such a proposal upon the Senate here wld, I think, be very serious. We opened our hearings before the Senate Committee this morning, and we have every reason to believe that if we pursue our present line we can secure ratification promptly.² If we give the appearance of changing our whole plan of campaign, it will be hard to convince the Senate that they shld continue to give priority to this matter. As already explained in Deptel 7259 to Paris rptd 6486 to London, 3575 to Bonn and 854 to Moscow,³ it is also our judgment that such a proposal might well have disastrous effect upon Adenauer’s effort to secure prompt ratification in Ger, and you shld restate arguments in third para reftel personally to FonMin.

I think you shld also make it clear to Mr. Eden that I am baffled that this sudden reversal of UK position on matter of major significance has occurred without a word of explanation to me. It may be that Mr. Schuman’s explanation as reported in Paris 7650 rptd to London 2116, Bonn 947, Moscow 275⁴ was intended by him to be an explanation of his point of view, but I did not find there any reference to any fact which was different from those which we considered when our previous agreement was reached.

Remind Eden that he and I had long discussion this subject Paris May 26.⁵ It was Eden who said we shld make clear in reply that there wld be no mtg with Sovs until they had answered questions in our last note. He further said Western public opinion had been entirely won over and I agreed. At Tri mtg May 28⁶ Eden stated that reply shld state the West regretted the Russians had refused their offer but that the offer remained open. He agreed with what I had said, namely if there were to be any talks they shld be low level but it was better to terminate the exchange. The 3 Mins agreed the reply shld take this line, Mr. Schuman adding reply shld not give impression withdrawing earlier proposals.

I wish to urge with all of the earnestness which I can express that we shld go ahead along the lines of the agreement which we reached in our Paris conversations and that we shld not show any sign of wavering.⁷

Acheson

1. Drafted and initialed for Secretary Acheson by Jessup and cleared with Laukhuff, Riddleberger, Perkins, Barbour, Bohlen, Matthews, Nitze, Bruce, and Secretary Acheson. Also sent to Paris and repeated to Bonn and Moscow.
2. Senate hearings on the contractual agreements began on June 10. On July 1 the Senate voted ratification, 77 to 5.
3. The arguments in paragraph 3 of this message stated that the French proposal would represent a weakening of the Western position, that it would confuse and weaken German opinion, that the Soviet Union would consider it as an indication of weakness, and finally that it would detract from the strength of the Western position which had been to concentrate on the single clear issue of popular elections. (740.5/6–752)
4. See footnote 2, Document 108.
5. Regarding this meeting, see footnote 3, Document 105.
6. For a report on this meeting, see Document 105.

7. On June 11 Dunn reported that he had just seen Schuman and had “put to him strongly” the points outlined in this telegram. Schuman reiterated his belief that the French proposal would indicate the true Soviet position on German unification better than a continued exchange of notes. Dunn summarized Schuman’s position as follows:

   “I must advise you that Schuman holds very firmly to his position, that he frankly bases it on French state of mind and that Eden’s agreement with him naturally strengthens his insistence upon it.” (Telegram 7744, 662A.00/6–1152)