Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

711.56352/11–452: Telegram

No. 874
The Ambassador in Spain (MacVeagh) to the Department of State¹

secret

Madrid, November 4, 1952—4 p.m.

362. USNEG—Noforn. As FonMin advised in his ltr of Oct 31, enclosing Span memo (Embtel 360 Nov 4 to Dept rptd London 49, Paris 68, Rome 27²), Arburua and Arguelles met with Train, and Vigon met with Kissner Nov 3. Fol comments by section on Span memo, therefore, based also on these discussions:

I. As indicated in Embtel 352³ rptd Paris 66, principles expressed in personal ltr of Oct 7 to FonMin and statement of intent in our memo of Oct 6⁴ have apparently had considerable influence on attitude of Span auths toward these negots. Despite some vaguenesses in their memo re base agrmt, and their expressed desire to proceed to signing of aid agrmts without waiting for accord on base agrmt, reasonable tone their memo, willingness accept limitations on aid we may be able provide, and expectation satisfactory base agrmt can be reached all provide, evidence to this effect.

II–VI. Same gen comment applies to discussion in these sections of reasons for our aiding Spain, which on many points appears show influence our arguments while revealing continued concern re Spain’s vulnerability to air attack and inadequacy, in Span view, of Def efforts of WE countries. Critical tone reference, we believe only to be expected from Span and can be ignored as irrelevant. If in some cases Span arguments appear envisage purposes other than our own, we anticipate discrepancies this regard can be resolved in detailed discussions now begun re aid agrmts.

Feel second para Section VI most important part of memo and also most obscure. However on basis of fol, we feel that difficulties apparently referred to can be solved and satisfactory base agrmt reached. Actually, during mtg with Kissner on Oct 24 (memo of mtg en route airpouch⁵) Vigon expressed confidence as last sentence this para does now that this problem of peacetime use of bases can be satisfactorily resolved. Later, on Oct 31, he called Kissner to his office and, in connection this subj, urged him to begin discussion tech details base agrmt with Air Min as soon as memo received. Still later, in discussion Nov 3, when Kissner asked whether Span memo intends to state or imply that in principle we have now been granted base rights in peacetime as well as wartime, he said yes, except for details re construction and personnel utilization, latter to be restricted to absolute minimum. Also at that time he stated further that these detailed tech arrangements can be worked out between Kissner and Air Min and that all three agrmts cld be signed simultaneously (see separate tel for full report this conversation⁶). In addition Train was likewise told Nov 3, in conversation with Arguelles and Arburua, that Span Govt is prepared sign base agrmt with US, and also that if this cld be agreed on without delay they cld see no reason why all three agrmts shld not be signed simultaneously, Arburua also expressing view that greatest Span concern re bases is still over method and extent of peacetime use (see separate tel for full report this conversation⁷).

VII. In accordance with our memo of Oct 6, both Kissner and Train have reiterated in their separate mtgs with Span, as I have done to FonMin, that suggestion econ and mil agrmts be signed before base agrmt does not conform with our requirements, and have urged that finalization not of two only, as suggested Span, but of all three be now vigorously and concomitantly sought. Since considerable work re programming must be done re aid agrmts before any funds can be obligated, whether or not these agrmts signed, they have pointed out, as I have done to FonMin, distinct possibility that work on all three agrmts can in fact be completed at about same time. In talk with Train Nov 3, Arburua indicated possible target date of Jan 1953 for actual initiation econ aid program is entirely agreeable.

Studies suggested second para this section being undertaken with Span.

VIII. Additional $75 million proposed for FY 1953 has not been mentioned by either Arguelles or Arburua and we feel it wld be best to ignore this apparently only exploratory suggestion, at least for the present. It is impossible to say whether or not Span will revert to it later, but we doubt whether they themselves consider it as either realistic or practical.

IX. We believe joint declaration wld be appropriate at time all three agrmts are signed.

Conclusion. In our opinion Span memo now opens way to full detailed discussions of all three agrmts and we intend to concentrate on their simultaneous completion. Detailed discussions have already been opened and we will report fully as they progress. In this connection we urge our ensuing comments and recommendations on any proposed changes in three agrmts be acted upon as expeditiously as possible by agencies concerned. Separate tels contain changes proposed by Span in draft MSA and MDAP agrmts handed Train and Kissner Nov 3. Kissner meets with Air Min Nov 5.⁸ Meanwhile we feel that, with this detached work in progress, Span memo requires no specific reply other than that I have sent to FonMin (see separate tel for text⁹) and that these exchanges of informal memoranda may now be terminated and our efforts shifted to the more fruitful discussions which Span themselves have invited. Shld it become clear, as matters develop, that accord on all three agrmts cannot in fact be reached so as to permit their being signed at same time, and thus Span proposal for separation become important issue, we believe we shld be prepared with alternative US position to avoid possible time-consuming impasse. In such an eventuality, we suggest we might inform Span that US prepared to sign covering draft basic Def agrmt and related tech agrmt (or if necessary only former), it being agreed at same time that technical schedules wld be completed soonest. We wld appreciate consideration of this alternative by agencies concerned and authority to use it if, in our judgment, it shld become necessary. In this connection, wld also appreciate earliest confirmation that covering draft Def agrmt still contains everything desired to be included in this document, which constitutes that part of total base agrmt which will ultimately be published and registered.

MacVeagh

1. Repeated to London, Paris, and Rome.
2. Supra.
3. Document 872.
4. Document 871 and its enclosure.
5. Despatch 358 from Madrid, Nov. 5; it contained an account of the fourteenth meeting between Kissner and Vigon. (711.56352/11–552)
6. Telegram 363 from Madrid, Nov. 4. (711.56352/11–452)
7. Telegram 364 from Madrid, Nov. 4. (711.56352/11–452)
8. A record of this meeting was transmitted in despatch 399 from Madrid, Nov. 14. (711.56352/11–452)
9. Telegram 365 from Madrid, Nov. 4; in it, MacVeagh expressed satisfaction at the prospect of embarking on detailed negotiations for the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement and the Economic Aid Agreement, but rejected the proposal that they be signed before accord had been reached on all aspects of the base agreement. (711.56352/11–452)