Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

711.56352/10–3052: Telegram

No. 872
The Ambassador in Spain (MacVeagh) to the Department of State¹

secret
niact

Madrid, October 30, 1952—6 p.m.

352. USNEG—Noforn. Fol is urgently submitted in connection with provision of aid figure for Spain in FY 1954 for aid budget. Understand this budget now coming up for immediate consideration and believe inclusion reasonable figure for Spain essential.

No official Spanish reply our memo of Oct 6² yet received, but this expected within few days and meanwhile informal conversations³ on high level indicate (1) that Spanish authorities are well pleased with our statements of intent as therein conveyed and (2) that in view our willingness regard Spain eligible in principle for US assistance over period of years on equal basis with other nations, they will not wish show themselves unreasonable as regards conceding base rights in principle or accepting amounts and types of specific aid we may be able furnish. In latter connection, all indications presently point to thorough Spanish understanding our limitations pointed out our memo, and also to falsity of view that they anxious extract highest “prices” possible from US regardless our situation. Believe therefore figures of military requirements⁴ presented Kissner during recent months shld now definitely be considered represent only optimum Spanish desires not “demands” and that next moves shld be communication our part of total assistance figure, at least through FY 1954, which we feel possible to aim at, within present and foreseeable limitation, thus providing basis for practical discussion and possible breakdown into specific programs. Moreover, figure this connection should not represent simply what we guess Spanish might “settle for” but genuinely our own best estimate of what our situation will allow us target. It can not be too strongly emphasized that purpose these negots is not seen here as making a deal but as initiating a cooperative defense enterprise, and our best chance of concluding them successfully is to keep this in mind and act accordingly.

Hence not haggling over “prices,” but convincing Spaniards that we seriously intend and are actually planning do all we can to render joint enterprise viable is line we shld fol now that their fundamental anxiety re equality of treatment in principle has been satisfied. Furthermore, from present indications, we believe success this connection not impossible, provided magnitude target figure fully represents seriousness with which regard enterprise as well as all factors, both actual and foreseeable, which must limit our participation in it. With Spaniards satisfied on this point, there wld then remain only details to discuss, and while we have been given to believe that, on the military side, some difficulties of an operational nature may arise, as for instance in connection with extent and frequency of US rotational unit training on Spanish territory in peacetime, we feel that these shld not prove incapable of solution given goodwill already established on both sides.

It is principally in connection with above picture that we feel failure to provide favor reasonable aid to Spain in the FY 1954 foreign aid budget at present under consideration might prove disastrous. It wld in fact constitute an overt action running directly contrary to the assurances we have been giving of our intentions and cause grave doubt there, if not suspicion, as to their validity. To try to convince Spaniards that we mean what we say about helping them if they sign our proposed agreements, while at the same time we conspicuously make no advance provision for doing so, may well prove impossible, and as stated above, it is very largely on their conviction of our seriousness that our chances of success in these negots from now on rest. At same time, it will readily be seen what unhappy consequences might ensue for ourselves, even perhaps to extent of wrecking a project the success of which we desire, shld the agreements be signed and no financial provision exist for our carrying out our share of its terms in approaching year.

What shld be the precise amount of such provision is of course another question and one on which we can only make recommendations based on the most recent calculations here and on our present understanding of the purposes to be served, which are both subject to change and correction in Washington. However, under the pressure of time, we wld submit fol in an effort to be helpful, insisting only on our belief that the total shld be sufficient to show we regard giving aid to Spain in a serious light. As to military assistance, basing ourselves on Kissner’s recommendations as presently revised, we believe not less than $80 million in new funds wld be appropriate. It goes without saying that if for any reason some portion of this sum should not be needed in Spain when the time comes, it cld be expended elsewhere, while shld it in fact be needed here and not have been specifically marked for Spain, it might be difficult or impossible to raise from other funds. In addition, on the economic side, basing ourselves on Train’s present recommendations, we believe not less than 57 million in new funds wld be appropriate. Consequently our joint recommendation is for a total of $137 million in new funds to be provided for aid to Spain in the foreign aid budget for FY 1954. Detailed justification fols in separate message.⁵

MacVeagh

1. Repeated to Paris for Porter.
2. For the text of the memorandum under reference, see the enclosure to MacVeagh’s letter, supra.
3. Kissner and Vigon met on Oct. 24 to discuss the U.S. memorandum of Oct. 6. A record of this conversation was transmitted in despatch 358 from Madrid, Nov. 5. (711.56352/11–552)
4. Reference is to the material which Kissner analyzed and submitted to the JCS on Aug. 20; for a summary, see Document 868.
5. Reference is to telegram 354 from Madrid, Oct. 31. (711.56352/10–3152) The recommendation of the Embassy to include in the fiscal year 1954 budget $80 million for military aid and $57 million for economic aid was taken into consideration, along with papers from the Departments of State and Defense and from the MSA, by the MAAC Subcommittee on Assistance to Spain (consisting of Arth of DMS, Millar and Tesoro of State, DePaul and Gulick of MSA, Silver of Defense, and Weiss of the Bureau of the Budget) in early November 1952. On Nov. 7, the subcommittee circulated a paper which provided that $24 million should be sought for economic aid and $50 to $80 million (the lower figure was the Department of State recommendation) for military aid, for a total of from $74 to $104 million. In addition to that sum, $40 million was to be sought for the dollar costs of base construction. This highly technical document was designated MAAC D–3/5. It constituted a revision of DMS D–7 and was used as the Administration’s basis for budget requests for Spain in December 1952. (Spanish Desk files, lot 58 D 344, “Negotiations—U.S.–Spain, Oct.–Dec. 1952”)