Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

752.5 MAP/9–552

No. 868
Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)¹

secret

[Washington,] September 5, 1952.

• Subject: Spain: Report from General Kissner and Probable JCS Review of US Military Policy toward Spain.

1. General Kissner, Chief, JUSMG (Spain), has forwarded a letter to the Chief of Staff, Air Force, enclosing Spanish lists of military requirements, together with JUSMG comments and recommendations.² A summary of the report is attached,³ together with comments from the working level at Defense. The following is a summary of the JUSMG cost estimates of the Spanish requirements and the estimated cost of the military assistance recommended by the JUSMG.

	Spanish Requirements	JUSMG Recommendation
Army	$348,631,000.00	$213,763,000.00
Navy	302,000,000.00	100,000,000.00
Air Force	709,979,952.00	126,991,692.00
Total	$1,360,610,952.00	$440,754,692.00

2. General Kissner stated that he had the impression that the Spaniards would “probably agree to conclude a Base Agreement satisfactory to us if assured of a military equipment program considerably less than the money value of the items they have listed as “indispensable” for the defense of their territory.” He suggested that the Air Force review the JUSMG analyses and consider recommending to the JCS that:

(a) Certain tasks and obligations in Western defense be planned for Spain; and

(b) As a result thereof, that a plan be evolved, to provide over a period of four or five years, the reasonable amount of equipment for each Spanish service which JUSMG was recommending.

Although not explicitly stated in recommendation (a), the question of seeking a Spanish commitment to assume a specific task in Western defense was raised by the Chief of the Army Section, JUSMG, and thus by implication may be raised by recommendation (a).

As an example of a specific task for the Spanish Army, General Kissner mentioned the use of one or two Spanish corps outside the Peninsula in the event of hostilities. In this connection also, he stated that General Vigon had indicated that the Spanish troops stationed at the ends of the Pyrenees might well be projected north to interdict enemy columns.

3. According to the working level at Defense, a paper⁴ is being cleared through Air Force transmitting the Kissner report, without comment, to the Joint Staff of the JCS for comment and recommendations on the two suggestions made by General Kissner. At 3:00 p.m., September 3, this transmittal paper had been sent for clearance to General White, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. If he clears the transmittal paper, the report might go directly to the Joint Staff. Possibly he might send the paper and the attached report to Chief of Staff, Air Force, for clearance. We expect to learn informally what action General White takes, and if the report reaches the Joint Staff, to which Committee it is assigned. The Joint Staff already has copies of the report on an informal basis. The working level at Defense estimates very roughly that three to six weeks will elapse before the JCS will take action.⁵

4. It is apparent that this report raises some important questions related to US plans, US military requirements in Spain, availability and allocation of military end-items, US relations with NATO countries, and the development of Spanish armed forces and their eventual relationship to NATO. If the Department of Defense decides that the base facilities presently sought in Spain are still required; if it appears that a military aid program along the lines of the one that has been recommended is practical and desirable both militarily and politically; and if it appears that it would get us the desired facilities on substantially the desired terms, I believe that we should approach the Spaniards on this basis. If we proceed accordingly and if we are successful in obtaining the desired Base Agreement, such improvement in the Spanish armed forces as would result from our military assistance would be an anchor to windward.

5. It is recommended that:

(a) You make it known to the JCS or the Director of the Joint Staff that the Department is prepared to advise and consult during the Defense study of the Kissner report. (The working level of the Department consulted with Admiral Campbell of the Joint Logistic Plans Committee on previous aspects of our policy towards Spain.)

(b) You make known to the JCS that the Department does not believe the US is in a position at this time to seek a commitment from Spain regarding a military assignment outside Spanish territory.

(c) You suggest to the JCS that in connection with consideration of the Kissner report it would appear desirable to review the US requirement for base facilities in Spain, in view of developments in the Spanish negotiations and in view of the progress in our European and African base build-up.

1. Drafted by Millar.
2. None found in Department of State files; the Kissner letter was dated Aug. 20.
3. Not printed; it was a technical breakdown of the requirements listed below.
4. Not found in Department of State files.
5. According to a letter from Lovett to Acheson, Dec. 8, the JCS did not take action until 3 months had elapsed; see Document 875.