711.56352/8–2152
No. 867
Memorandum by the Chief of the Mutual
Security Agency Economic Group in Spain (Train) to the
Deputy Director of the Mutual Security Agency (Kenney)1
Subj:
- Review of Spanish Negotiations—July 1951 to date.
[Here follow eight pages dealing with the background and progress of the Spanish negotiations.]
General Comments
I believe that the negotiations to date indicate clearly that high level consideration in Washington should again be focussed on what the objectives of our national policy towards Spain should be as well as the methods for implementing such policy. I believe that any government asked to cede base rights to a foreign power could have been expected to insist on a “quid pro quo” which, in its opinion, represented a reasonable evaluation of the privileges requested as well as to ask that it be treated on a basis of equality with other nations with which the U.S. has similar arrangements. Congress happened to vote $125 million for military and economic aid so this sum then became our offering price for the right to construct bases on Spanish territory. The amount might well have been lower or higher and it would still have borne no relation to what might be reasonable from the Spanish viewpoint. The point has frequently been made that the bases themselves would be an asset to Spain. This loses sight of the fact that, if hostilities ever start, these bases will be used by the U.S. Strategic Air Force for offensive operations against an enemy. The Spanish can never hope to have heavy bombers and thus would never require the type of installation necessary to service and support them. Thus far it would appear that our current thinking finds no place for the Spanish military potential in relation to the security of the U.S. or the defense of Western Europe. It seems to me to give more weight to the opposition of some of our NATO partners than it does to an evaluation of the positive contribution Spain could make to our foreign policy objectives. Thus, the Spanish contribution is limited to providing a good location for air bases and fails to take into account Spanish national pride and legitimate desires to make positive contribution to Western European defense. Franco has given definite indications that, while he appreciates that Spain cannot now expect to be accepted [Page 1879] in NATO, he fully realizes that Spain must be associated with NATO when the time arrives—probably under the stress of war—that Spanish membership in NATO will be welcomed. In any event, the strictly limited approach we have attempted is clearly unacceptable to the Spanish Government and I believe that it would prove to be equally unacceptable to the Spanish people.
- Kenney arrived in Madrid on Aug. 14.↩